On Sun, 20 Jun 2021 21:55:53 -0500 Samuel Holland <sam...@sholland.org> wrote:
Hi Samuel, many thanks for sending this, I like the idea of adding TOC0 support to the venerable mkimage very much. > Most Allwinner sunxi SoCs have separate boot ROMs in non-secure and > secure mode. The non-secure boot ROM (NBROM) uses the existing > sunxi_egon image type. The secure boot ROM (SBROM) uses a completely > different image type, known as TOC0. > > A TOC0 image is composed of a header and two or more items. These items > include signed firmware and a key chain linking to a root-of-trust > public key (ROTPK) hash burned to eFuses in the SoC. Signatures are made > using RSA-2048 + SHA256. > > This TOC0 implementation has been verified to work with the A64, H5, H6, > and H616 SBROMs. So as mentioned in the other mail, this requires OpenSSL v1.1.x. I followed the suggestion on [1] and ended up with a compat header file, which allows me to compile against v1.0.x installations. Any objections against making this part of the series? Happy to provide that patch. [1] https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/OpenSSL_1.1.0_Changes#Compatibility_Layer Some warnings popped up with various (non-niche!) compilers: > Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <sam...@sholland.org> > --- > arch/arm/Kconfig | 1 + > common/image.c | 1 + > include/image.h | 1 + > include/sunxi_image.h | 191 ++++++++++++ > tools/Makefile | 1 + > tools/sunxi_toc0.c | 710 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 6 files changed, 905 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 tools/sunxi_toc0.c > > diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig > index 0448787b8bc..97bf21da2e2 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig > @@ -998,6 +998,7 @@ config ARCH_SUNXI > select DM_SCSI if SCSI > select DM_SERIAL > select DM_USB if DISTRO_DEFAULTS > + select MKIMAGE_LINK_OPENSSL > select OF_BOARD_SETUP > select OF_CONTROL > select OF_SEPARATE > diff --git a/common/image.c b/common/image.c > index 51854aae5dd..d354d5d8d37 100644 > --- a/common/image.c > +++ b/common/image.c > @@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ static const table_entry_t uimage_type[] = { > { IH_TYPE_MTKIMAGE, "mtk_image", "MediaTek BootROM loadable > Image" }, > { IH_TYPE_COPRO, "copro", "Coprocessor Image"}, > { IH_TYPE_SUNXI_EGON, "sunxi_egon", "Allwinner eGON Boot Image" > }, > + { IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0, "sunxi_toc0", "Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image" > }, > { -1, "", "", }, > }; > > diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h > index 459685d4d43..c01cd2982e6 100644 > --- a/include/image.h > +++ b/include/image.h > @@ -312,6 +312,7 @@ enum { > IH_TYPE_IMX8IMAGE, /* Freescale IMX8Boot Image */ > IH_TYPE_COPRO, /* Coprocessor Image for remoteproc*/ > IH_TYPE_SUNXI_EGON, /* Allwinner eGON Boot Image */ > + IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0, /* Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image */ > > IH_TYPE_COUNT, /* Number of image types */ > }; > diff --git a/include/sunxi_image.h b/include/sunxi_image.h > index 5b2055c0af3..bdf80ec0e0a 100644 > --- a/include/sunxi_image.h > +++ b/include/sunxi_image.h > @@ -9,9 +9,12 @@ > * > * Shared between mkimage and the SPL. > */ > + > #ifndef SUNXI_IMAGE_H > #define SUNXI_IMAGE_H > > +#include <linux/types.h> > + > #define BOOT0_MAGIC "eGON.BT0" > #define BROM_STAMP_VALUE 0x5f0a6c39 > #define SPL_SIGNATURE "SPL" /* marks "sunxi" SPL header */ > @@ -79,4 +82,192 @@ struct boot_file_head { > /* Compile time check to assure proper alignment of structure */ > typedef char boot_file_head_not_multiple_of_32[1 - 2*(sizeof(struct > boot_file_head) % 32)]; > > +struct toc0_main_info { > + uint8_t name[8]; > + __le32 magic; > + __le32 checksum; > + __le32 serial; > + __le32 status; > + __le32 num_items; > + __le32 length; > + uint8_t platform[4]; > + uint8_t reserved[8]; > + uint8_t end[4]; > +}; > + > +#define TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME "TOC0.GLH" > +#define TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC 0x89119800 > +#define TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END "MIE;" > + > +struct toc0_item_info { > + __le32 name; > + __le32 offset; > + __le32 length; > + __le32 status; > + __le32 type; > + __le32 load_addr; > + uint8_t reserved[4]; > + uint8_t end[4]; > +}; > + > +#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT 