On Thu, Jan 09, 2020 at 12:55:17AM +0100, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote: > On 12/18/19 1:45 AM, AKASHI Takahiro wrote: > >With this commit, image validation can be enforced, as UEFI specification > >section 32.5 describes, if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is enabled. > > > >Currently we support > >* authentication based on db and dbx, > > so dbx-validated image will always be rejected. > >* following signature types: > > EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID (SHA256 digest for unsigned images) > > EFI_CERT_X509_GUID (x509 certificate for signed images) > >Timestamp-based certificate revocation is not supported here. > > > >Internally, authentication data is stored in one of certificates tables > >of PE image (See efi_image_parse()) and will be verified by > >efi_image_authenticate() before loading a given image. > > > >It seems that UEFI specification defines the verification process > >in a bit ambiguous way. I tried to implement it as closely to as > >EDK2 does. > > > >Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.aka...@linaro.org> > >--- > > include/efi_loader.h | 7 +- > > lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | 2 +- > > lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 454 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > > 3 files changed, 449 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) > > > >diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h > >index 1f88caf86709..e12b49098fb0 100644 > >--- a/include/efi_loader.h > >+++ b/include/efi_loader.h > >@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > > #include <common.h> > > #include <part_efi.h> > > #include <efi_api.h> > >+#include <pe.h> > > > > static inline int guidcmp(const void *g1, const void *g2) > > { > >@@ -398,7 +399,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_watchdog(unsigned long timeout); > > /* Called from places to check whether a timer expired */ > > void efi_timer_check(void); > > /* PE loader implementation */ > >-efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, void *efi, > >+efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > >+ void *efi, size_t efi_size, > > struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info); > > /* Called once to store the pristine gd pointer */ > > void efi_save_gd(void); > >@@ -726,6 +728,9 @@ void efi_sigstore_free(struct efi_signature_store > >*sigstore); > > struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name); > > > > bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); > >+ > >+bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, > >+ WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); > > #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ > > > > #else /* CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_LOADER) */ > >diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c > >index 493d906c641d..311681764034 100644 > >--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c > >+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c > >@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_load_image(bool boot_policy, > > efi_dp_split_file_path(file_path, &dp, &fp); > > ret = efi_setup_loaded_image(dp, fp, image_obj, &info); > > if (ret == EFI_SUCCESS) > >- ret = efi_load_pe(*image_obj, dest_buffer, info); > >+ ret = efi_load_pe(*image_obj, dest_buffer, source_size, info); > > if (!source_buffer) > > /* Release buffer to which file was loaded */ > > efi_free_pages((uintptr_t)dest_buffer, > >diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > >b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > >index 13541cfa7a28..939758e61e3c 100644 > >--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > >+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > >@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ > > > > #include <common.h> > > #include <efi_loader.h> > >+#include <malloc.h> > > #include <pe.h> > >+#include "../lib/crypto/pkcs7_parser.h" > > > > const efi_guid_t efi_global_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; > > const efi_guid_t efi_guid_device_path = EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL_GUID; > >@@ -205,6 +207,367 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type( > > } > > } > > > >+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT > >+/** > >+ * efi_image_parse - parse a PE image > >+ * @efi: Pointer to image > >+ * @len: Size of @efi > >+ * @regs: Pointer to a list of regions > >+ * @auth: Pointer to a pointer to authentication data in PE > >+ * @auth_len: Size of @auth > >+ * > >+ * Parse image binary in PE32(+) format, assuming that sanity of PE image > >+ * has been checked by a caller. > >+ * On success, an address of authentication data in @efi and its size