For FIT verification, all the properties of a public key come from
"control fdt" pointed to by fdt_blob. In UEFI secure boot, on the other
hand, a public key is located and retrieved from dedicated signature
database stored as UEFI variables.
Added two fields may hold values of a public key if fdt_blob is NULL, and
will be used in rsa_verify_with_pkey() to verify a signature in UEFI
sub-system.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.aka...@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <s...@chromium.org>
---
include/image.h | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h
index 7eb0b4b53184..20e1f95cf2a7 100644
--- a/include/image.h
+++ b/include/image.h
@@ -1142,6 +1142,13 @@ struct image_sign_info {
int required_keynode; /* Node offset of key to use: -1=any */
const char *require_keys; /* Value for 'required' property */
const char *engine_id; /* Engine to use for signing */
+ /*
+ * Note: the following two fields are always valid even w/o
+ * RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY in order to make sure this structure is
+ * the same on target and host. Otherwise, vboot test may fail.
+ */
+ const void *key; /* Pointer to public key in DER */
+ int keylen; /* Length of public key */
};
/* A part of an image, used for hashing */
--
2.21.0
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