Re: SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_NONE

[Reindl Harald]

Am 06.01.2015 um 01:32 schrieb RW:

On Tue, 06 Jan 2015 00:46:18 +0100
Reindl Harald wrote:

Am 06.01.2015 um 00:06 schrieb RW:

On Mon, 05 Jan 2015 22:58:55 +0100
Reindl Harald wrote:

Am 05.01.2015 um 22:54 schrieb Benny Pedersen:

Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05 18:52:

how can "SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_NONE" fire both?

the above is 2 diff tests

i know that by myself *but* if the sending domain does not publish
any SPF policy then there should be no positive score for
"SPF_HELO_PASS"

It doesn't have a positive score:

score SPF_HELO_PASS -0.001

that is a positive score in context of "less spam probability" just
because somebody sends a HELO command - frankly all day long zombies
send HELO commands of known domains up to fake PTR's  if the
envelope domain don't push a SPF policy *only* NO_SPF should hit

As I pointed-out the -0.001 is a nominal score assigned to
informational rules

yes and no, having 10 wrong informational hits and you are at -0.01 and may make the difference between tag-level or not

The point of helo tests is when they fail. If a
compromised host is telling you it's not permitted to send email then
what does it matter if the (probably spoofed) envelope domain doesn't
have an SPF policy

it's a matter of technical correctness
no SPF on the envelope domain, no SPF

* OK:    SPF_PASS
* OK:    SPF_PASS,SPF_HELO_PASS
* OK:    SPF_NONE
* WRONG: SPF_NONE,SPF_HELO_PASS

one can argue about the severity but the correctness is out of question

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