0x00010101 > +#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE 0x00010202 > +#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY 0x00010303 > +#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END "IIE;" > + > +struct toc0_small_tag { > + uint8_t tag; > + uint8_t length; > +}; > + > +typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_int; > +typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_oct; > +typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_seq; > +typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_exp; > + > +#define TOC0_SMALL_INT(len) { 0x02, (len) } > +#define TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(len) { 0x30, (len) } > +#define TOC0_SMALL_EXP(tag, len) { 0xa0 | (tag), len } > + > +struct toc0_large_tag { > + uint8_t tag; > + uint8_t prefix; > + uint8_t length_hi; > + uint8_t length_lo; > +}; > + > +typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_int; > +typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_bit; > +typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_seq; > + > +#define TOC0_LARGE_INT(len) { 0x02, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff } > +#define TOC0_LARGE_BIT(len) { 0x03, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff } > +#define TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(len) { 0x30, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff } > + > +/* > + * This looks somewhat like an X.509 certificate, but it is not valid BER. > + * > + * Some differences: > + * - Some X.509 certificate fields are missing or rearranged. > + * - Some sequences have the wrong tag. > + * - Zero-length sequences are accepted. > + * - Large strings and integers must be an even number of bytes long. > + * - Positive integers are not zero-extended to maintain their sign. > + * > + * See https://linux-sunxi.org/TOC0 for more information. > + */ > +struct toc0_cert_item { > + toc0_large_seq tag_totalSequence; > + struct toc0_totalSequence { > + toc0_large_seq tag_mainSequence; > + struct toc0_mainSequence { > + toc0_small_exp tag_explicit0; > + struct toc0_explicit0 { > + toc0_small_int tag_version; > + uint8_t version; > + } explicit0; > + toc0_small_int tag_serialNumber; > + uint8_t serialNumber; > + toc0_small_seq tag_signature; > + toc0_small_seq tag_issuer; > + toc0_small_seq tag_validity; > + toc0_small_seq tag_subject; > + toc0_large_seq tag_subjectPublicKeyInfo; > + struct toc0_subjectPublicKeyInfo { > + toc0_small_seq tag_algorithm; > + toc0_large_seq tag_publicKey; > + struct toc0_publicKey { > + toc0_large_int tag_n; > + uint8_t n[256]; > + toc0_small_int tag_e; > + uint8_t e[3]; > + } publicKey; > + } subjectPublicKeyInfo; > + toc0_small_exp tag_explicit3; > + struct toc0_explicit3 { > + toc0_small_seq tag_extension; > + struct toc0_extension { > + toc0_small_int tag_digest; > + uint8_t digest[32]; > + } extension; > + } explicit3; > + } mainSequence; > + toc0_large_bit tag_sigSequence; > + struct toc0_sigSequence { > + toc0_small_seq tag_algorithm; > + toc0_large_bit tag_signature; > + uint8_t signature[256]; > + } sigSequence; > + } totalSequence; > +}; > + > +#define sizeof_field(TYPE, MEMBER) sizeof((((TYPE *)0)->MEMBER)) > + > +#define TOC0_CERT_ITEM { > \ > + TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_totalSequence)), > \ > + { > \ > + TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence)), > \ > + { > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_EXP(0, sizeof(struct toc0_explicit0)), > \ > + { > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct > toc0_explicit0, version)), \ > + 0, > \ > + }, > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_mainSequence, > serialNumber)), \ > + 0, > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), > \ > + TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct > toc0_subjectPublicKeyInfo)), \ > + { > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), > \ > + TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_publicKey)), > \ > + { > \ > + TOC0_LARGE_INT(sizeof_field(struct > toc0_publicKey, n)), \ > + {}, > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct > toc0_publicKey, e)), \ > + {}, > \ > + }, > \ > + }, > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_EXP(3, sizeof(struct toc0_explicit3)), > \ > + { > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_extension)), > \ > + { > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct > toc0_extension, digest)), \ > + {}, > \ > + }, > \ > + }, > \ > + }, > \ > + TOC0_LARGE_BIT(sizeof(struct toc0_sigSequence)), > \ > + { > \ > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), > \ > + TOC0_LARGE_BIT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_sigSequence, > signature)), \ > + {}, > \ > + }, > \ > + }, > \ > +} > + > +struct toc0_key_item { > + __le32 vendor_id; > + __le32 key0_n_len; > + __le32 key0_e_len; > + __le32 key1_n_len; > + __le32 key1_e_len; > + __le32 sig_len; > + uint8_t key0[512]; > + uint8_t key1[512]; > + uint8_t reserved[32]; > + uint8_t sig[256]; > +}; > + > +#define TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS 3 > +#define TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN > \ > + ALIGN( \ > + sizeof(struct toc0_main_info) + \ > + sizeof(struct toc0_item_info) * TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS + \ > + sizeof(struct toc0_cert_item) + \ > + sizeof(struct toc0_key_item), \ > + 32) > + > #endif > diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile > index 8843185703c..cb8418466f0 100644 > --- a/tools/Makefile > +++ b/tools/Makefile > @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ AES_OBJS-$(CONFIG_FIT_CIPHER) := $(addprefix lib/aes/, \ > OPENSSL_OBJS-$(CONFIG_MKIMAGE_LINK_OPENSSL) := \ > lib/fdt-libcrypto.o \ > mxsimage.o \ > + sunxi_toc0.o \ > > ROCKCHIP_OBS = lib/rc4.o rkcommon.o rkimage.o rksd.o rkspi.o > > diff --git a/tools/sunxi_toc0.c b/tools/sunxi_toc0.c > new file mode 100644 > index 00000000000..f0bf86b477c > --- /dev/null > +++ b/tools/sunxi_toc0.c > @@ -0,0 +1,710 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ > +/* > + * (C) Copyright 2018 Arm Ltd. > + * (C) Copyright 2020-2021 Samuel Holland <sam...@sholland.org> > + */ > + > +#include <assert.h> > +#include <stdint.h> > +#include <stdio.h> > +#include <stdlib.h> > +#include <string.h> > + > +#include <openssl/asn1t.h> > +#include <openssl/pem.h> > +#include <openssl/rsa.h> > + > +#include <image.h> > +#include <sunxi_image.h> > + > +#include "imagetool.h" > +#include "mkimage.h" > + > +/* > + * NAND requires 8K padding. For other devices, BROM requires only > + * 512B padding, but let's use the larger padding to cover everything. > + */ > +#define PAD_SIZE 8192 > + > +#define pr_err(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, "TOC0 ERR: " fmt, ##args) > +#define pr_warn(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, "TOC0 WRN: " fmt, > ##args) > +#define pr_info(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, "TOC0 INF: " fmt, > ##args) > + > +static char *fw_key_file = "fw_key.pem"; > +static char *key_item_file = "key_item.bin"; > +static char *root_key_file = "root_key.pem"; > + > +/* > + * Create a key item in @buf, containing the public keys @root_key and > @fw_key, > + * and signed by the RSA key @root_key. > + */ > +static int toc0_create_key_item(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *len, > + RSA *root_key, RSA *fw_key) > +{ > + struct toc0_key_item *key_item = (void *)buf; > + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + unsigned int sig_len; > + int n_len, e_len; > + > + /* Store key 0. */ > + n_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(root_key), key_item->key0); > + e_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(root_key), key_item->key0 + n_len); > + if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key0)) { > + pr_err("Root key is too large\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + key_item->key0_n_len = cpu_to_le32(n_len); > + key_item->key0_e_len = cpu_to_le32(e_len); > + > + /* Store key 1. */ > + n_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(fw_key), key_item->key1); > + e_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(fw_key), key_item->key1 + n_len); > + if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key1)) { > + pr_err("Firmware key is too large\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + key_item->key1_n_len = cpu_to_le32(n_len); > + key_item->key1_e_len = cpu_to_le32(e_len); > + > + /* Sign the key item. */ > + key_item->sig_len = cpu_to_le32(RSA_size(root_key)); > + SHA256(buf, key_item->sig - buf, digest); > + if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, digest, sizeof(digest), > + key_item->sig, &sig_len, root_key)) { > + pr_err("Failed to sign key item\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + if (sig_len != sizeof(key_item->sig)) { > + pr_err("Signature length