Or is there anything going to happen wrt to https/TLS? I, personally, are not convinced of doing this...
In this specific case, and rogue mirror could have still exploited the hole, and I'd assume there is nothing done to check the trustworthiness of mirror operators (there's no real way to do so). Also, the X.509 trust model is inherently broken. 150 root CAs alone in the mozilla bundle (many of them which cannot be trusted per se by any sane person) and even more sub CAs... all of which can issue literally any certificate. Using TLS would IMO only help (a tiny bit) if Debian (respectively the derivates) would operate their own CA (and only accept that for services they offer, like mirrors, BTS, gitlab, etc.). -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Touch seeded packages, which is subscribed to apt in Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1812353 Title: content injection in http method (CVE-2019-3462) Status in apt package in Ubuntu: Fix Released Status in apt source package in Precise: Fix Released Status in apt source package in Trusty: Fix Released Status in apt source package in Xenial: Fix Released Status in apt source package in Bionic: Fix Released Status in apt source package in Cosmic: Fix Released Status in apt source package in Disco: Fix Released Bug description: apt, starting with version 0.8.15, decodes target URLs of redirects, but does not check them for newlines, allowing MiTM attackers (or repository mirrors) to inject arbitrary headers into the result returned to the main process. If the URL embeds hashes of the supposed file, it can thus be used to disable any validation of the downloaded file, as the fake hashes will be prepended in front of the right hashes. To manage notifications about this bug go to: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apt/+bug/1812353/+subscriptions -- Mailing list: https://launchpad.net/~touch-packages Post to : [email protected] Unsubscribe : https://launchpad.net/~touch-packages More help : https://help.launchpad.net/ListHelp
