On 09:04 Tue 12 May , a...@keemail.me wrote:
> Hello!I'm interested in the security audit performed by Solar Designer in
> 2005, which is mentioned in the "Security" section of the openvz website.
> Is there a reason why it's still not publicly available?
> greetings apoc
Alexander found a report which was done for OpenVZ in 2005.
I have attached it.
> _______________________________________________
> Users mailing list
> Users@openvz.org
> https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/users
>From so...@openwall.com Thu Dec 1 03:53:19 2005
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2005 03:53:19 +0300
From: Solar Designer <so...@openwall.com>
To: secur...@openvz.org
Subject: report for OpenVZ security audit phase 1
Message-ID: <20051201005319.ga19...@openwall.com>
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Kirill et al.,
The report is attached as a text/plain file (such that you can easily
comment on it in a follow-up e-mail if needed) and also as a part of the
bigger tarball (which includes other relevant files as well).
Thanks,
--
Alexander
--PEIAKu/WMn1b1Hv9
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OpenVZ security audit, phase 1, Sep 15 through Nov 30, 2005.
High-level subsystems/features covered in the audit.
The following components were included in the audit:
1. The kernel:
OpenVZ kernel patch (initially patch-022stab034-core, later
patch-022stab038-core, patch-022stab045-combined, and finally
patch-022stab050-combined). Most of the analysis was performed on
patch-022stab038-core.
The entire OpenVZ kernel (that is, Linux 2.6.8 with the OpenVZ patch
applied). Only a small portion of the kernel sources was actually
reviewed and/or stress-tested. This includes code paths specifically
affected by changes made in OpenVZ as well as kernel subsystems and
their properties that are especially important for correct analysis of
OpenVZ-introduced code and changes.
Priority was given to features enabled with the default OpenVZ kernel
configurations.
The kernel was _not_ checked for any non-OVZ-specific vulnerabilities
that are fixed upstream.
2. vzctl (initially vzctl-2.7.0-21, later vzctl-2.7.0-24).
3. vzpkg (vzpkg-2.7.0-17) and vzrpm (vzrpm44-4.4.1-22.5).
4. vzquota (vzquota-2.7.0-7).
Only partial reviews of vz* utilities were performed, please see below.
Portions of code and vulnerability classes that have been covered.
The following portions of code have been reviewed and/or tested and the
vulnerability classes checked for, arranged by OpenVZ component:
1. The kernel:
1.1. The entire OpenVZ kernel source tree has been checked for:
1.1.1. Actions allowed specifically with any one of a process' UIDs
(uid, euid, fsuid) being zero. This is likely Linux pre-2.2 heritage
which is not valid under the capability model and would potentially
result in very practical vulnerabilities with the OpenVZ security model.
Automated checking was used initially ("grep" with many regular
expressions aimed to catch most common ways to check UIDs against zero),
followed by manual review of pieces of code containing the lines with
matches.
A handful of problematic UID checks like this was actually identified
(added to "checklist" and commented on in "remarks-038-10"). These are
located in facilities that are unlikely to be compiled into OpenVZ
kernels or are otherwise not particularly relevant to OpenVZ. They need
to be reported upstream.
The LSMs located under security/, except for security/commoncap.c, have
been specifically excluded from the audit. Some are known to ruin the
OpenVZ security model. The recommendation is to document this.
1.1.2. Actions allowed specifically with capabilities included in
vzctl's CAPDEFAULTMASK.
A number of problems were discovered, including upstream bugs with and
without OVZ specifics, actions which shouldn't have been allowed for
VPSes or which need virtualization, and possibilities for uncontrolled
consumption of kernel resources. All of these have been appropriately
marked in the "checklist" and some also in "remarks-038-10".
CAP_NET_RAW involved a significant amount of testing for other VPSes'
network traffic sniffing with different socket types and for raw packet
injections with spoofed source addresses. It passed the tests.
Only a small number of instances of capability checks haven't been
reviewed for real (but have been added to the "checklist"). These have
been determined to not be particularly relevant and/or to be relatively
hard (time-consuming) to review and validate.
1.2. Code paths related to dropping of CAP_SETVEID on VPS creation and
entry. Passed review and testing.
1.3. Definition and uses of cap_set_full(). Uses of CAP_FULL_SET and
CAP_INIT_EFF_SET. Passed review.
1.4. Potential missing restrictions for VPS root vs. host root (lack of
virtualization) and unsafe code in:
1.4.1. Syscalls available to VPS root but not to users, as identified by
"sysfuzzer" (23 syscalls). One OVZ vulnerability and one
non-OVZ-specific upstream problem were identified.
1.4.2. Syscalls which were explicitly excluded from "sysfuzzer" (reboot,
vhangup). Passed review.