mismatch\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + *len = sizeof(*key_item); > + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; > + > +err: > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Verify the key item in @buf, containing two public keys @key0 and @key1, > + * and signed by the RSA key @key0. If @root_key is provided, only signatures > + * by that key will be accepted. @key1 is returned in @key. > + */ > +static int toc0_verify_key_item(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, > + RSA *root_key, RSA **fw_key) > +{ > + struct toc0_key_item *key_item = (void *)buf; > + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + int n_len, e_len; > + RSA *key0 = NULL; > + RSA *key1 = NULL; > + BIGNUM *n, *e; > + > + if (len < sizeof(*key_item)) > + goto err; > + > + /* Load key 0. */ > + n_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key0_n_len); > + e_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key0_e_len); > + if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key0)) > + goto err; > + n = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key0, n_len, NULL); > + e = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key0 + n_len, e_len, NULL); > + key0 = RSA_new(); > + if (!key0) > + goto err; > + if (!RSA_set0_key(key0, n, e, NULL)) > + goto err; > + > + /* If a root key was provided, compare it to key 0. */ > + if (root_key && (BN_cmp(n, RSA_get0_n(root_key)) || > + BN_cmp(e, RSA_get0_e(root_key)))) { > + pr_err("Root key mismatch\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + /* Verify the key item signature. */ > + SHA256(buf, key_item->sig - buf, digest); > + if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, digest, sizeof(digest), > + key_item->sig, le32_to_cpu(key_item->sig_len), key0)) { > + pr_err("Bad key item signature\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + if (fw_key) { > + /* Load key 1. */ > + n_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key1_n_len); > + e_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key1_e_len); > + if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key1)) > + goto err; > + n = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key1, n_len, NULL); > + e = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key1 + n_len, e_len, NULL); > + key1 = RSA_new(); > + if (!key1) > + goto err; > + if (!RSA_set0_key(key1, n, e, NULL)) > + goto err; > + > + if (*fw_key) { > + /* If a FW key was provided, compare it to key 1. */ > + if (BN_cmp(n, RSA_get0_n(*fw_key)) || > + BN_cmp(e, RSA_get0_e(*fw_key))) { > + pr_err("Firmware key mismatch\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + } else { > + /* Otherwise, send key1 back to the caller. */ > + *fw_key = key1; > + key1 = NULL; > + } > + } > + > + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; > + > +err: > + RSA_free(key0); > + RSA_free(key1); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Create a certificate in @buf, describing the firmware with SHA256 digest > + * @digest, and signed by the RSA key @fw_key. > + */ > +static int toc0_create_cert_item(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *len, RSA *fw_key, > + uint8_t digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) > +{ > + static const struct toc0_cert_item cert_item_template = TOC0_CERT_ITEM; > + struct toc0_cert_item *cert_item = (void *)buf; > + uint8_t cert_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; > + struct toc0_totalSequence *totalSequence; > + struct toc0_sigSequence *sigSequence; > + struct toc0_extension *extension; > + struct toc0_publicKey *publicKey; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + unsigned int sig_len; > + > + memcpy(cert_item, &cert_item_template, sizeof(*cert_item)); > + *len = sizeof(*cert_item); > + > + /* > + * Fill in the public key. > + * > + * Only 2048-bit RSA keys are supported. Since this uses a fixed-size > + * structure, it may fail for non-standard exponents. > + */ > + totalSequence = &cert_item->totalSequence; > + publicKey = &totalSequence->mainSequence.