On Tue, Jun 03, 2025 at 07:54:48PM +0530, Anshul Dalal wrote:
> We use the spl_board_prepare_for_boot hook to call k3_falcon_prep which
> is ran after tispl is loaded but before jump_to_image.
>
> In here, we find the boot media and load the image just as std falcon
> flow (since spl_start_uboot returns 0 now). Once the kernel and args are
> loaded, we perform fdt fixups on the fdt accompanying the kernel (if
> loaded as FIT) or the loaded up args and return.
>
> Now when the flow goes to jump_to_image, we do the regular pre-jump
> procedure and jump to ATF which jumps to the kernel directly since we
> have already loaded the kernel and dtb at their respective addresses
> (PRELOADED_BL33_BASE and K3_HW_CONFIG_BASE).
>
> Signed-off-by: Anshul Dalal <ansh...@ti.com>
> ---
> arch/arm/mach-k3/common.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 107 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-k3/common.c b/arch/arm/mach-k3/common.c
> index fc230f180d0..70317fec19c 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/mach-k3/common.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/mach-k3/common.c
> @@ -259,8 +259,115 @@ static __maybe_unused void k3_dma_remove(void)
> pr_warn("DMA Device not found (err=%d)\n", rc);
> }
>
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_OS_BOOT) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64)
> +static bool tispl_loaded;
> +
> +int spl_start_uboot(void)
> +{
> + if (!tispl_loaded)
> + return 1;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int k3_falcon_fdt_fixup(void *fdt)
> +{
> + struct disk_partition info;
> + struct blk_desc *dev_desc;
> + char bootmedia[32];
> + char bootpart[32];
> + char str[256];
> + int ret;
> +
> + strcpy(bootmedia, env_get("boot"));
> + strcpy(bootpart, env_get("bootpart"));
Since we're talking secure parts, strncpy is even more important, and
being aware of:
* Note that unlike userspace strncpy, this does not %NUL-pad the buffer.
* However, the result is not %NUL-terminated if the source exceeds
* @count bytes.
from lib/string.c
> + ret = blk_get_device_part_str(bootmedia, bootpart, &dev_desc, &info, 0);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + printf("Failed to get part details for %s %s [%d]\n", bootmedia,
> + bootpart, ret);
... and bail out?
I feel like all the changes here need a read with "and on failure in secure
mode what can someone abuse this to do" in mind.
--
Tom
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