1.4.3. Syscalls which might also be available to VPS root but not to
users, but which could have been missed by "sysfuzzer". The entire list
of syscalls supported on i386 was reviewed manually and potentially
relevant ones (53 syscalls) were selected for review and/or testing. A
couple of problems were identified.
The problems identified with syscall reviews matched those identified
with the review on capabilities described above.
Complete lists of syscalls checked (reviewed and/or tested) along with
the status for each are included in the "checklist".
1.4.4. ioctls available to VPS root but not to users. All devices major
and minor numbers (for majors up to 1023) for both character and block
devices were brute-forced and open()able ones listed. No unexpected or
unintended ones were identified. A bug allowing for VPS root initiated
node crashes was triggered (and has been fixed before revision 050).
Non-OVZ-specific issues with /dev/*random were raised on the mailing
list.
1.4.5. sysctls. Passed testing for proper virtualization.
1.5. All of the OVZ-introduced code has been checked for certain generic
vulnerability classes, as described below. However, it has not been
manually reviewed in its entirety.
1.5.1. Uses of __{get,put}_user() and __copy_{to,from}_user() where
"non-underscored" versions of these macros/functions are required. No
erroneous uses found.
1.5.2. All identified syscall wrappers were checked for possible race
conditions which could result from copying of arguments passed by
reference from the user-space twice. No such race conditions were
found. The list of functions identified and checked is available in the
"checklist".
However, other race conditions were identified in ip_tables.c:
do_add_counters() (as well as in other instances of this code) and in
do_env_enter().
1.5.3. All *[kv]malloc() calls in patch context have been checked for
possible integer overflows when calculating the allocation sizes. Such
integer overflows were actually discovered in ip_tables.c (and in other
instances of this code).
1.5.4. All *[kv]malloc() calls in patch context have been checked for
allocations of user-controlled amounts of memory with no sanity limits.
The only ones identified are beancounted.
1.6. The classical chroot break (see "breakout.c") was attempted.
Unexpectedly, it resulted in an Oops. The bug has since been fixed and
"breakout.c" fails as it should now.
1.7. Both code reviews and testing was done on possibilities to access
another VE's processes by PID, using PTRACE_ATTACH, kill(2), and
setpriority(2). The results are consistent: such attempts fail from
within a VPS, whereas non-root users on the host system are permitted to
access in-VPS processes which happen to run under the same UID.
1.8. It was tested whether host filesystem mount flags (noexec, nosuid,
nodev) have any effect on VPSes using simfs. The answer is "no", they
don't. This may be documented to avoid any confusion and to "legalize"
the use of "noexec" for some limited protection of the host system from
accidental execution of files from VPSes.
1.9. An attempt was made to identify resources that are not properly
beancounted and not limited for individual VPSes. tmpfs allocations
passed the test. Loopback mounts also passed both code review and
testing for the simple reason that they're not available in VPSes.
However, route tables, network interfaces (aliases), bind mounts, and
tmpfs mounts have been determined to not be properly beancounted or
limited. Additionally, the queues_count variable in ipc/mqueue.c is not
virtualized, potentially allowing to DoS the functionality for non-root
users in all VPSes and on the host system.
1.10. Some other OVZ-introduced code and some other changes applied with
the OVZ patch have been reviewed manually. Some of these are listed in
the "checklist".
2. vzctl:
2.1. The VPS entry code paths were reviewed, leading to the discovery of
a race condition in the kernel's do_env_enter().
2.2. Testing and review of "strace" logs revealed that only the first 16
fd's were being closed on VPS entry. This needs to be corrected. Also,
the fd's are being closed _after_ the ioctl call, which is not great,
although the risk is now mitigated by having the VPS-entering process
protected from ptrace(2).
2.3. The permissions on files and directories created by vzctl were
checked. It was determined that vzctl.spec doesn't explicitly set
permissions on /dev/vzctl, letting them depend on umask. This needs to
be corrected. Additionally, it is preferable for default permissions on
/vz/private to be forced to 700 (which is not the case currently, unless
running with umask 077 which is uncommon). The rationale for this was
discussed on the mailing list (potential fd passing).
2.4. The default capabilities list has been reviewed and it will need to
be revised as a result of the kernel reviews.
2.5. The vzctl(8) manual page has been reviewed for its description of
the --capability option. It has been determined that a warning should
be added stating that enabling non-default capabilities may completely
break the OpenVZ security model.
3. vzpkg and vzrpm:
3.1. Initially, vzpkg was determined to be using host's rpm and yum on
VPSes. This was obviously insecure.
3.2. vzrpm would properly switch to VE context when executing scripts,
however a brief review of source code of RPM revealed many other vectors
for attack by a malicious VPS.
Because of these flaws, no further reviews on these utilities were done.
