** Description changed: - (This is uploaded to noble as 2.8.1 per - https://wiki.ubuntu.com/AptUpdates) + (Please see https://wiki.ubuntu.com/AptUpdates for the versioning) [Impact] - We have received feedback from users that use NIST-P256 keys for their repositories that are upset about receiving a warning. APT 2.8.0 in noble-proposed would bump the warning to an error, breaking them. - - We also revoked additional ECC curves, which may still be considered - trusted, so we should not bump them to errors. + We have received feedback from users that use NIST-P256 keys for their repositories that are upset about receiving a warning. We also revoked additional ECC curves, which may still be considered trusted, so we should not bump them to errors. Also existing users may have third-party repositories that use 1024-bit - RSA keys and we have not adequately informed them yet perhaps. + RSA keys and we have not adequately informed them yet perhaps. We tried + to revoke them in the 2.8.0, 2.8.1, and 2.8.2 updates (see bug 2060721). + This has been deferred to a later update than 2.8.3 such that we can + solve the warnings and other bugs. [Solution] Hence we will restore all elliptic curve keys of 256 or more bit to trusted: - ">=rsa2048,ed25519,ed448,nistp256,nistp384,nistp512,brainpoolP256r1,brainpoolP320r1,brainpoolP384r1,brainpoolP512r1,secp256k1"; + ">=rsa1024,ed25519,ed448,nistp256,nistp384,nistp512,brainpoolP256r1,brainpoolP320r1,brainpoolP384r1,brainpoolP512r1,secp256k1"; At the same time we will also introduce a more nuanced approach to revocations by introducing a 'next' level that issues a warning if the key is not allowed in it and a 'future' level that will issue an audit message with the --audit option. For the next level, we will set it to: ">=rsa2048,ed25519,ed448,nistp256,nistp384,nistp512" This means we restrict warnings to Brainpool curves and the secp256k1 key, which we have not received any feedback about them being used yet. For the future level, we will take a strong approach to best practices as it is only seen when explictly running with --audit and the intention is to highlight best practices. It will be set to ">=rsa3072,ed25519,ed448"; Which corresponds to the NIST recommendations for 2031 (and as little curves as possible). - - We are also introducing a mitigation for existing 24.04 systems to not - upgrade the policy yet; by creating an apt.conf.d configuration file - that temporarily allows the 1024-bit RSA keys if upgraded from apt - 2.7.x; with the plan to remove them in 24.04.2. [Test plan] Tests are included in the library unit tests for parsing the specification strings; we have also included a test for the gpgv method to ensure that it produces the correct outcome for both 'next' and 'future' revoked keys. The manual test cases are the same as for LP: #2060721. Test Case A: Existing noble system (warning) 0. Update an existing noble container to the new APT 1. Observe/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/00-temporary-rsa1024 being created 2. Add a PPA with an old 1024-bit signing key 3. Run apt update 4. Observe that the PPA is updated with a warning Test Case B: New noble system (error) 0. Bootstrap a new noble system including apt from proposed (using e.g. mmdebstrap) 1. Observe NO /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/00-temporary-rsa1024 2. Add a PPA with an old 1024-bit signing key 3. Run apt update 4. Observe that the PPA is not updated, but the other repositories are Test Case C: mantic -> noble (error) 0. Upgrade mantic to noble w/ apt from proposed, observe behavior as in B Test Case D: jammy -> noble (error) 0. Upgrade jammy to noble w/ apt from proposed, observe behavior as in B [Where problems could occur] There could of course be bugs in the implementation of the new feature; this could result in verification of files failing. This also happens if you specify an invalid `next` or `future` string. There cannot be any false positives: The new levels are only *additional* checks, anything not in the `Assert-Pubkey-Algo` list is still revoked.
** Description changed: (Please see https://wiki.ubuntu.com/AptUpdates for the versioning) [Impact] We have received feedback from users that use NIST-P256 keys for their repositories that are upset about receiving a warning. We also revoked additional ECC curves, which may still be considered trusted, so we should not bump them to errors. Also existing users may have third-party repositories that use 1024-bit RSA keys and we have not adequately informed them yet perhaps. We tried to revoke them in the 2.8.0, 2.8.1, and 2.8.2 updates (see bug 2060721). This has been deferred to a later update than 2.8.3 such that we can solve the warnings and other bugs. [Solution] Hence we will restore all elliptic curve keys of 256 or more bit to trusted: ">=rsa1024,ed25519,ed448,nistp256,nistp384,nistp512,brainpoolP256r1,brainpoolP320r1,brainpoolP384r1,brainpoolP512r1,secp256k1"; At the same time we will also introduce a more nuanced approach to revocations by introducing a 'next' level that issues a warning if the key is not allowed in it and a 'future' level that will issue an audit message with the --audit option. For the next level, we will set it to: ">=rsa2048,ed25519,ed448,nistp256,nistp384,nistp512" This means we restrict warnings to Brainpool curves and the secp256k1 key, which we have not received any feedback about them being used yet. For