will > >+ * be returned in @auth and @auth_len, respectively. > >+ * > >+ * Return: true on success, false on error > >+ */ > >+bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, > >+ WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len) > > > This function is way too long (> 100 lines). Please, cut it into logical > units. > > > > >+{ > >+ struct efi_image_regions *regs; > >+ IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos; > >+ IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; > >+ IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sections, **sorted; > >+ int num_regions, num_sections, i, j; > >+ int ctidx = IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY; > >+ u32 align, size, authsz, authoff; > >+ size_t bytes_hashed; > >+ > >+ dos = (void *)efi; > >+ nt = (void *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew); > >+ > >+ /* > >+ * Count maximum number of regions to be digested. > >+ * We don't have to have an exact number here. > >+ * See efi_image_region_add()'s in parsing below. > >+ */ > >+ num_regions = 3; /* for header */ > >+ num_regions += nt->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; > >+ num_regions++; /* for extra */ > >+ > >+ regs = calloc(sizeof(*regs) + sizeof(struct image_region) * num_regions, > >+ 1); > >+ if (!regs) > >+ goto err; > >+ regs->max = num_regions; > >+ > >+ /* > >+ * Collect data regions for hash calculation > >+ * 1. File headers > >+ */ > >+ if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) { > >+ IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (void *)nt; > >+ IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64 *opt = &nt64->OptionalHeader; > >+ > >+ /* Skip CheckSum */ > >+ efi_image_region_add(regs, efi, &opt->CheckSum, 0); > >+ if (nt64->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= ctidx) { > >+ efi_image_region_add(regs, > >+ &opt->CheckSum + 1, > >+ efi + opt->SizeOfHeaders, 0); > >+ } else { > >+ /* Skip Certificates Table */ > >+ efi_image_region_add(regs, > >+ &opt->CheckSum + 1, > >+ &opt->DataDirectory[ctidx], 0); > >+ efi_image_region_add(regs, > >+ &opt->DataDirectory[ctidx] + 1, > >+ efi + opt->SizeOfHeaders, 0); > >+ } > >+ > >+ bytes_hashed = opt->SizeOfHeaders; > >+ align = opt->FileAlignment; > >+ authoff = opt->DataDirectory[ctidx].VirtualAddress; > >+ authsz = opt->DataDirectory[ctidx].Size; > >+ } else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { > >+ IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32 *opt = &nt->OptionalHeader; > >+ > >+ efi_image_region_add(regs, efi, &opt->CheckSum, 0); > >+ efi_image_region_add(regs, &opt->CheckSum + 1, > >+ &opt->DataDirectory[ctidx], 0); > >+ efi_image_region_add(regs, &opt->DataDirectory[ctidx] + 1, > >+ efi + opt->SizeOfHeaders, 0); > >+ > >+ bytes_hashed = opt->SizeOfHeaders; > >+ align = opt->FileAlignment; > >+ authoff = opt->DataDirectory[ctidx].VirtualAddress; > >+ authsz = opt->DataDirectory[ctidx].Size; > >+ } else { > >+ debug("%s: Invalid optional header magic %x\n", __func__, > >+ nt->OptionalHeader.Magic); > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* 2. Sections */ > >+ num_sections = nt->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; > >+ sections = (void *)((uint8_t *)&nt->OptionalHeader + > >+ nt->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader); > >+ sorted = calloc(sizeof(IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *), num_sections); > >+ if (!sorted) { > >+ debug("%s: Out of memory\n", __func__); > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* > >+ * Make sure the section list is in ascending order. > >+ * As we can assume that it is already ordered in most cases, > >+ * the following code is optimized for this. > >+ */ > >+ for (sorted[0] = §ions[0], i = 1; i < num_sections; i++) { > > If sections[0] is not the lowest entry this function fails. > > Please, use qsort() supplied in lib/qsort.c.
I'd rather fix my code as it is much simpler than qsort. > >+ if (sorted[i - 1]->VirtualAddress > >+ <= sections[i].VirtualAddress) { > >+ sorted[i] = §ions[i]; > >+ } else { > >+ if (i == 1) { > >+ sorted[1] = sorted[0]; > >+ sorted[0] = §ions[1]; > >+ continue; > >+ } > >+ > >+ sorted[i] = sorted[i - 1]; > >+ for (j = i - 2; j >= 0; j--) { > >+ if (!j || sorted[j]->VirtualAddress > >+ <= sections[i].VirtualAddress) { > >+ sorted[j + 1] = §ions[i]; > >+ continue; > >+ } else { > >+ sorted[j + 1] = sorted[j]; > >+ } > >+ } > >+ } > >+ } > >+ > >+ for (i = 0; i < num_sections; i++) { > >+ if (!sorted[i]->SizeOfRawData) > >+ continue; > >+ > >+ size = (sorted[i]->SizeOfRawData + align - 1) & ~(align - 1); > >+ efi_image_region_add(regs, efi + sorted[i]->PointerToRawData, > >+ efi + sorted[i]->PointerToRawData + size, > >+ 0); > >+ debug("section[%d](%s): raw: 0x%x-0x%x, virt: %x-%x\n", > >+ i, sorted[i]->Name, > >+ sorted[i]->PointerToRawData, > >+ sorted[i]->PointerToRawData + size, > >+ sorted[i]->VirtualAddress, > >+ sorted[i]->VirtualAddress > >+ + sorted[i]->Misc.VirtualSize); > >+ > >+ bytes_hashed += size; > >+ } > >+ free(sorted); > >+ > >+ /* 3. Extra data excluding Certificates Table */ > >+ if (bytes_hashed + authsz < len) { > >+ debug("extra data for hash: %lu\n", > >+ len - (bytes_hashed + authsz)); > >+ efi_image_region_add(regs, efi + bytes_hashed, > >+ efi + len - authsz, 0); > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* Return Certificates Table */ > >+ if (authsz) { > >+ if (len < authoff + authsz) { > >+ debug("%s: Size for auth too large: %u >= %zu\n", > >+ __func__, authsz, len - authoff); > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ if (authsz < sizeof(*auth)) { > >+ debug("%s: Size for auth too small: %u < %zu\n", > >+ __func__, authsz, sizeof(*auth)); > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ *auth = efi + authoff; > >+ *auth_len = authsz; > >+ debug("WIN_CERTIFICATE: 0x%x, size: 0x%x\n", authoff, authsz); > >+ } else { > >+ *auth = NULL; > >+ *auth_len = 0; > >+ } > >+ > >+ *regp = regs; > >+ > >+ return true; > >+ > >+err: > >+ free(regs); > >+ > >+ return false; > >+} > >+ > >+/** > >+ * efi_image_unsigned_authenticate - authenticate unsigned image with > >+ * SHA256 hash > >+ * @regs: List of regions to be verified > >+ * > >+ * If an image is not signed, it doesn't have a signature. In this case, > >+ * its message digest is calculated and it will be compared with one of > >+ * hash values stored in signature databases. > >+ * > >+ * Return: true if authenticated, false if not > >+ */ > >+static bool efi_image_unsigned_authenticate(struct efi_image_regions *regs) > >+{ > >+ struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; > >+ bool ret = false; > >+ > >+ dbx = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(L"dbx"); > >+ if (!dbx) { > >+ debug("Getting signature database(dbx) failed\n"); > >+ goto out; > >+ } > >+ > >+ db = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(L"db"); > >+ if (!db) { > >+ debug("Getting signature database(db) failed\n"); > >+ goto out; > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* try black-list first */ > >+ if (efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, NULL, dbx, NULL)) { > >+ debug("Image is not signed and rejected by \"dbx\"\n"); > >+ goto out; > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* try white-list */ > >+ if (efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, NULL, db, NULL)) > >+ ret = true; > >+ else > >+ debug("Image is not signed and not found in \"db\" or > >\"dbx\"\n"); > >+ > >+out: > >+ efi_sigstore_free(db); > >+ efi_sigstore_free(dbx); > >+ > >+ return ret; > >+} > >+ > >+/** > >+ * efi_image_authenticate - verify a signature of signed image > >+ * @efi: Pointer to image > >+ * @len: Size of @efi > >+ * > >+ * A signed image should have its signature stored in a table of its PE > >header. > >+ * So if an image is signed and only if if its signature is verified using > >+ * signature databases, an image is authenticated. > >+ * If an image is not signed, its validity is checked by using > >+ * efi_image_unsigned_authenticated(). > >+ * TODO: > >+ * When AuditMode==0, if the image's signature is not found in > >+ * the authorized database, or is found in the forbidden database, > >+ * the image will not be started and instead, information about it > >+ * will be placed in this table. > >+ * When AuditMode==1, an EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO element is created > >+ * in the EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE for every certificate found > >+ * in the certificate table of every image that is validated. > >+ * > >+ * Return: true if authenticated, false if not > >+ */ > >+static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t len) > >+{ > >+ struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL; > >+ WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL, *wincert; > >+ size_t wincerts_len; > >+ struct pkcs7_message *msg = NULL; > >+ struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; > >+ struct x509_certificate *cert = NULL; > >+ bool ret = false; > >+ > >+ if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) > >+ return true; > >+ > >+ if (!efi_image_parse(efi, len, ®s, &wincerts, > >+ &wincerts_len)) { > >+ debug("Parsing PE executable image failed\n"); > >+ return false; > >+ } > >+ > >+ if (!wincerts) { > >+ /* The image is not signed */ > >+ ret = efi_image_unsigned_authenticate(regs); > >+ free(regs); > >+ > >+ return ret; > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* > >+ * verify signature using db and dbx > >+ */ > >+ db = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(L"db"); > >+ if (!db) { > >+ debug("Getting signature database(db) failed\n"); > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ > >+ dbx = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(L"dbx"); > >+ if (!dbx) { > >+ debug("Getting signature database(dbx) failed\n"); > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* go through WIN_CERTIFICATE list */ > >+ for (wincert = wincerts; > >+ (void *)wincert < (void *)wincerts + wincerts_len; > >+ wincert = (void *)wincert + ALIGN(wincert->dwLength, 8)) { > >+ if (wincert->dwLength < sizeof(*wincert)) { > >+ debug("%s: dwLength too small: %u < %zu\n", > >+ __func__, wincert->dwLength, sizeof(*wincert)); > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ msg = pkcs7_parse_message((void *)wincert + sizeof(*wincert), > >+ wincert->dwLength - sizeof(*wincert)); > >+ if (!msg) { > >+ debug("Parsing image's signature failed\n"); > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* try black-list first */ > >+ if (efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, msg, dbx, NULL)) { > >+ debug("Signature was rejected by \"dbx\"\n"); > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ > >+ if (!efi_signature_verify_signers(msg, dbx)) { > >+ debug("Signer was rejected by \"dbx\"\n"); > >+ goto err; > >+ } else { > >+ ret = true; > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* try white-list */ > >+ if (!efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, msg, db, &cert)) { > >+ debug("Verifying signature with \"db\" failed\n"); > >+ goto err; > >+ } else { > >+ ret = true; > >+ } > >+ > >+ if (!efi_signature_verify_cert(cert, dbx)) { > >+ debug("Certificate was rejected by \"dbx\"\n"); > >+ goto err; > >+ } else { > >+ ret = true; > >+ } > >+ } > >+ > >+err: > >+ x509_free_certificate(cert); > >+ efi_sigstore_free(db); > >+ efi_sigstore_free(dbx); > >+ pkcs7_free_message(msg); > >+ free(regs); > >+ > >+ return ret; > >+} > >+#else > >+static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t len) > >+{ > >+ return true; > >+} > >+#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ > >+ > > /** > > * efi_load_pe() - relocate EFI binary > > * > >@@ -216,7 +579,8 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type( > > * @loaded_image_info: loaded image protocol > > * Return: status code > > */ > >-efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, void *efi, > >+efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > >+ void *efi, size_t efi_size, > > struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info) > > { > > IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; > >@@ -231,17 +595,57 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj > >*handle, void *efi, > > uint64_t image_base; > > unsigned long virt_size = 0; > > int supported = 0; > >+ void *new_efi = NULL; > >+ size_t new_efi_size; > >+ efi_status_t ret; > >+ > >+ /* > >+ * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be > >+ * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. > >+ */ > >+ if (efi_size & 0x7) { > >+ new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL; > >+ new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); > >+ if (!new_efi) > >+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > >+ memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size); > >+ efi = new_efi; > >+ efi_size = new_efi_size; > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* Sanity check for a file header */ > >+ if (efi_size < sizeof(*dos)) { > >+ printf("%s: Truncated DOS Header\n", __func__); > >+ ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ goto err; > >+ } > > > > dos = efi; > > if (dos->e_magic != IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) { > > printf("%s: Invalid DOS Signature\n", __func__); > >- return EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* assume sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32) <= sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64) */ > >+ if (efi_size < dos->e_lfanew + sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32)) { > >+ printf("%s: Invalid offset for Extended Header\n", __func__); > >+ ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ goto err; > > } > > > > nt = (void *) ((char *)efi + dos->e_lfanew); > >+ if ((nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) && > >+ (efi_size < dos->e_lfanew + sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64))) { > >+ printf("%s: Invalid offset for Extended Header\n", __func__); > >+ ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ > > if (nt->Signature != IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) { > > printf("%s: Invalid NT Signature\n", __func__); > >- return EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ goto