Report: http://calif.io, 2026-11-17, https://calif.io/java4shell
Disposition: OUT-OF-MODEL (THREAT_MODEL.md section 3: the JVM and the JDK
are outside the framework's scope)
TLP:CLEAR

In short
--------

CVE-2026-114938 is not a vulnerability in Apache Struts. The defect is in
the Java runtime's Base64 decoder, and it is corrected by updating the JDK;
no Struts release changes it. Struts applications do run on that runtime,
so the JDK update applies to them like to any other Java application.

What the report describes
-------------------------

The report describes a memory-corruption defect in the Base64 decoder of
OpenJDK 17.0.6 and newer, in the code path the JVM uses on x86-64
processors with AVX-512 VBMI support. According to the report, malformed
Base64 input can make the decoder write outside the buffer it was given,
and ARM64 is not affected.

The report lists a number of products its authors tested, and adds that
sample applications built on Apache Struts and Spring Boot were affected as
well. It names no Struts version, component or request, and it states that
application-specific details are withheld.

What the framework does with that input
---------------------------------------

Apache Struts itself contains no Base64 decoding. The only use of the JDK's
Base64 class in the framework's own code is an encoder that produces the
CSP nonce (DefaultCspSettings).

Struts does hand request data to libraries that use the JDK decoder. The
one on the default request path is multipart handling:

- A POST request with a multipart/form-data content type is passed to the
multipart parser before the action mapping is resolved
(Dispatcher.wrapRequest). Multipart support is enabled unless
struts.multipart.enabled is set to false.
- Struts 7.x parses such a request with Apache Commons FileUpload 2
(JakartaMultiPartRequest); Struts 6.x uses Apache Commons FileUpload 1.x.
- Commons FileUpload, in both generations, uses java.util.Base64 while it
reads the headers of the parts in the request.

Both libraries call the documented JDK API as intended. The project has not
confirmed whether the defect can be triggered through this path; treat it
as possible on an affected runtime.

Applications, servlet containers and other libraries on the classpath may
decode Base64 from request data in further places (authentication headers,
tokens, application code). Those are outside what the framework controls.

Why that is not a vulnerability in Apache Struts
------------------------------------------------

The Struts threat model places the servlet container, the JVM, the JDK and
the operating system outside the framework's scope (THREAT_MODEL.md section
3 and section 5): the operator maintains them and Struts does not patch or
harden them. Here the framework and the libraries it uses pass text to a
standard JDK method, and the fault occurs inside that method. The component
that needs the correction is the Java runtime, and the operator owns its
version.

What the project is doing
-------------------------

This verdict owes no change in Apache Struts.

What users should do
--------------------

- Update the Java runtime to a release that contains the fix for
CVE-2026-114938, following the advisory of your JDK vendor. This is the
correction.
- Until then, the report gives two JVM options as interim mitigations on
x86-64 hosts: -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics, or -XX:UseAVX=2. The project has
not tested them; check them against your vendor's advisory.
- An application that accepts no file uploads can set
struts.multipart.enabled to false, which stops Struts from parsing
multipart requests at all. This removes one consumer of the decoder; it
does not replace the JDK update.

References
----------

- The report: https://calif.io/java4shell
- OpenJDK vulnerability advisory:
https://openjdk.org/groups/vulnerability/advisories/2026-11-17
- Threat model: https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md
- Security policy: https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/main/SECURITY.md
- Security guide: https://struts.apache.org/security/
- File upload (struts.multipart.enabled):
https://struts.apache.org/core-developers/file-upload

New evidence that concerns Apache Struts source code goes to
[email protected]. Questions are welcome on this list.

On behalf of the Apache Struts PMC
Ɓukasz

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