Review for Source Package: libpisp
[Summary]
MIR team ACK under the constraint to resolve the below listed required TODOs.
This does IMHO not need a security review
List of specific binary packages to be promoted to main: libpisp-dev, libpisp1,
libpisp-common
Specific binary packages built, but NOT to be promoted to main: <none>
Required TODOs:
- #1 Please add a proper symbols file to avoid accidentially breaking the
interface without noticing.
Recommended TODOs:
- none
[Rationale, Duplication and Ownership]
- There is no other package in main providing the same functionality.
- A team is committed to own long term maintenance of this package.
- The rationale given in the report seems valid and useful for Ubuntu (in the
Pi space)
[Dependencies]
OK:
- no other Dependencies to MIR due to this (libc and boost are in main,
nlohmann has a MIR filed)
- no -dev/-debug/-doc packages that need exclusion (it exists but has no
problematic dependencies)
- No dependencies in main that are only superficially tested requiring
more tests now.
Problems: None
[Embedded sources and static linking]
OK:
- no embedded source present
- no static linking
- does not have unexpected Built-Using entries
- not a go package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
- not a rust package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
Problems: None
[Security]
OK:
- history of CVEs does not look concerning (but to be fair the project is
rather new)
- does not run a daemon as root
- does not use webkit1,2
- does not use lib*v8 directly
- does not expose any external endpoint (port/socket/... or similar)
- does not process arbitrary web content
- does not use centralized online accounts
- does not integrate arbitrary javascript into the desktop
- does not deal with system authentication (eg, pam), etc)
- does not deal with security attestation (secure boot, tpm, signatures)
- does not deal with cryptography (en-/decryption, certificates,
signing, ...)
- this makes appropriate (for its exposure) use of established risk
mitigation features (dropping permissions, using temporary environments,
restricted users/groups, seccomp, systemd isolation features,
apparmor, ...) [as lib this is more for the lib user]
Problems: None
- does parse data formats (files [images, video, audio,
xml, json, asn.1], network packets, structures, ...) from
an untrusted source. Well, it does not really - it checks the device
but I feel that is not uncontrolled.
The PiSP also can read from memory for later stages, but
that is the processing unit not the library here.
The lib instead configures that device and therefore AFAICS does not
process untrusted data itself.
[Common blockers]
OK:
- does not FTBFS currently
- This does seem to need special HW for build or test so it can't be
automatic at build or autopkgtest time. But as outlined
by the requester in [Quality assurance - testing] there:
- is hardware and a test plan or code
The owning team is committed and aware of the implications for
ongoing maintenance.
- no new python2 dependency
Problems:
- does not have a test suite that runs at build time
- does have a non-trivial test suite that runs as autopkgtest
The lib will be implicitly tested a bit in higher level tests around libcamera
and rpicam-apps, but the majority of even these need hardware. That issue has
been acknowledged, hardware made available to the team.
Verifying it was added to the test plan of the team and the ISO tests of the
(arm) Desktop images for Raspberry Pi.
I think thereby you mitigated the testing as good as possible and I'd
thereby not consider this a blocking problem - thank you!
[Packaging red flags]
OK:
- Ubuntu does not carry a delta (ubuntu only for now)
- debian/watch is present and looks ok (if needed, e.g. non-native)
- debian/watch is not present but also not needed (e.g. native)
- Upstream update history is too short to judge it
- Ubuntu update history is too short to judge it
- the current release is packaged
- promoting this does not seem to cause issues for MOTUs that so far
maintained the package
- no massive Lintian warnings
- debian/rules is rather clean
- It is not on the lto-disabled list
Problems:
- symbols tracking is not in place.
I think this is easy to fix and helps to ensure accidential changes in
bug and security fixes can be avoided. Please add that.
[Upstream red flags]
OK:
- no Errors/warnings during the build
- no incautious use of malloc/sprintf (as far as we can check it)
- no use of sudo, gksu, pkexec, or LD_LIBRARY_PATH (usage is OK inside
tests)
- no use of user nobody
- no use of setuid / setgid
- no important open bugs (crashers, etc) in Debian or Ubuntu (but to be
fair these will only pop up when released and used in the field)
- no dependency on webkit, qtwebkit or libseed
- not part of the UI for extra checks
- no translation present, but none needed for this case (user visible)?
Problems: None
** Changed in: libpisp (Ubuntu)
Assignee: Christian Ehrhardt (paelzer) => (unassigned)
** Changed in: libpisp (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Incomplete
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2093321
Title:
[MIR] libpisp
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