err; > > } > > > > for (i = 0; machines[i]; i++) > >@@ -253,14 +657,29 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj > >*handle, void *efi, > > if (!supported) { > > printf("%s: Machine type 0x%04x is not supported\n", > > __func__, nt->FileHeader.Machine); > >- return EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ goto err; > > } > > > >- /* Calculate upper virtual address boundary */ > > num_sections = nt->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; > > sections = (void *)&nt->OptionalHeader + > > nt->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader; > > > >+ if (efi_size < ((void *)sections + sizeof(sections[0]) * num_sections > >+ - efi)) { > >+ printf("%s: Invalid number of sections: %d\n", > >+ __func__, num_sections); > >+ ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* Authenticate an image */ > >+ if (!efi_image_authenticate(efi, efi_size)) { > >+ ret = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; > > According to the UEFI specification LoadImage() should return > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION in this case. Will check. > Further behaviour should depend on variables AuditMode and DeployedMode. > > If authentication fails, you must update the configuration table > identified by EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID containing the Image > Execution Information. If the authentication succeeds you may enter a > record. > > It seems to me that in your patch series you are not creating the > configuration table at all. >From the very beginning of my submissions, I have clearly said that this feature was *beyond the scope* in my current series. ===8<=== Unsupported features: (marked as TODO in most cases in the source code, and won't be included in this series) (snip) * recording rejected images in EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE ===>8=== > The content of the Image Execution Information Table should be used to > decide if StartImage() may start an image. This is still missing in the > patch series. No. Whether such information be in configuration table or not, non-authenticated image won't be started if secure boot is in force. Thanks, -Takahiro Akashi > > Best regards > > Heinrich > > >+ goto err; > >+ } > >+ > >+ /* Calculate upper virtual address boundary */ > > for (i = num_sections - 1; i >= 0; i--) { > > IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sec = §ions[i]; > > virt_size = max_t(unsigned long, virt_size, > >@@ -279,7 +698,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj > >*handle, void *efi, > > if (!efi_reloc) { > > printf("%s: Could not allocate %lu bytes\n", > > __func__, virt_size); > >- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > >+ ret = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > >+ goto err; > > } > > handle->entry = efi_reloc + opt->AddressOfEntryPoint; > > rel_size = opt->DataDirectory[rel_idx].Size; > >@@ -295,7 +715,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj > >*handle, void *efi, > > if (!efi_reloc) { > > printf("%s: Could not allocate %lu bytes\n", > > __func__, virt_size); > >- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > >+ ret = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > >+ goto err; > > } > > handle->entry = efi_reloc + opt->AddressOfEntryPoint; > > rel_size = opt->DataDirectory[rel_idx].Size; > >@@ -304,13 +725,16 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj > >*handle, void *efi, > > } else { > > printf("%s: Invalid optional header magic %x\n", __func__, > > nt->OptionalHeader.Magic); > >- return EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ goto err; > > } > > > > /* Copy PE headers */ > >- memcpy(efi_reloc, efi, sizeof(*dos) + sizeof(*nt) > >- + nt->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader > >- + num_sections * sizeof(IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER)); > >+ memcpy(efi_reloc, efi, > >+ sizeof(*dos) > >+ + sizeof(*nt) > >+ + nt->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader > >+ + num_sections * sizeof(IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER)); > > > > /* Load sections into RAM */ > > for (i = num_sections - 1; i >= 0; i--) { > >@@ -327,7 +751,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj > >*handle, void *efi, > > (unsigned long)image_base) != EFI_SUCCESS) { > > efi_free_pages((uintptr_t) efi_reloc, > > (virt_size + EFI_PAGE_MASK) >> EFI_PAGE_SHIFT); > >- return EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR; > >+ goto err; > > } > > > > /* Flush cache */ > >@@ -340,4 +765,9 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj > >*handle, void *efi, > > loaded_image_info->image_size = virt_size; > > > > return EFI_SUCCESS; > >+ > >+err: > >+ free(new_efi); > >+ > >+ return ret; > > } > > >