On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 07:29:17PM +0100, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote: > On 1/28/20 9:25 AM, AKASHI Takahiro wrote: > > With this commit, image validation can be enforced, as UEFI specification > > section 32.5 describes, if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is enabled. > > > > Currently we support > > * authentication based on db and dbx, > > so dbx-validated image will always be rejected. > > * following signature types: > > EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID (SHA256 digest for unsigned images) > > EFI_CERT_X509_GUID (x509 certificate for signed images) > > Timestamp-based certificate revocation is not supported here. > > > > Internally, authentication data is stored in one of certificates tables > > of PE image (See efi_image_parse()) and will be verified by > > efi_image_authenticate() before loading a given image. > > > > It seems that UEFI specification defines the verification process > > in a bit ambiguous way. I tried to implement it as closely to as > > EDK2 does. > > > > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.aka...@linaro.org> > > According to git bisect this patch breaks the test > test/py/tests/test_efi_fit.py.
This error only occurs on "compressed" FIT images. While I'm not sure whether it is directly related to efi support in bootm or not, I've fixed it any way. Thanks, -Takahiro Akashi > Best regards > > Heinrich
