Jon,

On 12/13/21 11:51, jonmcalexan...@wellsfargo.com.INVALID wrote:
So, based on these entries on the log4j apache pages, I can't see
that any 1x product is vulnerable. Mark, is there some message from
Apache that we can share with those that need to know that for
certain 1x log4j is NOT vulnerable?
This is not something the Tomcat team (or Mark, individually) can really do for you.

You should check for information from the log4j team.

Unofficially, log4j 1.x does not seem to be affected. There were some questions about configuring it for use with a JMS appender, but it seems those issues would be limited to having a compromised JMS server or an injection into JNDI from another (unrelated) exploit.

-chris




News
CVE-2021-44228

The Log4j team has been made aware of a security vulnerability, CVE-2021-44228, 
that has been addressed in Log4j 2.15.0.

Log4j's JNDI support has not restricted what names could be resolved. Some 
protocols are unsafe or can allow remote code execution. Log4j now limits the 
protocols by default to only java, ldap, and ldaps and limits the ldap 
protocols to only accessing Java primitive objects by default served on the 
local host.

One vector that allowed exposure to this vulnerability was Log4j's allowance of 
Lookups to appear in log messages. As of Log4j 2.15.0 this feature is now 
disabled by default. While an option has been provided to enable Lookups in 
this fashion, users are strongly discouraged from enabling it.

For those who cannot upgrade to 2.15.0, in releases >=2.10, this behavior can be mitigated 
by setting either the system property log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups or the environment variable 
LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS to true. For releases >=2.7 and <=2.14.1, all PatternLayout 
patterns can be modified to specify the message converter as %m{nolookups} instead of just %m. 
For releases >=2.0-beta9 and <=2.10.0, the mitigation is to remove the JndiLookup class 
from the classpath: zip -q -d log4j-core-*.jar 
org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class.


Fixed in Log4j 2.15.0

CVE-2021-44228<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44228>: 
Apache Log4j2 JNDI features do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other 
JNDI related endpoints.

Severity: Critical

Base CVSS Score: 10.0 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Versions Affected: all log4j-core versions >=2.0-beta9 and <=2.14.1

Descripton: Apache Log4j <=2.14.1 JNDI features used in configuration, log 
messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other 
JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message 
parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup 
substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by 
default.

Mitigation: In releases >=2.10, this behavior can be mitigated by setting either the system 
property log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups or the environment variable LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS to 
true. For releases >=2.7 and <=2.14.1, all PatternLayout patterns can be modified to 
specify the message converter as %m{nolookups} instead of just %m. For releases >=2.0-beta9 
and <=2.10.0, the mitigation is to remove the JndiLookup class from the classpath: zip -q 
-d log4j-core-*.jar org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class.

Credit: This issue was discovered by Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba Cloud Security 
Team.

References: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-3201 and 
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-3198

Thanks,

Dream * Excel * Explore * Inspire
Jon McAlexander
Infrastructure Engineer
Asst Vice President

Middleware Product Engineering
Enterprise CIO | EAS | Middleware | Infrastructure Solutions

8080 Cobblestone Rd | Urbandale, IA 50322
MAC: F4469-010
Tel 515-988-2508 | Cell 515-988-2508

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