Report: http://calif.io, 2026-11-17, https://calif.io/java4shell Disposition: OUT-OF-MODEL (THREAT_MODEL.md section 3: the JVM and the JDK are outside the framework's scope) TLP:CLEAR
In short -------- CVE-2026-114938 is not a vulnerability in Apache Struts. The defect is in the Java runtime's Base64 decoder, and it is corrected by updating the JDK; no Struts release changes it. Struts applications do run on that runtime, so the JDK update applies to them like to any other Java application. What the report describes ------------------------- The report describes a memory-corruption defect in the Base64 decoder of OpenJDK 17.0.6 and newer, in the code path the JVM uses on x86-64 processors with AVX-512 VBMI support. According to the report, malformed Base64 input can make the decoder write outside the buffer it was given, and ARM64 is not affected. The report lists a number of products its authors tested, and adds that sample applications built on Apache Struts and Spring Boot were affected as well. It names no Struts version, component or request, and it states that application-specific details are withheld. What the framework does with that input --------------------------------------- Apache Struts itself contains no Base64 decoding. The only use of the JDK's Base64 class in the framework's own code is an encoder that produces the CSP nonce (DefaultCspSettings). Struts does hand request data to libraries that use the JDK decoder. The one on the default request path is multipart handling: - A POST request with a multipart/form-data content type is passed to the multipart parser before the action mapping is resolved (Dispatcher.wrapRequest). Multipart support is enabled unless struts.multipart.enabled is set to false. - Struts 7.x parses such a request with Apache Commons FileUpload 2 (JakartaMultiPartRequest); Struts 6.x uses Apache Commons FileUpload 1.x. - Commons FileUpload, in both generations, uses java.util.Base64 while it reads the headers of the parts in the request. Both libraries call the documented JDK API as intended. The project has not confirmed whether the defect can be triggered through this path; treat it as possible on an affected runtime. Applications, servlet containers and other libraries on the classpath may decode Base64 from request data in further places (authentication headers, tokens, application code). Those are outside what the framework controls. Why that is not a vulnerability in Apache Struts ------------------------------------------------ The Struts threat model places the servlet container, the JVM, the JDK and the operating system outside the framework's scope (THREAT_MODEL.md section 3 and section 5): the operator maintains them and Struts does not patch or harden them. Here the framework and the libraries it uses pass text to a standard JDK method, and the fault occurs inside that method. The component that needs the correction is the Java runtime, and the operator owns its version. What the project is doing ------------------------- This verdict owes no change in Apache Struts. What users should do -------------------- - Update the Java runtime to a release that contains the fix for CVE-2026-114938, following the advisory of your JDK vendor. This is the correction. - Until then, the report gives two JVM options as interim mitigations on x86-64 hosts: -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics, or -XX:UseAVX=2. The project has not tested them; check them against your vendor's advisory. - An application that accepts no file uploads can set struts.multipart.enabled to false, which stops Struts from parsing multipart requests at all. This removes one consumer of the decoder; it does not replace the JDK update. References ---------- - The report: https://calif.io/java4shell - OpenJDK vulnerability advisory: https://openjdk.org/groups/vulnerability/advisories/2026-11-17 - Threat model: https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md - Security policy: https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/main/SECURITY.md - Security guide: https://struts.apache.org/security/ - File upload (struts.multipart.enabled): https://struts.apache.org/core-developers/file-upload New evidence that concerns Apache Struts source code goes to [email protected]. Questions are welcome on this list. On behalf of the Apache Struts PMC Ćukasz