4. vzquota:
4.1. quotacheck.c was reviewed in its entirety. It was determined to be
safe to use on stopped VPSes, but unsafe on running ones (three distinct
race conditions were identified).
4.2. It was checked that quota_io.c: open_quota_file() properly sets
safe permissions on the file and there are no other O_CREATs or creat()
calls in vzquota.
The rest of vzquota was determined to not be thoroughly reviewed due to
serious security issues being unlikely there.
OpenVZ-specific security issues found.
These are mostly in "checklist" order:
1. The kernel:
1.1. Issues "enabled" with capabilities granted to VPS root:
1.1.1. CAP_NET_RAW enables SO_BINDTODEVICE. The code for SO_BINDTODEVICE
does not process non-NUL-terminated devname[] strings correctly,
potentially allowing for leaks of information off the kernel stack
(leftovers from previous activity), at a rate of 1 bit per 128 syscalls
or better. The code needs to be corrected.
1.1.2. CAP_SYS_PTRACE: arch/ia64/kernel/perfmon.c and
arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c were not virtualized. This has since been
fixed.
1.1.3. CAP_SYS_PACCT: is not virtualized at all, should be dropped from
the default capability set.
1.1.4. CAP_SYS_NICE: enables SCHED_FIFO and SCHED_RR. It has since been
determined to disallow those for VPSes.
1.1.5. CAP_SYS_RESOURCE used to allow for setublimit() and ubstat() to be
invoked from within VPS. This has since been fixed.
1.1.6. CAP_VE_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_VE_NET_ADMIN enable several things which
needed to be fixed: the code in ip_tables.c with its security issues
(already fixed), mount (no limit on number of mounts in a VPS, not yet
fixed), net/ipv4/devinet.c (no limit on number of interfaces, not yet
fixed), net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c (no limit on number of routes, not yet
fixed).
1.2. Oops / node crash bug in alloc_ve_tty_driver(). Already fixed.
1.3. Assorted issues in ip_tables.c (integer overflows when calculating
allocation sizes, race conditions). These are already fixed. Similar
bugs in other instances of this code are not fixed (but that code is
currently not used on OVZ).
1.4. Oops / node crash bug triggerable with the classical chroot break.
Already fixed.
1.5. Host system non-root to VPS attacks with matching UIDs. Subtle host
non-root + VPS root => host root attack with fd passing. The latter may
be worked around with hardened permissions on /vz/private (700). None
of this is currently fixed.
1.6. do_env_enter() race condition with (re)setting capabilities too late.
Fixed.
1.7. route tables, network interfaces (aliases), and mounts are not
properly beancounted or limited, allowing for DoS attacks on the host
node. route table flood appears to be the most effective, leading to
the system running out of physical memory within minutes.
1.8. The queues_count variable in ipc/mqueue.c is not virtualized,
potentially allowing to DoS the functionality for non-root users in all
VPSes and on the host system.
2. vzctl:
2.1. Only the first 16 fd's are being closed on VPS entry. This needs
to be corrected. Ideally, all but fd 0-2 and the fd needed for the
ioctl should be closed before the ioctl.
2.2. vzctl.spec doesn't explicitly set permissions on /dev/vzctl,
letting them depend on umask. This needs to be corrected.
Additionally, it is preferable for default permissions on /vz/private to
be forced to 700.
2.3. The default capabilities list should be revised. CAP_SYS_PACCT
should be dropped. If possible, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG should also be
dropped.
2.4. A warning should be added to the vzctl(8) manual page stating that
enabling non-default capabilities may completely break the OpenVZ
security model. Maybe vzctl itself should print a warning, too, when
requested to set known-unsafe capabilities.
3. vzpkg and vzrpm:
3.1. Initially, vzpkg was determined to be using host's rpm and yum on
VPSes. This was obviously insecure.
3.2. vzrpm would properly switch to VE context when executing scripts,
however a brief review of source code of RPM revealed many other vectors
for attack by a malicious VPS, including via NSS modules, libraries'
configuration files, malicious/changing Berkeley databases (disobeying
any locking conventions), and symlink races exploiting the fact that RPM
would keep its current directory outside of the chroot point.
It has been agreed that vzrpm should be ditched and the packages to
install/update should be introduced into the VPS instead, to be
installed with an in-VPS instance of RPM.
4. vzquota's vzdqcheck, "vzquota on ... -p ...", and
"vzquota init ... -p ..." have been determined to be unsafe to use on
running VPSes (perhaps they shouldn't be used like that anyway).
It would be preferable to add a check making them refuse to work like
that. The difficulty here appears to be that vzdqcheck and vzquota are
only supplied directory paths and not veid's. Maybe that should be
re-worked, to have all utilities accept veid's and translate them to
paths using a common library?