the future level, we will take a strong approach to best practices as it is only seen when explictly running with --audit and the intention is to highlight best practices. It will be set to ">=rsa3072,ed25519,ed448"; Which corresponds to the NIST recommendations for 2031 (and as little curves as possible). [Test plan] Tests are included in the library unit tests for parsing the specification strings; we have also included a test for the gpgv method to ensure that it produces the correct outcome for both 'next' and 'future' revoked keys. - The manual test cases are the same as for LP: #2060721. + Some smoke tests: - Test Case A: Existing noble system (warning) - - 0. Update an existing noble container to the new APT - 1. Observe/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/00-temporary-rsa1024 being created - 2. Add a PPA with an old 1024-bit signing key - 3. Run apt update - 4. Observe that the PPA is updated with a warning - - Test Case B: New noble system (error) - - 0. Bootstrap a new noble system including apt from proposed (using e.g. mmdebstrap) - 1. Observe NO /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/00-temporary-rsa1024 - 2. Add a PPA with an old 1024-bit signing key - 3. Run apt update - 4. Observe that the PPA is not updated, but the other repositories are - - Test Case C: mantic -> noble (error) - - 0. Upgrade mantic to noble w/ apt from proposed, observe behavior as in - B - - Test Case D: jammy -> noble (error) - - 0. Upgrade jammy to noble w/ apt from proposed, observe behavior as in B + - Observe one a system with a 1024R signed repository that it keeps working and produces a warning (ensures a key listed in "next" but not in "current" warns) + - Sign a repository with a NIST P-256 key and ensure it does not produce warnings (ensures that a key listed in "current" and "next" does not warn) [Where problems could occur] There could of course be bugs in the implementation of the new feature; this could result in verification of files failing. This also happens if you specify an invalid `next` or `future` string. There cannot be any false positives: The new levels are only *additional* checks, anything not in the `Assert-Pubkey-Algo` list is still revoked. ** Description changed: (Please see https://wiki.ubuntu.com/AptUpdates for the versioning) [Impact] We have received feedback from users that use NIST-P256 keys for their repositories that are upset about receiving a warning. We also revoked additional ECC curves, which may still be considered trusted, so we should not bump them to errors. Also existing users may have third-party repositories that use 1024-bit RSA keys and we have not adequately informed them yet perhaps. We tried to revoke them in the 2.8.0, 2.8.1, and 2.8.2 updates (see bug 2060721). This has been deferred to a later update than 2.8.3 such that we can solve the warnings and other bugs. [Solution] Hence we will restore all elliptic curve keys of 256 or more bit to trusted: ">=rsa1024,ed25519,ed448,nistp256,nistp384,nistp512,brainpoolP256r1,brainpoolP320r1,brainpoolP384r1,brainpoolP512r1,secp256k1"; At the same time we will also introduce a more nuanced approach to revocations by introducing a 'next' level that issues a warning if the key is not allowed in it and a 'future' level that will issue an audit message with the --audit option. For the next level, we will set it to: ">=rsa2048,ed25519,ed448,nistp256,nistp384,nistp512" This means we restrict warnings to Brainpool curves and the secp256k1 key, which we have not received any feedback about them being used yet. For the future level, we will take a strong approach to best practices as it is only seen when explictly running with --audit and the intention is to highlight best practices. It will be set to ">=rsa3072,ed25519,ed448"; Which corresponds to the NIST recommendations for 2031 (and as little - curves as possible). + curves as possible). This level is unused in the 24.04 upload as the + corresponding "audit" log level has not been backported to it. [Test plan] Tests are included in the library unit tests for parsing the specification strings; we have also included a test for the gpgv method to ensure that it produces the correct outcome for both 'next' and 'future' revoked keys. Some smoke tests: - Observe one a system with a 1024R signed repository that it keeps working and produces a warning (ensures a key listed in "next" but not in "current" warns) - Sign a repository with a NIST P-256 key and ensure it does not produce warnings (ensures that a key listed in "current" and "next" does not warn) [Where problems could occur] There could of course be bugs in the implementation of the new feature; this could result in verification of files failing. This also happens if you specify an invalid `next` or `future` string. There cannot be any false positives: The new levels are only *additional* checks, anything not in the `Assert-Pubkey-Algo` list is still revoked. ** Description changed: (Please see https://wiki.ubuntu.com/AptUpdates for the versioning) [Impact] We have received feedback from users that use NIST-P256 keys for their repositories that are upset about receiving a warning. We also revoked additional ECC curves, which may still be considered trusted, so we should not bump them to errors. Also existing users may have third-party repositories that use 1024-bit RSA keys and we have not adequately informed them yet perhaps. We