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey; > + if (BN_bn2binpad(RSA_get0_n(fw_key), publicKey->n, > sizeof(publicKey->n)) < 0 || > + BN_bn2binpad(RSA_get0_e(fw_key), publicKey->e, > sizeof(publicKey->e)) < 0) { > + pr_err("Incorrect key size\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + /* Fill in the firmware digest. */ > + extension = &totalSequence->mainSequence.explicit3.extension; > + memcpy(&extension->digest, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); > + > + /* > + * Sign the certificate. > + * > + * In older SBROM versions (and by default in newer versions), > + * the last 4 bytes of the certificate are not signed. > + * > + * (The buffer passed to SHA256 starts at tag_mainSequence, but > + * the buffer size does not include the length of that tag.) > + */ > + SHA256((uint8_t *)totalSequence, sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence), > + cert_digest); > + sigSequence = &totalSequence->sigSequence; > + if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, cert_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, > + sigSequence->signature, &sig_len, fw_key)) { > + pr_err("Failed to sign certificate\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + if (sig_len != sizeof(sigSequence->signature)) { > + pr_err("Signature length mismatch\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; > + > +err: > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Verify the certificate in @buf, describing the firmware with SHA256 digest > + * @digest, and signed by the RSA key contained within. If @fw_key is > provided, > + * only that key will be accepted. > + * > + * This function is only expected to work with images created by mkimage. > + */ > +static int toc0_verify_cert_item(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA > *fw_key, > + uint8_t digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) > +{ > + const struct toc0_cert_item *cert_item = (const void *)buf; > + uint8_t cert_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; > + const struct toc0_totalSequence *totalSequence; > + const struct toc0_sigSequence *sigSequence; > + const struct toc0_extension *extension; > + const struct toc0_publicKey *publicKey; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + RSA *key = NULL; > + BIGNUM *n, *e; > + > + /* Extract the public key from the certificate. */ > + totalSequence = &cert_item->totalSequence; > + publicKey = &totalSequence->mainSequence.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey; > + n = BN_bin2bn(publicKey->n, sizeof(publicKey->n), NULL); > + e = BN_bin2bn(publicKey->e, sizeof(publicKey->e), NULL); > + key = RSA_new(); > + if (!key) > + goto err; > + if (!RSA_set0_key(key, n, e, NULL)) > + goto err; > + > + /* If a key was provided, compare it to the embedded key. */ > + if (fw_key && (BN_cmp(RSA_get0_n(key), RSA_get0_n(fw_key)) || > + BN_cmp(RSA_get0_e(key), RSA_get0_e(fw_key)))) { > + pr_err("Firmware key mismatch\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + /* If a digest was provided, compare it to the embedded digest. */ > + extension = &totalSequence->mainSequence.explicit3.extension; > + if (digest && memcmp(&extension->digest, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) > { > + pr_err("Firmware digest mismatch\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + /* Verify the certificate's signature. See the comment above. */ > + SHA256((uint8_t *)totalSequence, sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence), > + cert_digest); > + sigSequence = &totalSequence->sigSequence; > + if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, cert_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, > + sigSequence->signature, > + sizeof(sigSequence->signature), key)) { > + pr_err("Bad certificate signature\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; > + > +err: > + RSA_free(key); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Always create a TOC0 containing 3 items. The extra item will be ignored on > + * SoCs which do not support it. > + */ > +static int toc0_create(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *root_key, RSA > *fw_key, > + uint8_t *key_item, uint32_t key_item_len, > + uint8_t *fw_item, uint32_t fw_item_len, uint32_t fw_addr) > +{ > + struct toc0_main_info *main = (void *)buf; My compiler warns: HOSTCC tools/sunxi_toc0.o tools/sunxi_toc0.c: In function ‘toc0_create’: tools/sunxi_toc0.c:314:25: warning: ‘main’ is usually a function [-Wmain] struct toc0_main_info *main = (void *)buf; Can you rename this variable? "main" is indeed confusing and not very descriptive. > + struct toc0_item_info *item = (void *)(main + 1); > + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; > + uint32_t *buf32 = (void *)buf; > + RSA *orig_fw_key = fw_key; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + uint32_t checksum = 0; > + uint32_t