Richard Barnes has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-04: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- It might be useful to note that SSL stripping is a flavor of downgrade attack. Likewise, it could be worth noting in this section or Section 2.2 that STARTTLS is very vulnerable to downgrade without some sort of HSTS-like mechanism. For example, there's some recent evidence of downgrade attacks on mail protocols. Downgrade in general could use more attention. The IETF can fix things in newer versions of the protocol, but if the client and server can't negotiate that version, it's all for naught. https://www.techdirt.com/blog/netneutrality/articles/20141012/06344928801/revealed-isps-already-violating-net-neutrality-to-block-encryption-make-everyone-less-safe-online.shtml Given the news about POODLE this week, I would suggest changing Section 2.4 to be "Padding Oracle Attacks", and adding POODLE there. I'm surprised not to see some mention of Heartbleed in Section 2.13. _______________________________________________ Uta mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta
