Review for Source Package: src:openssh and src:openssh-gssapi

[Summary]
This is a re-review of src:openssh and a fresh review of src:openssh-gssapi
which is a variant of openssh - this means the upstream sources are identical
but the debian packaging varies.

MIR team ACK.

This does need a security review, so I'll assign ubuntu-security
List of specific binary packages to be promoted to main: 
bin:openssh-server-gssapi, bin:openssh-client-gssapi
Specific binary packages built, but NOT to be promoted to main: None

Notes:
#0 - src:openssh-gssapi includes the gssapi authentication patches, and the 
ccache patch which are not included in openssh

Recommended TODOs:
#1 - The package openssh-gssapi should get a team bug subscriber before being 
promoted
#2 - Please address the openssh-gssapi autopkgtest failure on s390x (may be a 
transient one)
#3 - Please consider packaging the latest upstream release: 10.6p1
#4 - Please consider addressing the compiler warnings seen in the build logs.
#5 - Please evaluate the crash bug reports against the latest release of 
src:openssh.

[Rationale, Duplication and Ownership]
- There is no other package in main providing the same functionality.
- A team is committed to own long term maintenance of this package.
- The rationale given in the report seems valid and useful for Ubuntu

[Dependencies]
OK:
- no other runtime Dependencies to MIR due to this
- no other build-time Dependencies with active code in the final binaries to 
MIR due to this
- no -dev/-debug/-doc packages that need exclusion
- No dependencies in main that are only superficially tested requiring more 
tests now.

Problems: None

[Embedded sources and static linking]
OK:
- no embedded source present
- no static linking
- does not have unexpected Built-Using entries
- not a go package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
- not a rust package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
- Does not include vendored code

Problems: None

[Security]
OK:
- history of CVEs does not look concerning
  => significant history, but expected.
- does not run a daemon as root
  => sshd runs as root
- does not use webkit1,2
- does not use lib*v8 directly
- does not parse data formats (files [images, video, audio,
  xml, json, asn.1], network packets, structures, ...) from
  an untrusted source.
  => parses network packets from unauthenticated remote hosts
- does not expose any external endpoint (port/socket/... or similar)
  => listens on TCP/22
- does not process arbitrary web content
- does not use centralized online accounts
- does not integrate arbitrary javascript into the desktop
- does not deal with system authentication (eg, pam), etc)
  => Core function, can't be avoided.
- does not deal with security attestation (secure boot, tpm, signatures)
- does not deal with cryptography (en-/decryption, certificates,
  signing, ...)
  => Expected to deal with cryptography using openssl
- this makes appropriate (for its exposure) use of established risk
  mitigation features (dropping permissions, using temporary environments,
  restricted users/groups, seccomp, systemd isolation features,
  apparmor, ...)
  => Good use of risk mitigation features. Uses privilege separation, seccomp 
and
     restricted user/groups. 

Problems: None

[Common blockers]
OK:
- does not FTBFS currently
- does have a test suite that runs at build time
  - test suite fails will fail the build upon error.
- does have a non-trivial test suite that runs as autopkgtest
- This does not need special HW for build or test

Problems:
- openssh-gssapi has an autopkgtest failure on s390x
  
https://autopkgtest.ubuntu.com/results/autopkgtest-stonking/stonking/s390x/o/openssh-gssapi/20261001_082546_3fb36@/log.gz

[Packaging red flags]
OK:
- Ubuntu does carry a delta, but it is reasonable and maintenance under control
- symbols tracking not applicable for this kind of code.
  => openssh, openssh-gssapi do not ship any shared libraries.
- debian/watch is present and looks ok (if needed, e.g. non-native)
- Upstream update history is good
- Debian/Ubuntu update history is good
- the current release is packaged
  => OpenSSH 10.6/10.6p1, contains no CVE fixes.
- promoting this does not seem to cause issues for MOTUs that so far maintained 
the package
- no massive Lintian warnings
- debian/rules is rather clean
  => somewhat complicated
- debian/control defines a correct Maintainer field
- It is not on the lto-disabled list

Problems: None


[Upstream red flags]
OK:
- no incautious use of malloc/sprintf (as far as we can check it)
- no use of sudo, gksu, pkexec, or LD_LIBRARY_PATH (usage is OK inside tests)
- no use of user 'nobody' outside of tests
- use of setuid for ssh-keysign and setgid for ssh-agent , but ok because ...
  => ssh-keysign needs root to read the host's private keys
  => ssh-agent needs stops other processes from attaching a debugger to it and 
stealing keys
- no dependency on webkit, qtwebkit or libseed
- translation present (partly)
  => the .po files translate the package's install-time prompts, not OpenSSH's 
messages

Problems:
- Several open bugs (crashers, etc) in Debian and Ubuntu
- Several build warnings noted
   Warning flag                 Count
   -Wdiscarded-qualifiers               10
   -Wformat-truncation=         10
   -Wmissing-field-initializers 8
   -Wstringop-truncation                1
   -Wmaybe-uninitialized                1
   -Wunused-variable                    1

** Changed in: openssh-gssapi (Ubuntu)
     Assignee: Pushkar Kulkarni (pushkarnk) => Ubuntu Security Team 
(ubuntu-security)

** Changed in: openssh (Ubuntu)
     Assignee: (unassigned) => Ubuntu Security Team (ubuntu-security)

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2167624

Title:
  MIR (source fork): openssh-gssapi + ccache patch (the new thing)

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