item_offset; > + uint32_t item_length; > + int i; > + > + /* Hash the firmware for inclusion in the certificate. */ > + SHA256(fw_item, fw_item_len, digest); > + > + /* Create the main TOC0 header, containing three items. */ > + memcpy(main->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, sizeof(main->name)); > + main->magic = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC); > + main->checksum = cpu_to_le32(BROM_STAMP_VALUE); > + main->num_items = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS); > + memcpy(main->end, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END, sizeof(main->end)); > + > + /* The first item links the ROTPK to the signing key. */ > + item_offset = sizeof(*main) + TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS * sizeof(*item); > + /* Using an existing key item avoids needing the root private key. */ > + if (key_item) { > + item_length = sizeof(*key_item); > + if (toc0_verify_key_item(key_item, item_length, > + root_key, &fw_key)) > + goto err; > + memcpy(buf + item_offset, key_item, item_length); > + } else if (toc0_create_key_item(buf + item_offset, &item_length, > + root_key, fw_key)) { > + goto err; > + } > + > + item->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY); > + item->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); > + item->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length); > + memcpy(item->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item->end)); > + > + /* The second item contains a certificate signed by the firmware key. */ > + item_offset = item_offset + item_length; > + if (toc0_create_cert_item(buf + item_offset, &item_length, > + fw_key, digest)) > + goto err; > + > + item++; > + item->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT); > + item->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); > + item->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length); > + memcpy(item->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item->end)); > + > + /* The third item contains the actual boot code. */ > + item_offset = ALIGN(item_offset + item_length, 32); > + item_length = fw_item_len; > + if (buf + item_offset != fw_item) > + memmove(buf + item_offset, fw_item, item_length); > + > + item++; > + item->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE); > + item->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); > + item->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length); > + item->load_addr = cpu_to_le32(fw_addr); > + memcpy(item->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item->end)); > + > + /* Pad to the required block size with 0xff to be flash-friendly. */ > + item_offset = item_offset + item_length; > + item_length = ALIGN(item_offset, PAD_SIZE) - item_offset; > + memset(buf + item_offset, 0xff, item_length); > + > + /* Fill in the total padded file length. */ > + item_offset = item_offset + item_length; > + main->length = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); > + > + /* Verify enough space was provided when creating the image. */ > + assert(len >= item_offset); > + > + /* Calculate the checksum. Yes, it's that simple. */ > + for (i = 0; i < item_offset / 4; ++i) > + checksum += le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]); > + main->checksum = cpu_to_le32(checksum); > + > + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; > + > +err: > + if (fw_key != orig_fw_key) > + RSA_free(fw_key); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static const struct toc0_item_info * > +toc0_find_item(const struct toc0_main_info *main, > + uint32_t name, uint32_t *offset, uint32_t *length) > +{ > + const struct toc0_item_info *item = (void *)(main + 1); > + uint32_t item_offset, item_length; > + uint32_t num_items, main_length; > + int i; > + > + num_items = le32_to_cpu(main->num_items); > + main_length = le32_to_cpu(main->length); > + > + for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i, ++item) { > + if (le32_to_cpu(item->name) != name) > + continue; > + > + item_offset = le32_to_cpu(item->offset); > + item_length = le32_to_cpu(item->length); > + > + if (item_offset > main_length || > + item_length > main_length - item_offset) > + continue; > + > + *offset = item_offset; > + *length = item_length; > + > + return item; > + } > + > + return NULL; > +} > + > +static int toc0_verify(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *root_key) > +{ > + const struct toc0_main_info *main = (void *)buf; > + const struct