On 9/10/2014 11:10 AM, Jeffrey Janner wrote:
-----Original Message----- From: Mark Thomas [mailto:ma...@apache.org] Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2014 9:00 AM To: Tomcat Users List Cc: Tomcat Developers List; annou...@apache.org; annou...@tomcat.apache.org; fulldisclos...@seclists.org; bugt...@securityfocus.com Subject: [SECURITY] CVE-2013-4444 Remote Code Execution in Apache Tomcat-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 CVE-2013-4444 Remote Code Execution Severity: Important Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation Versions Affected: - - Apache Tomcat 7.0.0 to 7.0.39 Description: In very limited circumstances, it was possible for an attacker to upload a malicious JSP to a Tomcat server and then trigger the execution of that JSP. While Remote Code Execution would normally be viewed as a critical vulnerability, the circumstances under which this is possible are, in the view of the Tomcat security team, sufficiently limited that this vulnerability is viewed as important. For this attack to succeed all of the following requirements must be met: a) Using Oracle Java 1.7.0 update 25 or earlier (or any other Java implementation where java.io.File is vulnerable to null byte injection). b) A web application must be deployed to a vulnerable version of Tomcat (see previous section). c) The web application must use the Servlet 3.0 File Upload feature. d) A file location within a deployed web application must be writeable by the user the Tomcat process is running as. The Tomcat security documentation recommends against this.How does one avoid this if deploying war files? By definition, doesn't the exploded directory need to be writable by the Tomcat process? The only way I can think of is to not explode the war file, but that is a performance hit.e) A custom listener for JMX connections (e.g. the JmxRemoteListener that is not enabled by default) must be configured and be able to load classes from Tomcat's common class loader (i.e. the custom JMX listener must be placed in Tomcat's lib directory) f) The custom JMX listener must be bound to an address other than localhost for a remote attack (it is bound to localhost by default). If the custom JMX listener is bound to localhost, a local attack will still be possible.Are these two an AND case?
That's what he said: "For this attack to succeed all of the following requirements must be met:"
If using the JmxRemoteListener, wouldn't one normally deploy it in Tomcat/lib? Finally, if you've taken care of a) & b), is this sufficient to mitigate the problem, even if any/all of c) thru g) apply?Note that requirements b) and c) may be replaced with the following requirement: g) A web application is deployed that uses Apache Commons File Upload 1.2.1 or earlier. In this case a similar vulnerability may exist on any Servlet container, not just Apache Tomcat. Mitigation: This vulnerability may be mitigated by using any one of the following mitigations: - - Upgrade to Oracle Java 1.7.0 update 40 or later (or any other Java implementation where java.io.File is not vulnerable to null byte injection). - - Use OS file permissions to prevent the process Tomcat is running as from writing to any location within a deployed application. - - Disable any custom JMX listeners - - Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 7.0.40 or later Credit: This issue was identified by Pierre Ernst of the VMware Security Engineering, Communications & Response group (vSECR) and reported to the Tomcat security team via the Pivotal security team. References: [1] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-7.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.22 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJUEFl4AAoJEBDAHFovYFnnR3cQAL034ZrbUeBcJ4zotNp5+ea 2 llNatC3MUlg/vZ2qG8Qo4xxbdS4F53cpu90fFhKm+dFzIiRhZeHROYDv6Lu1biSu Nvq0YXV6KVJ9Js4G6HFilhy3vownvn/hMAjzmPojSYjWO5slXNfFvAlwyRrGt0C p t5rUh4QNavhgO4m0HXJJLg+PNlSKsnGdra+0gWmq8YKtKotgu24SbPq/p3HP7T uJ nnMjx4A6r2LcoghL/nFAPp2ZwgBCtm67osObJ1uMxYhZ2I/3MztFYpSKvfVONu UK rL265wmrKLvvDdozd/Aw2d2poXdSO/oWeuhKbbzYOxpUT6iRzf+BkPUR99e6R qso lOfLoAYuzYfK4rW/ooxVNKnHMhs+0BVfNZoclKCDSvz+a9dIVS5XD6KcyJQ3uv1 2 ujyTGaGhLuS/ciAVS372Dx8H0/mfd5nZCkYL6NDyzSWSmb5eG4XxqrLi77yByvA T ulSAyg1UWk8sRgQ4AY3belH3jDiN1rHSWJAaB+WVwszQdCe4iXgDyB1u4ES22 oAN Ymrg5l7tLQ8/9LyMvlQ0tE4f+OYE6kki6e4JMc2cMqPL/rcjiUnLWZ7YUyx92RM1 LRt9QhMd1h3Uwle7a7LxqJCGf/rIPwRmrjTYYWt43np1Adx7y2RuZOTDjEY98sN 3 oCLjuSCalVcBX9hGaJ7n =98BB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscr...@tomcat.apache.org For additional commands, e-mail: users-h...@tomcat.apache.org--------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscr...@tomcat.apache.org For additional commands, e-mail: users-h...@tomcat.apache.org
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