Report: Full Disclosure mailing list, 2026-10-31, https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/6 Disposition: VALID-HARDENING, WW-5855 (THREAT_MODEL.md sections 9, 13) TLP:CLEAR
In short The comparison is correct but not constant-time, and the project is changing it. It is not a vulnerability: the token is a 165-bit random value held server-side per session, the interceptor is documented as protection against duplicate submissions, and CSRF defence is the application's responsibility in the threat model. What the report describes TokenHelper.validToken compares the submitted token with the session token using String.equals. The post argues that response timing reveals how many leading characters match and estimates that about 1,150 requests could recover a token. No measurements are given. What the framework does with that input - The token is generated from a SecureRandom 165-bit integer rendered in base 36 (TokenHelper.generateGUID) and stored in the session. - validToken compares the submitted value with the stored one using String.equals; on a mismatch the session token is kept, on a match it is removed (TokenHelper.validToken). - The token interceptor is documented as ensuring that one request per token is processed, to guard against back buttons and double clicks (token interceptor page). Why this is not a vulnerability The threat model (section 9) places CSRF token management with the application; the framework token is a double-submit guard. The project has no evidence that a per-character timing difference in a JVM string comparison is measurable across a network against a per-session random token, and the report provides none. The comparison is nevertheless being made constant-time, as a hardening change. What the project is doing WW-5855 replaces the comparison with a constant-time one. What users should do Nothing is required. Applications that need CSRF protection should use a dedicated CSRF mechanism, as the security guide describes. References - https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/WW-5855 - https://struts.apache.org/core-developers/token-interceptor.html - https://struts.apache.org/security/ - https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md (sections 9, 13) - https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/main/SECURITY.md New evidence goes to [email protected]; questions about this notice go to this list. on behalf of the Apache Struts PMC Ćukasz