toc0_item_info *item; > + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; > + uint32_t main_length = le32_to_cpu(main->length); > + uint32_t checksum = BROM_STAMP_VALUE; > + uint32_t *buf32 = (void *)buf; > + uint32_t length, offset; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + RSA *fw_key = NULL; > + int i; > + > + if (len < main_length) > + goto err; > + > + /* Verify the main header. */ > + if (memcmp(main->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, sizeof(main->name))) > + goto err; > + if (le32_to_cpu(main->magic) != TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC) > + goto err; > + /* Verify the checksum without modifying the buffer. */ > + for (i = 0; i < main_length / 4; ++i) > + checksum += le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]); > + if (checksum != 2 * le32_to_cpu(main->checksum)) > + goto err; > + /* The length must be at least 512 byte aligned. */ > + if (main_length % 512) > + goto err; > + if (memcmp(main->end, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END, sizeof(main->end))) > + goto err; > + > + /* Verify the key item if present. */ > + item = toc0_find_item(main, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY, &offset, &length); > + if (!item) > + fw_key = root_key; > + else if (toc0_verify_key_item(buf + offset, length, root_key, &fw_key)) > + goto err; > + > + /* Hash the firmware to compare with the certificate. */ > + item = toc0_find_item(main, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE, &offset, > &length); > + if (!item) { > + pr_err("Image does not contain a firmware item\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + SHA256(buf + offset, length, digest); > + > + /* Verify the certificate item. */ > + item = toc0_find_item(main, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT, &offset, &length); > + if (!item) { > + pr_err("Image does not contain a certificate item\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + if (toc0_verify_cert_item(buf + offset, length, fw_key, digest)) > + goto err; > + > + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; > + > +err: > + if (fw_key != root_key) > + RSA_free(fw_key); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int toc0_check_params(struct image_tool_params *params) > +{ > + if (!params->dflag) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (params->keydir) { > + asprintf(&fw_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, fw_key_file); tools/sunxi_toc0.c: In function ‘toc0_check_params’: tools/sunxi_toc0.c:508:3: warning: ignoring return value of ‘asprintf’, declared with attribute warn_unused_result [-Wunused-result] 508 | asprintf(&fw_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, fw_key_file); Can you provide some example which at least briefly mentions those files here and their purpose? I guess this would eventually become a chapter in the README.sunxi file which I promised a while ago ... Cheers, Andre > + asprintf(&key_item_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, > key_item_file); > + asprintf(&root_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, > root_key_file); > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int toc0_verify_header(unsigned char *buf, int image_size, > + struct image_tool_params *params) > +{ > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + RSA *root_key = NULL; > + FILE *fp; > + > + /* A root public key is optional. */ > + fp = fopen(root_key_file, "rb"); > + if (fp) { > + pr_info("Verifying image with existing root key\n"); > + root_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); > + if (!root_key) > + root_key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); > + fclose(fp); > + if (!root_key) { > + pr_err("Failed to read public key from '%s'\n", > + root_key_file); > + goto err; > + } > + } > + > + ret = toc0_verify(buf, image_size, root_key); > + > +err: > + RSA_free(root_key); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static const char *toc0_item_name(uint32_t name) > +{ > + if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT) > + return "Certificate"; > + if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE) > + return "Firmware"; > + if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY) > + return "Key"; > + return "(unknown)"; > +} > + > +static void toc0_print_header(const void *buf) > +{ > + const struct toc0_main_info *main = buf; > + const struct toc0_item_info *item = (void *)(main + 1); > + uint32_t