> From: Michael Walle <mwa...@kernel.org> > Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2023 11:11:24 +0100 > > Hi Heinrich,
Hi Michael, > > Any runtime device drivers for variable storage should not be in the > > U-Boot runtime but live in the secure world (e.g. OP-TEE) FF-A is the > > new ARM protocol for talking to the secure world and hence fits into > > the picture. > > What if I just want a simple embedded boot stack where I don't > want any secure world and just want to be able to boot a COTS linux > distribution via EFI? That already works for many Linux distros. As long as the distro installs the appropriate BOOTxxx.EFI file you don't actually need to set any EFI variables for the OS to boot. It can't get any simpler than that. Of the main Linux distros it seems that only Debian doesn't do this. Someone should probably lobby Debian to do this as well as it would mean that Debian would just work on an EBBR compliant system. Things get more complicated if you want to install multiple OSes. Then having EFI variable support makes things a lot more straightforward. And of course EFI secure boot needs EFI variable support as well (with proper support) for authenticated EFI variables. But IMHO that no longer falls into "simple embedded boot stack" territory. > Assuming, that there might be a simple dedicated EEPROM to store the > variables which is not exposed to linux, is that something which would > be rejected by u-boot mainline now? Not necessarily. But such an approach will have limitations: * Completely hiding the EEPROM from the OS may be hard. Even if you have a dedicated SPI controller for the EEPROM things like the SPI bus clock or power domains may still be under OS control. * It is not possible to properly implement authenticated variables for secure boot if the EEPROM and associated hardware is just removed from the device tree but still accessable to the OS. An implementation that pretends the variables are "secure" will probably be rejected. Cheers, Mark