Alternatively, maybe the race conditions should be resolved (to the
extent possible without further changes to the kernel). The easiest
initial workaround could be to change the open flags in get_inode_size()
to (O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW). This won't help
against mknod()s of rewinding tape device files, but not that many
systems have tape drives.
Portions of code and potential issues yet to be checked for.
Essentially all lines on "checklist" that do not start with a plus (item
completed) or minus (determined to not be done) may be worked on. The
most important of these are, described in plain English:
1. The OVZ-introduced code should be reviewed in its entirety. As it
has been described above, so far only portions of the code have been
thoroughly reviewed, whereas the rest has only been checked for certain
classes of vulnerabilities, -- and the primary focus was on higher risk
issues (with risk probability taken into account) with OpenVZ kernel at
large. Now that all capability uses, syscalls, etc. have been checked
(with very few exceptions) would be a good time to proceed with further
reviews of all of the OVZ-introduced code.
2. We should double-check that OpenVZ contains all relevant upstream
security fixes applied after Linux 2.6.8.1. Any missing fixes should be
back-ported and applied. Alternatively, OpenVZ should be updated to a
newer base kernel version (ideally, this should be done regularly).
3. vzctl should be reviewed in its entirety.
4. Once fixes for the issues identified so far are available, they will
need to be peer-reviewed. This applies to both kernel and user-space
code fixes.
5. Once vzpkg implements an alternate approach that is not fundamentally
flawed, vzpkg will also need to be reviewed in its entirety.
6. Security of the infrastructure around OpenVZ will need to be
considered. Is all of the code being distributed signed? With what
key? Is the private key secure? Where people are supposed to obtain
the public key and how they verify its authenticity? Are development
systems secure? Are distribution websites, mirrors, etc. secure? What
process is there to announce security updates? And so on.
Recommendations for "hardening" OpenVZ security.
1. Kirill's proposed dentry-based "area checks" should be fully
implemented, both as a hardening measure against "escaped" VPSes and as
a policy enforcement and safety measure for tools used off the host
system. In particular, it could be used to make host-initiated backups
and quotachecks safe (or at least safer than they are now).
2. Certain risky/irrelevant functionality that Linux normally provides
could be disabled for VPSes. vm86() and vm86old() syscalls would be an
example.
3. The most reliable way to deal with attacks based on matching UIDs is
to simply not have those, but rather translate full 32-bit unique
UIDs/GIDs to VPS-specific ones on kernel interfaces. This has been
briefly discussed on the mailing list. The biggest disadvantage that
was mentioned is that it would make it harder to migrate VPSes across
nodes.
It was suggested that matching UIDs/GIDs could continue to be used in
different VPSes, but they would be different from those the host system
would use. In order to ensure cross-VPS security even if an attacker
would manage to escape from a VPS' chroot jail, permissions on
/vz/private would need to be set to 700 (with host root as the owner),
which is being recommended above for other reasons anyway. Additionally,
the meaning of certain capabilities (CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, etc.) would need
to be "virtualized" when in VE context. That is, the DAC override would
apply only to files whose owner UIDs fall within the VPS' range, etc.
Unfortunately, with all these considerations, this does appear to be not
so trivial to implement. So this is more of an idea for further
discussion rather than a final recommendation.
4. It may be possible to replace the temporary exec_env and exec_ub
switches on IRQs, etc. with a safer concept. The issue has just been
raised on the mailing list and not yet discussed, so it is too early to
position it as a "recommendation".
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--PEIAKu/WMn1b1Hv9--
>From so...@openwall.com Mon Jan 16 22:41:07 2006
Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2006 22:41:07 +0300
From: Solar Designer <so...@openwall.com>
To: Kirill Korotaev <d...@sw.ru>
Cc: Kir Kolyshkin <k...@openvz.org>
Subject: Re: review announce
Message-ID: <20060116194107.ga3...@openwall.com>
References: <43cb90a0.6090...@sw.ru>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
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In-Reply-To: <43cb90a0.6090...@sw.ru>
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Hi Kirill and Kir,
On Mon, Jan 16, 2006 at 03:25:04PM +0300, Kirill Korotaev wrote:
> Hope you are well.
Yeah, just extremely busy and tired... as usual. I hope all is well
with you, too.
> We plan to make OVZ security review announce, say in 2 weeks.
> How are you with it? Your name will be mentioned, maybe you want us to
> provide some additional information about this? Kir will send a draft of
> the announce later.
>
> Some of the problems you found with huge amount of mounts/interfaces and
> vzrpm are still not fixed though. And this is mostly the reason why I
> ask your opinion. I will handle these issues after vz3.0 release which
> should happen soon.
I am concerned about your not fixing vzrpm. Yes, please do give me an
opportunity to review a draft of the announcement before you send it
out. I imagine, you would not want to hint to possible security issues
with vzrpm in the announcement, but at the same time I wouldn't want
responsibility for having "missed" those fundamental issues when they
become public a bit later (as you release a fixed version or otherwise).
