On Sat, 16 Aug 2014 23:55:55 +0000 Joonas Lehtonen <joonas.lehto...@bitmessage.ch> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA512 > > > It's logistically difficult to sign the repodata... but of course > > it could be done. > > > > Many, if not all of the things they mention (I can't seem to find a > > link to the orig USENIX pdf thats still valid to be sure) were > > fixed by us moving to using metalinks by default. > > > > The metalink is fetched over https and the ssl certs are checked. > > The metalink has checksums of the current and previous repodata > > only. > > While transport layer security is certainly weaker than gpg signatures > (depending on where you store your private keys) it is certainly > addresses the easiest MITM attacks. Yeah. > Is there any kind of certificate pinning in place when verifying the > certificate of https://mirrors.fedoraproject.org or can the > certificate be from any trusted CA? I'm not sure. Yum (and dnf) uses python-urlgrabber, which uses urlgrabber, which uses curl. So, it would depend on the default curl config. > Thanks for your explanation! No problem. kevin
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