I guess I should have specified that the access time labels
should be used in conjunction with the role labels, like
"(adamsHealthTeam&(regularCheckup|illnessEvaluation))|(massStateResearcher&populationStudy)".
Adam
On Aug 10, 2012 8:56 AM, "Benson Margulies"
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 8:52 AM, Adam Fuchs
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> Not sure I understand why this gets into n*m roles. Can you
elaborate?
>
> The question of when your physician should have access
seems like it could
> be represented by just a few labels, like "regularCheckup",
> "illnessEvaluation", and "populationStudy". Those labels
could then be tied
> to an auditing system that could verify appropriateness of
access over time.
And if you change doctors? Maybe that's a job for some sort
of role/group model.
>
> Adam
>
> On Aug 9, 2012 10:19 PM, "Josh Elser" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>
>> I've thought quite a bit about the approach you've
outlined previously..
>>
>> The main caveat I've always struggled to overcome is how
to encapsulate
>> *when* a physician should have access to your records.
This expands the
>> problem into n*m roles which becomes difficult to manage
inside Accumulo,
>> especially as time elapses.
>>
>> On 8/8/2012 6:29 PM, Marc Parisi wrote:
>>>
>>> Just some ideas and thoughts....
>>>
>>> With a system I'm building I have code to take care of
user roles. Roles
>>> will define visibilities, how analysis is performed,
information
>>> sharing, etc. I have a particular role for sharing. I
also have an area
>>> of interest, usually assigned to a physician role,
therefore only a
>>> physician's office can see certain data from it. The data
corresponding
>>> to a given person can be accessed by that person ( if
they have app
>>> access ), the physician that created it, and other
physicians ( with a
>>> different area of interest ) with whom the user wants to
share their
>>> data. Each area of interest will be cryptographically
secured. Our
>>> approach will utilize multiple crypto technologies. I
would suggest
>>> making crypto your last stop. Focus on getting
>>> the visibility hierarchy designed. HIPAA requirements can
come later.
>>>
>>> In my approach, there is no elevation of fields per se.
Instead, there
>>> are visibiilities for all assigned parties,so in my case
it is a matter
>>> of labeling. The data can have hierarchies, and each
hierarchy has
>>> different labels to control access.
>>>
>>> " Patient demographic fields are PHI (personal health
information) and
>>> these should not be visible to all who want to perform
analysis, but
>>> only to main administrators,
>>> patient and maybe physician. I assume these would have to
have
>>> separate authorization label. "
>>>
>>> Yes. I think this is where roles will help. Assign roles and
>>> visibilities to those roles. As of right now, I'm putting
ephemeral data
>>> in my visibilities ( user ID for a physician, among other
things ). I
>>> will probably move this to the qualifier and take a more
simple approach
>>> to visibilities.
>>>
>>> Each role has different actions. Right now I have four
actions; syncing,
>>> querying, deleting, and sharing. You don't have to
capture actions, but
>>> you might want to limit how the roles of users vary, and
I think
>>> modeling the security actions within each role is an
excellent way to do
>>> so.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Aug 8, 2012 at 4:08 PM, Edmon Begoli
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
>>> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> I am trying to model the healthcare claim on accumulo
and I want to
>>> lay it out so that it:
>>>
>>> A. Accurately reflects the structure of the claim
>>>
>>> B. I could have controls finely applied to different
sections of the
>>> document
>>>
>>> I am simplifying matter but claim contains claim document
>>> identifiers,
>>> demographics of the patient, and line items for the
procedures
>>> performed:
>>>
>>> claim identifier, data submitted, data processed,
state of origin,
>>> ...
>>> patient name, dob, location, other identifiers
>>> procedure 1 code, procedure 1 provider, procedure 1
cost, ...
>>> ...
>>> procedure n code, procedure n provider, procedure n
cost, ...
>>>
>>>
>>> Patient demographic fields are PHI (personal health
information) and
>>> these should not be visible to all who want to
perform analysis, but
>>> only to main administrators,
>>> patient and maybe physician. I assume these would
have to have
>>> separate authorization label.
>>>
>>> Other fields may be visible to different groups of
people - i.e.
>>> federal claim administrators can see all, but
regional offices can
>>> only see their states.
>>> Separate, more permissive labels.
>>>
>>> Finally, it might make sense to "elevate" some fields
for easy access
>>> and analysis - ie. diagnostic codes, zip code, cost.
>>> This would not be a matter of labels, but data design.
>>>
>>>
>>> With all this in mind, I would welcome if anyone has
any security and
>>> data design suggestions.
>>>
>>>
>