I am not so concerned about the DoS issues, although I think you could
have applied workarounds for them easily (just hard-code some sane
limits that would not be reached in normal VPS operation), -- and that
would do for now.
> BTW, we are trying to push now OpenVZ to SUSE kernel, and your name is
> also mentioned there as an external code reviewer.
OK. The same concern regarding vzrpm applies here, if vzrpm is
documented as covered by the review.
Maybe the security review announcement could list components covered by
the review: ovzkernel, vzctl, vzquota. Just omit vzrpm and vzpkg.
Would that work for you?
What mainstream kernel version does SUSE use? If it's different from
2.6.8, then some of the checks on OVZ that I've performed do not apply.
P.S. The news item on vzctl 2.7.0-25 includes:
* Security: do preload libnss on enter action
This got me curious. I don't think there was a security issue (since
vzctl enter is meant to ultimately execute code from within the VPS and
AFAIR it didn't perform any NSS calls after the chroot() but before
entering VPS context) and I'm also not sure how you're preloading NSS
(I'm not aware of a reliable way to do it).
But this change is good as a hardening measure.
Thanks,
--
Alexander
>From so...@openwall.com Wed Jan 18 20:34:12 2006
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2006 20:34:12 +0300
From: Solar Designer <so...@openwall.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torva...@osdl.org>, Andrew Morton <a...@osdl.org>,
secur...@kernel.org, da...@davemloft.net,
Rusty Russell <ru...@rustcorp.com.au>,
Stanislav Protassov <s...@sw.ru>, Kirill Korotaev <d...@sw.ru>
Subject: [AUDIT] assorted comments on Linux 2.6
Message-ID: <20060118173412.ga13...@openwall.com>
References: <43ce507b.1090...@sw.ru>
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Linus et al.,
This is a follow-up to the two issues that Kirill has provided patches
for today. Basically, the OpenVZ security audit that I've performed
resulted in the discovery of a few (yes, only a few) security-relevant
bugs in the kernel itself. Some of those do not affect the security of
typical systems because certain capabilities are required to trigger the
bugs, however they do affect virtualization solutions on top of Linux
which make extensive use of capabilities. The netfilter issues are an
example of this.
There are, however, issues which may be relevant to typical installs as
well. Attached to this message is a non-patch commenting on some of my
findings. I've removed from it the issues that Kirill has already
reported (and provided real patches for).
In this non-patch, I am using the following keywords:
AUDIT-UN - Upstream, Non-security (but this actually has security impact
on patched kernels where the functionality is made available to users
that are not fully trusted, and OpenVZ is not the only project affected)
AUDIT-UL - Upstream, Low severity
AUDIT-UM - Upstream, Medium severity
No "Upstream, High severity" issues were discovered. (But the primary
focus was on OpenVZ specifics rather than on the mainstream kernel.)
Obviously, I am not bothering you with any "non-upstream" issues.
I am sorry that I currently do not have the time to properly handle
this, provide real patches, etc. I am providing this in hope that it
will be useful, but with no expectations.
Thanks,
--
/sd
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filename="linux-2.6.15.1-audit-comments.notapatch"
diff -rpU 10 linux-2.6.15.1.orig/drivers/acpi/asus_acpi.c
linux-2.6.15.1/drivers/acpi/asus_acpi.c
--- linux-2.6.15.1.orig/drivers/acpi/asus_acpi.c Sun Jan 15 09:16:02 2006
+++ linux-2.6.15.1/drivers/acpi/asus_acpi.c Wed Jan 18 19:56:56 2006
@@ -840,20 +840,21 @@ static int __init asus_hotk_add_fs(struc
{
struct proc_dir_entry *proc;
mode_t mode;
/*
* If parameter uid or gid is not changed, keep the default setting for
* our proc entries (-rw-rw-rw-) else, it means we care about security,
* and then set to -rw-rw----
*/
+/* AUDIT-UM: so much for "safe defaults"... */
if ((asus_uid == 0) && (asus_gid == 0)) {
mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO;
} else {
mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP;
}
acpi_device_dir(device) = asus_proc_dir;
if (!acpi_device_dir(device))