head_length, main_length, num_items; > + uint32_t item_offset, item_length, item_name; > + int load_addr = -1; > + int i; > + > + num_items = le32_to_cpu(main->num_items); > + head_length = sizeof(*main) + num_items * sizeof(*item); > + main_length = le32_to_cpu(main->length); > + > + printf("Allwinner TOC0 Image\n" > + "Size: %d bytes\n" > + "Contents: %d items\n" > + " 00000000:%08x Headers\n", > + main_length, num_items, head_length); > + > + for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i, ++item) { > + item_offset = le32_to_cpu(item->offset); > + item_length = le32_to_cpu(item->length); > + item_name = le32_to_cpu(item->name); > + > + if (item_name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE) > + load_addr = le32_to_cpu(item->load_addr); > + > + printf(" %08x:%08x %s\n", > + item_offset, item_length, > + toc0_item_name(item_name)); > + } > + > + if (num_items && item_offset + item_length < main_length) { > + item_offset = item_offset + item_length; > + item_length = main_length - item_offset; > + > + printf(" %08x:%08x Padding\n", > + item_offset, item_length); > + } > + > + if (load_addr != -1) > + printf("Load address: 0x%08x\n", load_addr); > +} > + > +static void toc0_set_header(void *buf, struct stat *sbuf, int ifd, > + struct image_tool_params *params) > +{ > + uint32_t key_item_len = 0; > + uint8_t *key_item = NULL; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + RSA *root_key = NULL; > + RSA *fw_key = NULL; > + FILE *fp; > + > + /* Either a key item or the root private key is required. */ > + fp = fopen(key_item_file, "rb"); > + if (fp) { > + pr_info("Creating image using existing key item\n"); > + key_item_len = sizeof(struct toc0_key_item); > + key_item = OPENSSL_malloc(key_item_len); > + if (!key_item || fread(key_item, key_item_len, 1, fp) != 1) { > + pr_err("Failed to read key item from '%s'\n", > + root_key_file); > + goto err; > + } > + fclose(fp); > + fp = NULL; > + } > + > + fp = fopen(root_key_file, "rb"); > + if (fp) { > + root_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); > + if (!root_key) > + root_key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); > + fclose(fp); > + fp = NULL; > + } > + > + /* When using an existing key item, the root key is optional. */ > + if (!key_item && (!root_key || !RSA_get0_d(root_key))) { > + pr_err("Failed to read private key from '%s'\n", > + root_key_file); > + goto err; > + } > + > + /* The certificate/firmware private key is always required. */ > + fp = fopen(fw_key_file, "rb"); > + if (fp) { > + fw_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); > + fclose(fp); > + fp = NULL; > + } > + if (!fw_key) { > + /* If the root key is a private key, it can be used instead. */ > + if (root_key && RSA_get0_d(root_key)) { > + pr_info("Using root key as firmware key\n"); > + fw_key = root_key; > + } else { > + pr_err("Failed to read private key from '%s'\n", > + fw_key_file); > + goto err; > + } > + } > + > + /* Warn about potential compatiblity issues. */ > + if (key_item || fw_key != root_key) > + pr_warn("Only H6 supports separate root and firmware keys\n"); > + > + ret = toc0_create(buf, params->file_size, root_key, fw_key, > + key_item, key_item_len, > + buf + TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN, > + params->orig_file_size, params->addr); > + > +err: > + OPENSSL_free(key_item); > + OPENSSL_free(root_key); > + if (fw_key != root_key) > + OPENSSL_free(fw_key); > + if (fp) > + fclose(fp); > + > + if (ret != EXIT_SUCCESS) > + exit(ret); > +} > + > +static int toc0_check_image_type(uint8_t type) > +{ > + return type == IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0 ? 0 : 1; > +} > + > +static int toc0_vrec_header(struct image_tool_params *params, > + struct image_type_params *tparams) > +{ > + tparams->hdr = calloc(tparams->header_size, 1); > + > + /* Save off the unpadded data size for SHA256 calculation. */ > + params->orig_file_size = params->file_size - TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN; > + > + /* Return padding to 8K blocks. */ > + return ALIGN(params->file_size, PAD_SIZE) - params->file_size; > +} > + > +U_BOOT_IMAGE_TYPE( > + sunxi_toc0, > + "Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image support", > + TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN, > + NULL, > + toc0_check_params, > + toc0_verify_header, > + toc0_print_header, > + toc0_set_header, > + NULL, > + toc0_check_image_type, > + NULL, > + toc0_vrec_header > +);
