On Tue, 23 Feb 2021 13:41:58 -0800 (PST)
John Hardin wrote:

> On Tue, 23 Feb 2021, Dan Malm wrote:
> 
> > On 2021-02-23 16:29, John Hardin wrote:  
> >> On Tue, 23 Feb 2021, Dan Malm wrote:

> >>> Received: from onecom-webmail1 (service.pub.appspod1-cph3.one.com
> >>> [ ])
> >>>     by mailrelay3 (Halon) with 
> >>>     id 89da92dc-72a5-11eb-bf40-fd1a731c465d;
> >>>     Fri, 19 Feb 2021 11:28:08 +0000 (UTC)
> >>> X-Originating-IP: 46.30.211.29


> > And "X-Originating-IP: 46.30.211.29" is the IP the webserver
> > handling the webmail saw for this mail, i.e. the user IP, which for
> > normal users will often be in PBL. It's also the IP that triggers
> > the hit on RDNS_NONE  
> 
> Which it should not, as it's not the "last external" IP address.
> That's why I asked for the headers - it seems from this (absent any
> actual testing) that SA isn't keeping the received-equivalent headers
> in the correct order with the genuine received headers.

I've explained this in a recent post in this thread.  Without the SMTPA
you would have


  X-Spam-Relays-External: [ ip=46.30.211.130 ...][ ip=46.30.211.29 ...] 

With authentication (SMTPA) the networks move down one and you get 

  X-Spam-Relays-Internal: [ ip=46.30.211.130 ...]
  X-Spam-Relays-External: [ ip=46.30.211.29 ...]

In most cases doing this leave X-Spam-Relays-External empty and it
prevents running LE tests on mail submission, but it takes no account of
sections added for Originating-IP or upstream Received headers. 

This behaviour is actually abusable as a forged header can be used
trigger various whitelisting rules, see  Bug 7590.

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