return -ENODEV;
diff -rpU 10 linux-2.6.15.1.orig/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c
linux-2.6.15.1/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c
--- linux-2.6.15.1.orig/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c Sun Jan 15 09:16:02 2006
+++ linux-2.6.15.1/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c Wed Jan 18 19:56:56 2006
@@ -703,20 +703,21 @@ static int agp_open(struct inode *inode,
if (minor != AGPGART_MINOR)
goto err_out;
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(struct agp_file_private), GFP_KERNEL);
if (priv == NULL)
goto err_out_nomem;
set_bit(AGP_FF_ALLOW_CLIENT, &priv->access_flags);
priv->my_pid = current->pid;
+/* AUDIT-UL: should check a capability */
if ((current->uid == 0) || (current->suid == 0)) {
/* Root priv, can be controller */
set_bit(AGP_FF_ALLOW_CONTROLLER, &priv->access_flags);
}
client = agp_find_client_by_pid(current->pid);
if (client != NULL) {
set_bit(AGP_FF_IS_CLIENT, &priv->access_flags);
set_bit(AGP_FF_IS_VALID, &priv->access_flags);
}
diff -rpU 10 linux-2.6.15.1.orig/drivers/net/wan/sbni.c
linux-2.6.15.1/drivers/net/wan/sbni.c
--- linux-2.6.15.1.orig/drivers/net/wan/sbni.c Sun Jan 15 09:16:02 2006
+++ linux-2.6.15.1/drivers/net/wan/sbni.c Wed Jan 18 19:56:56 2006
@@ -1318,37 +1318,39 @@ sbni_ioctl( struct net_device *dev, st
#endif
switch( cmd ) {
case SIOCDEVGETINSTATS :
if (copy_to_user( ifr->ifr_data, &nl->in_stats,
sizeof(struct sbni_in_stats) ))
error = -EFAULT;
break;
case SIOCDEVRESINSTATS :
+/* AUDIT-UL: should check a capability */
if( current->euid != 0 ) /* root only */
return -EPERM;
memset( &nl->in_stats, 0, sizeof(struct sbni_in_stats) );
break;
case SIOCDEVGHWSTATE :
flags.mac_addr = *(u32 *)(dev->dev_addr + 3);
flags.rate = nl->csr1.rate;
flags.slow_mode = (nl->state & FL_SLOW_MODE) != 0;
flags.rxl = nl->cur_rxl_index;
flags.fixed_rxl = nl->delta_rxl == 0;
if (copy_to_user( ifr->ifr_data, &flags, sizeof flags ))
error = -EFAULT;
break;
case SIOCDEVSHWSTATE :
+/* AUDIT-UL: should check a capability */
if( current->euid != 0 ) /* root only */
return -EPERM;
spin_lock( &nl->lock );
flags = *(struct sbni_flags*) &ifr->ifr_ifru;
if( flags.fixed_rxl )
nl->delta_rxl = 0,
nl->cur_rxl_index = flags.rxl;
else
nl->delta_rxl = DEF_RXL_DELTA,
@@ -1356,35 +1358,37 @@ sbni_ioctl( struct net_device *dev, st
nl->csr1.rxl = rxl_tab[ nl->cur_rxl_index ];
nl->csr1.rate = flags.rate;
outb( *(u8 *)&nl->csr1 | PR_RES, dev->base_addr + CSR1 );
spin_unlock( &nl->lock );
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_SBNI_MULTILINE
case SIOCDEVENSLAVE :
+/* AUDIT-UL: should check a capability */
if( current->euid != 0 ) /* root only */
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user( slave_name, ifr->ifr_data, sizeof
slave_name ))
return -EFAULT;
slave_dev = dev_get_by_name( slave_name );
if( !slave_dev || !(slave_dev->flags & IFF_UP) ) {
printk( KERN_ERR "%s: trying to enslave non-active "
"device %s\n", dev->name, slave_name );
return -EPERM;
}
return enslave( dev, slave_dev );
case SIOCDEVEMANSIPATE :
+/* AUDIT-UL: should check a capability */
if( current->euid != 0 ) /* root only */
return -EPERM;
return emancipate( dev );
#endif /* CONFIG_SBNI_MULTILINE */
default :
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff -rpU 10 linux-2.6.15.1.orig/drivers/s390/crypto/z90main.c
linux-2.6.15.1/drivers/s390/crypto/z90main.c
--- linux-2.6.15.1.orig/drivers/s390/crypto/z90main.c Sun Jan 15 09:16:02 2006
+++ linux-2.6.15.1/drivers/s390/crypto/z90main.c Wed Jan 18 19:56:56 2006
@@ -1887,20 +1887,21 @@ z90crypt_unlocked_ioctl(struct file *fil
PRINTK("No longer issuing messages about depre"
"cated ioctl Z90STAT_PCIXCCCOUNT.\n");
}
tempstat = get_status_PCIXCCcount();
if (copy_to_user((int *)arg, &tempstat, sizeof(int)) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case Z90QUIESCE:
+/* AUDIT-UL: should check a capability */
if (current->euid != 0) {
PRINTK("QUIESCE fails: euid %d\n",
current->euid);
ret = -EACCES;
} else {
PRINTK("QUIESCE device from PID %d\n", PID());
quiesce_z90crypt = 1;
}
break;
diff -rpU 10 linux-2.6.15.1.orig/fs/fcntl.c linux-2.6.15.1/fs/fcntl.c
--- linux-2.6.15.1.orig/fs/fcntl.c Sun Jan 15 09:16:02 2006
+++ linux-2.6.15.1/fs/fcntl.c Wed Jan 18 19:56:56 2006