tried to revoke them in the 2.8.0, 2.8.1, and 2.8.2 updates (see bug 2060721). This has been deferred to a later update than 2.8.3 such that we can solve the warnings and other bugs. [Solution] Hence we will restore all elliptic curve keys of 256 or more bit to trusted: ">=rsa1024,ed25519,ed448,nistp256,nistp384,nistp512,brainpoolP256r1,brainpoolP320r1,brainpoolP384r1,brainpoolP512r1,secp256k1"; + + Note that we still keep rsa1024 as allowed. At the same time we will also introduce a more nuanced approach to revocations by introducing a 'next' level that issues a warning if the key is not allowed in it and a 'future' level that will issue an audit message with the --audit option. For the next level, we will set it to: ">=rsa2048,ed25519,ed448,nistp256,nistp384,nistp512" This means we restrict warnings to Brainpool curves and the secp256k1 key, which we have not received any feedback about them being used yet. For the future level, we will take a strong approach to best practices as it is only seen when explictly running with --audit and the intention is to highlight best practices. It will be set to ">=rsa3072,ed25519,ed448"; Which corresponds to the NIST recommendations for 2031 (and as little curves as possible). This level is unused in the 24.04 upload as the corresponding "audit" log level has not been backported to it. [Test plan] Tests are included in the library unit tests for parsing the specification strings; we have also included a test for the gpgv method to ensure that it produces the correct outcome for both 'next' and 'future' revoked keys. Some smoke tests: - Observe one a system with a 1024R signed repository that it keeps working and produces a warning (ensures a key listed in "next" but not in "current" warns) - Sign a repository with a NIST P-256 key and ensure it does not produce warnings (ensures that a key listed in "current" and "next" does not warn) [Where problems could occur] There could of course be bugs in the implementation of the new feature; this could result in verification of files failing. This also happens if you specify an invalid `next` or `future` string. There cannot be any false positives: The new levels are only *additional* checks, anything not in the `Assert-Pubkey-Algo` list is still revoked. -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Touch seeded packages, which is subscribed to apt in Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2073126 Title: More nuanced public key algorithm revocation Status in apt package in Ubuntu: Fix Released Status in apt source package in Noble: Fix Committed Status in apt source package in Oracular: Fix Released Bug description: (Please see https://wiki.ubuntu.com/AptUpdates for the versioning) [Impact] We have received feedback from users that use NIST-P256 keys for their repositories that are upset about receiving a warning. We also revoked additional ECC curves, which may still be considered trusted, so we should not bump them to errors. Also existing users may have third-party repositories that use 1024-bit RSA keys and we have not adequately informed them yet perhaps. We tried to revoke them in the 2.8.0, 2.8.1, and 2.8.2 updates (see bug 2060721). This has been deferred to a later update than 2.8.3 such that we can solve the warnings and other bugs. [Solution] Hence we will restore all elliptic curve keys of 256 or more bit to trusted: ">=rsa1024,ed25519,ed448,nistp256,nistp384,nistp512,brainpoolP256r1,brainpoolP320r1,brainpoolP384r1,brainpoolP512r1,secp256k1"; Note that we still keep rsa1024 as allowed. At the same time we will also introduce a more nuanced approach to revocations by introducing a 'next' level that issues a warning if the key is not allowed in it and a 'future' level that will issue an audit message with the --audit option. For the next level, we will set it to: ">=rsa2048,ed25519,ed448,nistp256,nistp384,nistp512" This means we restrict warnings to Brainpool curves and the secp256k1 key, which we have not received any feedback about them being used yet. For the future level, we will take a strong approach to best practices as it is only seen when explictly running with --audit and the intention is to highlight best practices. It will be set to ">=rsa3072,ed25519,ed448"; Which corresponds to the NIST recommendations for 2031 (and as little curves as possible). This level is unused in the 24.04 upload as the corresponding "audit" log level has not been backported to it. [Test plan] Tests are included in the library unit tests for parsing the specification strings; we have also included a test for the gpgv method to ensure that it produces the correct outcome for both 'next' and 'future' revoked keys. Some smoke tests: - Observe one a system with a 1024R signed repository that it keeps working and produces a warning (ensures a key listed in "next" but not in "current" warns) - Sign a repository with a NIST P-256 key and ensure it does not produce warnings (ensures that a key listed in "current" and "next" does not warn) [Where problems could occur] There could of course be bugs in the implementation of the new feature; this could result in verification of files failing. This also happens if you specify an invalid `next` or `future` string. There cannot be any false positives: The new levels are only *additional* checks, anything not in the `Assert-Pubkey-Algo` list is still revoked. 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