On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
> This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support.
> PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both
> UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in
> measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are
> gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if
> UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled.
>
> This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
> to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.koj...@linaro.org>
> ---
>
> Changes in v3:
> - hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
>
> Changes in v2:
> - Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c
> - Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
> - Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
> - Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c
> - Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c
>
>
> lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 6 +++
> lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +-
> lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +---------------------------
> lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 ++
> 5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
> index 0b99d7c774..b76e77180e 100644
> --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
> @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
> select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
> select PKCS7_VERIFY
> select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO
> + select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
> default n
> help
> Select this option if you want to enable capsule
> @@ -336,6 +337,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
> select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
> select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
> select PKCS7_VERIFY
> + select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
> default n
> help
> Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support.
> @@ -343,6 +345,10 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
> it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install,
> at least, PK, KEK and db.
>
> +config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
> + bool
> + depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT || EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
> +
> config EFI_ESRT
> bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation"
> depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT
> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
> index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644
> --- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
> @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o
> -obj-y += efi_signature.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o
>
> EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $\",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE))
> $(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)
> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
> b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
> index f53ef367ec..b8a790bcb9 100644
> --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
> @@ -213,7 +213,68 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type(
> }
> }
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
> +/**
> + * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region
> + * @regs: Pointer to array of regions
> + * @start: Start address of region (included)
> + * @end: End address of region (excluded)
> + * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions
> + *
> + * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.
> + *
> + * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.
> + * Overlapping entries will not be allowed.
> + *
> + * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence
> + * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.
> + *
> + * Return: status code
> + */
> +efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
> + const void *start, const void *end,
> + int nocheck)
> +{
> + struct image_region *reg;
> + int i, j;
> +
> + if (regs->num >= regs->max) {
> + EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);
> + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
> + }
> +
> + if (end < start)
> + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {
> + reg = ®s->reg[i];
> + if (nocheck)
> + continue;
> +
> + /* new data after registered region */
> + if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)
> + continue;
> +
> + /* new data preceding registered region */
> + if (end <= reg->data) {
> + for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)
> + memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j],
> + sizeof(*reg));
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + /* new data overlapping registered region */
> + EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);
> + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> + }
> +
> + reg = ®s->reg[i];
> + reg->data = start;
> + reg->size = end - start;
> + regs->num++;
> +
> + return EFI_SUCCESS;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
> * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header
> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t
> efi_size)
>
> EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
>
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
> + return true;
> +
Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in
this case?
Best regards
Heinrich
> if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled())
> return true;
>
> @@ -668,13 +732,6 @@ err:
> EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, %d\n", __func__, ret);
> return ret;
> }
> -#else
> -static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
> -{
> - return true;
> -}
> -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
> -
>
> /**
> * efi_check_pe() - check if a memory buffer contains a PE-COFF image
> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
> index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644
> --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
> @@ -15,18 +15,16 @@
> #include <crypto/public_key.h>
> #include <linux/compat.h>
> #include <linux/oid_registry.h>
> +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
> #include <u-boot/rsa.h>
> #include <u-boot/sha256.h>
>
> -const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =
> - EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
> const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
> const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID;
> const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
> const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
> const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
>
> -#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) ||
> defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
> static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = {
> /* SEQUENCE */
> 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7,
> @@ -539,68 +537,6 @@ out:
> return !revoked;
> }
>
> -/**
> - * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region
> - * @regs: Pointer to array of regions
> - * @start: Start address of region (included)
> - * @end: End address of region (excluded)
> - * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions
> - *
> - * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.
> - *
> - * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.
> - * Overlapping entries will not be allowed.
> - *
> - * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence
> - * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.
> - *
> - * Return: status code
> - */
> -efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
> - const void *start, const void *end,
> - int nocheck)
> -{
> - struct image_region *reg;
> - int i, j;
> -
> - if (regs->num >= regs->max) {
> - EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);
> - return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
> - }
> -
> - if (end < start)
> - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> -
> - for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {
> - reg = ®s->reg[i];
> - if (nocheck)
> - continue;
> -
> - /* new data after registered region */
> - if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)
> - continue;
> -
> - /* new data preceding registered region */
> - if (end <= reg->data) {
> - for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)
> - memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j],
> - sizeof(*reg));
> - break;
> - }
> -
> - /* new data overlapping registered region */
> - EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);
> - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> - }
> -
> - reg = ®s->reg[i];
> - reg->data = start;
> - reg->size = end - start;
> - regs->num++;
> -
> - return EFI_SUCCESS;
> -}
> -
> /**
> * efi_sigstore_free - free signature store
> * @sigstore: Pointer to signature store structure
> @@ -846,4 +782,3 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16
> *name)
>
> return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size);
> }
> -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */
> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
> index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644
> --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ struct efi_auth_var_name_type {
> const enum efi_auth_var_type type;
> };
>
> +const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =
> + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
> +
> static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = {
> {u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK},
> {u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK},
>
