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*Apologies for cross postings*
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Call For Participation: Online Workshop Series "Proofs, Computation and Meaning"
Third online event: December 7, 2022, 4 pm CET
Website:
https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://ls.informatik.uni-tuebingen.de/pcm-online/__;!!IBzWLUs!TZ5MJofKHnh2rJGwKYZzxRgbV2HzR6hIxiSk5ZyKvzzLvPBa85fp38ywh7dcFCGx46WyEK3WIl42ayEc0Pskv9VlmpDyGrfqytKYGj0AuA$
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This online workshop series was originally planned as an in person meeting
which was canceled due to the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic in early
March 2020.
The event was planned to bring researchers whose work focuses on the notion of
formal proof from either a philosophical, computational or mathematical
perspective. With the obvious limitations of an online format, we wish to keep
this original motivation, which looks even more timely in a time in which
interdisciplinary interactions are made more difficult by the pandemic.
The goal is that of creating an opportunity for members of different
communities to interact and exchange their views on proofs, their identity
conditions, and the more convenient ways of representing them formally.
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SCOPE:
Around thirty years after the fall of Hilbert's program, the proofs-as-programs
paradigm established the view that a proof should not be identified, as in
Hilbert's metamathematics, with a string of symbols in some formal system.
Rather, proofs should consist in computational or epistemic objects conveying
evidence to mathematical propositions. The relationship between formal
derivations and proofs should then be analogous to the one between words and
their meanings.
This view naturally gives rise to questions such as “which conditions should a
formal arrangement of symbols satisfy to represent a proof?” or “when do two
formal derivations represent the same proof?". These questions underlie past
and current research in proof theory both in the theoretical computer science
community (e.g. categorical logic, domain theory, linear logic) and in the
philosophy community (e.g. proof-theoretic semantics).
In spite of these common motivations and historical roots, it seems that today
proof theorists in philosophy and in computer science are losing sight of each
other. This workshop aims at contributing to a renaissance of the interaction
between researchers with different backgrounds by establishing a constructive
environment for exchanging views, problems and results.
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ORGANIZATION:
The workshop series includes three events, each focusing on one specific aspect
of proofs and their representation. To foster interaction and discussion, each
event will consists in short talks followed by a 15 minutes slot during which
participants can engage in discussion or just take a short break.
Event 3. On the nature of proofs
December 7, 4-7 pm (CET)
The developments of logic, and of proof theory in particular, have lead us to
look at proofs primarily through the lens of various formal systems, such as
natural deduction, sequent calculus, tableaux, proof nets etc. Yet, is it
possible to investigate the nature of proofs, their identity conditions, their
relations with computation and with meaning in a direct way, i.e. independently
of the choice of a particular formal system?
Speakers:
- Bahareh Afshari (University of Amsterdam/University of Gothenburg)
- Sonia Marin (University of Birmingham)
- Alberto Naibo (Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University)
- Antonio Piccolomini d'Aragona (Czech Academy of Science)
- Noam Zeilberger (École Polytechnique Paris-Saclay)
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CALL FOR PARTICIPATION:
If you attended previous workshops, you will receive a Zoom link soon.
Otherwise, please send an e-mail to [email protected] or
[email protected].
