Le lun. 25 oct. 2021 à 07:14, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.aka...@linaro.org>
a écrit :
> On Wed, Oct 20, 2021 at 07:39:37AM -0600, Simon Glass wrote:
> > Hi Masami,
> >
> > On Wed, 20 Oct 2021 at 02:18, Masami Hiramatsu
> > <masami.hirama...@linaro.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Simon,
> > >
> > > 2021年10月15日(金) 9:40 Simon Glass <s...@chromium.org>:
> > > >
> > > > Hi Takahiro,
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, 7 Oct 2021 at 00:25, AKASHI Takahiro <
> takahiro.aka...@linaro.org> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > The commit 47a25e81d35c ("Revert "efi_capsule: Move signature from
> DTB to
> > > > > .rodata"") failed to revert the removal of
> efi_get_public_key_data().
> > > > >
> > > > > Add back this function and move it under lib/efi_loader so that
> other
> > > > > platforms can utilize it. It is now declared as a weak function so
> that
> > > > > it can be replaced with a platform-specific implementation.
> > > > >
> > > > > Fixes: 47a25e81d35c ("Revert "efi_capsule: Move signature from DTB
> to
> > > > > .rodata"")
> > > > > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.aka...@linaro.org>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c | 36
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > > 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c
> b/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c
> > > > > index b75e4bcba1a9..44f5da61a9be 100644
> > > > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c
> > > > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c
> > > > > @@ -11,15 +11,20 @@
> > > > > #include <common.h>
> > > > > #include <efi_loader.h>
> > > > > #include <efi_variable.h>
> > > > > +#include <env.h>
> > > > > +#include <fdtdec.h>
> > > > > #include <fs.h>
> > > > > #include <malloc.h>
> > > > > #include <mapmem.h>
> > > > > #include <sort.h>
> > > > > +#include <asm/global_data.h>
> > > > >
> > > > > #include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
> > > > > #include <crypto/pkcs7_parser.h>
> > > > > #include <linux/err.h>
> > > > >
> > > > > +DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
> > > > > +
> > > > > const efi_guid_t efi_guid_capsule_report =
> EFI_CAPSULE_REPORT_GUID;
> > > > > static const efi_guid_t efi_guid_firmware_management_capsule_id =
> > > > > EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_ID_GUID;
> > > > > @@ -251,6 +256,37 @@ out:
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > #if defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
> > > > > +int __weak efi_get_public_key_data(void **pkey, efi_uintn_t
> *pkey_len)
> > > >
> > > > I don't think this should be weak. What other way is there of
> handling
> > > > this and why would it be platform-specific?
> > >
> > > I have a question about the current design of the capsule auth key.
> > > If the platform has its own key-storage, how can the platform use the
> > > platform specific storage? Does such platform load the key from the
> storage
> > > and generate the dtb node in the platform initialization code? (or
> > > device driver?)
> >
> > Are we talking about a public key (which I assume from the function
> > naming) or some secret key. What is an auth key?
>
> Surely, a public key (more strictly, x509 certificate under the current
> implementation)
>
> > As I understand it, the public key should be provided by the platform
> > in devicetree that U-Boot uses, by whatever prior stage has access to
> > the key.
>
> I still believe that some platform provider may want to save the key
> in a *safer* storage, which should be at least read-only for non-authorized
> writers.
indeed. And U-Boot may not be entitled at all to check the capsule
signature. For example updating SCP firmware with a key that is in secure
world and will never leave this world.
But if this issue (__weak or not) is the only blocking factor
> for my entire patch series, I'm willing to drop __weak for now since
> someone with production system may change it in the future when he has
> a good reason for that :)
If that need be….
>
> -Takahiro Akashi
>
>
> > Regards,
> > Simon
>
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