@@ -414,20 +414,21 @@ static long band_table[NSIGPOLL] = {
POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND, /* POLL_OUT */
POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLMSG, /* POLL_MSG */
POLLERR, /* POLL_ERR */
POLLPRI | POLLRDBAND, /* POLL_PRI */
POLLHUP | POLLERR /* POLL_HUP */
};
static inline int sigio_perm(struct task_struct *p,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
{
+/* AUDIT-UL: shouldn't this be checking a capability instead of euid == 0? */
return (((fown->euid == 0) ||
(fown->euid == p->suid) || (fown->euid == p->uid) ||
(fown->uid == p->suid) || (fown->uid == p->uid)) &&
!security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig));
}
static void send_sigio_to_task(struct task_struct *p,
struct fown_struct *fown,
int fd,
int reason)
diff -rpU 10 linux-2.6.15.1.orig/fs/open.c linux-2.6.15.1/fs/open.c
--- linux-2.6.15.1.orig/fs/open.c Sun Jan 15 09:16:02 2006
+++ linux-2.6.15.1/fs/open.c Wed Jan 18 19:56:56 2006
@@ -492,20 +492,21 @@ asmlinkage long sys_access(const char __
current->fsgid = current->gid;
/*
* Clear the capabilities if we switch to a non-root user
*
* FIXME: There is a race here against sys_capset. The
* capabilities can change yet we will restore the old
* value below. We should hold task_capabilities_lock,
* but we cannot because user_path_walk can sleep.
*/
+/* AUDIT-UL: should also check for SECURE_NOROOT */
if (current->uid)
cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
else
current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
res = __user_walk(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_ACCESS, &nd);
if (!res) {
res = vfs_permission(&nd, mode);
/* SuS v2 requires we report a read only fs too */
if(!res && (mode & S_IWOTH) && IS_RDONLY(nd.dentry->d_inode)
diff -rpU 10 linux-2.6.15.1.orig/kernel/sys.c linux-2.6.15.1/kernel/sys.c
--- linux-2.6.15.1.orig/kernel/sys.c Sun Jan 15 09:16:02 2006
+++ linux-2.6.15.1/kernel/sys.c Wed Jan 18 19:56:56 2006
@@ -669,20 +669,27 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
key_fsgid_changed(current);
proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID);
return 0;
}
static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear)
{
struct user_struct *new_user;
+/* AUDIT-UM: This may cause setreuid, setuid, and setresuid to fail on
+ * transient errors, which older and/or poorly-written user-space apps
+ * might not expect. A similar Linux 2.2 kernel problem is known to
+ * result in a root compromise with older versions of Sendmail:
+ * http://www.sendmail.org/sendmail.8.10.1.LINUX-SECURITY.txt
+ * That Linux 2.2 problem had been fixed, however this new one is
+ * introduced somewhere between 2.2 and 2.4... */
new_user = alloc_uid(new_ruid);
if (!new_user)
return -EAGAIN;
if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >=
current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur &&
new_user != &root_user) {
free_uid(new_user);
return -EAGAIN;
}
diff -rpU 10 linux-2.6.15.1.orig/net/core/sock.c linux-2.6.15.1/net/core/sock.c
--- linux-2.6.15.1.orig/net/core/sock.c Sun Jan 15 09:16:02 2006
+++ linux-2.6.15.1/net/core/sock.c Wed Jan 18 19:56:56 2006
@@ -396,33 +396,41 @@ set_rcvbuf:
/* Bind this socket to a particular device like "eth0",
* as specified in the passed interface name. If the
* name is "" or the option length is zero the socket
* is not bound.
*/
if (!valbool) {
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = 0;
} else {
+/* The check is signed, but that's OK due to optlen having been checked for
+ * possibly being negative right in sys_setsockopt(). */
if (optlen > IFNAMSIZ)
optlen = IFNAMSIZ;
if (copy_from_user(devname, optval, optlen)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
/* Remove any cached route for this socket. */
sk_dst_reset(sk);
if (devname[0] == '\0') {
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = 0;
} else {
+/* AUDIT-UN: devname comes from userspace
+ * and it might not be NUL-terminated. dev_get_by_name() uses strncmp() on it
+ * with IFNAMSIZ as the max length (good), however the actual number of bytes
+ * initialized in devname[] may be less than that (if optlen is less),
+ * resulting in the strncmp() checking uninitialized kernel stack space.
