How does having it zeroed rather than randomized make it easier for an
attacker to find the encryption key? Let's keep in mind this is "just"
swap, too: if I'm not mistaken the key is different every boot.
Marc Deslauriers already put this Wishlist, and I've asked some input
from the Ubuntu Security Team about this; but I think Wishlist is
correct for now, so we'll keep this as a nice to have for the next
ubiquity upload (soonish anyway, really), unless I get some information
to point to this being a major issue to address right now.
** Changed in: ubiquity (Ubuntu)
Assignee: (unassigned) => Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre (mathieu-tl)
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1506995
Title:
Ubiquity facilitate attack on crypto LUKS
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