+ * Potential data leaks, one byte per 128 calls on average or better? */
struct net_device *dev =
dev_get_by_name(devname);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
break;
}
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = dev->ifindex;
dev_put(dev);
}
}
break;
--n8g4imXOkfNTN/H1--
>From so...@openwall.com Thu Jan 19 14:53:40 2006
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2006 14:53:40 +0300
From: Solar Designer <so...@openwall.com>
To: d...@sw.ru, s...@sw.ru
Subject: [lafo...@netfilter.org: netfilter do_replace() overflow]
Message-ID: <20060119115340.ga15...@openwall.com>
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I'll respond to Harald now.
----- Forwarded message from Harald Welte <lafo...@netfilter.org> -----
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2006 09:57:04 +0100
From: Harald Welte <lafo...@netfilter.org>
To: Solar Designer <so...@openwall.com>
Cc: coret...@netfilter.org
Subject: netfilter do_replace() overflow
Hi Solar Designer,
JFYI: This issue has actually been known, not to me personally but to
other members of the netfilter core team.
The point is, it has always been known that root can crash and/or do
other nasty things with ip_tables (and it's evil twins) anyway.
We don't do a big deal of checking on the data structure. So by
carefully crafting an ip_tables structure and sending it via
setsockopt(), root can cause major breakage.
The underlying problem is that the kernel code doesn't really have any
code to really parse the data structure into all it's bits, and to
verify all the relative pointers/offsets used, etc. It merely iterates
over that ugly blob.
The kind of checking we do (match/target parameters valid, no loops in
data structure, ...) are mostly to assure that there is no accidential
mistake by the admin or the userspace iptables program.
According to how I recall Rusty's statement with regard to this matter
at the last netfilter developer workshop, there seem to be many places
in the kernel where this kind of laziness of "well, he's root /
CAP_NET_ADMIN anway" exists. At least there seem{s,ed} no general
policy about always veryfing everything that even root hands the kernel.
We [now] know that with OpenVZ like virtualization, this argument
doesn't really count anymore.
I just wanted to let you know about this, just in case you or anyone at
SWsoft has time to further investigate this issue.
We're certainly interested in helping you, but at least I myself am
currently terribly caught up in a number of [real world] issues, so my
time is a bit limited.
If you wanted to prepare/push any kind of sophisticated
{ip,arp,ip6,eb}tables data structure verification patch, I would gladly
review and merge it.
Please also base any patches on 2.6.16-rc1, since there now is x_tables
- a first step in the direction of unifying {ip,ip6,arp} tables on the
backend side.
Yes, the interface, the data structures and the N copies of it suck. I
always wanted to focus on writing something better rather than fixing
all the old stuff :(
Cheers,
Harald
--
- Harald Welte <lafo...@netfilter.org> http://netfilter.org/
============================================================================
"Fragmentation is like classful addressing -- an interesting early
architectural error that shows how much experimentation was going
on while IP was being designed." -- Paul Vixie
----- End forwarded message -----
>From so...@openwall.com Fri Mar 24 21:51:03 2006
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2006 21:51:03 +0300
From: Solar Designer <so...@openwall.com>
To: Kirill Korotaev <d...@sw.ru>
Subject: Re: [AUDIT] assorted comments on Linux 2.6
Message-ID: <20060324185103.ga27...@openwall.com>
References: <43ce507b.1090...@sw.ru> <20060118173412.ga13...@openwall.com>
<20060323.224855.08427074.da...@davemloft.net> <4423b5b9.5060...@sw.ru>
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On Fri, Mar 24, 2006 at 12:02:49PM +0300, Kirill Korotaev wrote:
> Sorry, did I miss something of forgot it?
> what is it about? :)
It was this bug:
+++ linux-2.6.8.1-ve022stab038-m/net/core/sock.c Thu Oct 20 04:38:16 2005
[...]
@@ -384,6 +386,13 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
if (devname[0] == '\0') {
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = 0;
} else {
+/* AUDIT-UN, AUDIT-VL: devname comes from userspace (is under VPS root control)
+ * and it might not be NUL-terminated. dev_get_by_name() uses strncmp() on it
+ * with IFNAMSIZ as the max length (good), however the actual number of bytes
+ * initialized in devname[] may be less than that (if optlen is less),
+ * resulting in the strncmp() checking uninitialized kernel stack space.
+ * Potential data leaks, one bit per call? */
+/* dev_get_by_name() is VPS-aware - good */
struct net_device *dev =
dev_get_by_name (devname);
I think I was wrong about the leak rate - it's more like:
+ * Potential data leaks, one byte per 128 calls on average or better? */
as corrected in the 2.6.15.1 "patch" that I ended up submitting upstream.
> From S. David Miller:
> >I've taken care of the SO_BINDTODEVICE issue and will push
> >that fix around.
> >
> >Thanks!
--
Alexander
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