This bug was fixed in the package apport - 2.14.1-0ubuntu3.23
---------------
apport (2.14.1-0ubuntu3.23) trusty-security; urgency=medium
[ Marc Deslauriers ]
* SECURITY UPDATE: code execution via malicious crash files
- Use ast.literal_eval in apport/ui.py, added test to test/test_ui.py.
- No CVE number
- LP: #1648806
* SECURITY UPDATE: path traversal vulnerability with hooks execution
- Clean path in apport/report.py, added test to test/test_ui.py.
- No CVE number
- LP: #1648806
[ Steve Beattie ]
* SECURITY UPDATE: code execution via malicious crash files
- Only offer restarting the application when processing a
crash file in /var/crash in apport/ui.py, gtk/apport-gtk,
and kde/apport-kde. Add testcases to test/test_ui.py,
test/test_ui_gtk.py, and test_ui_kde.py.
- No CVE number
- LP: #1648806
-- Marc Deslauriers <marc.deslauri...@ubuntu.com> Mon, 12 Dec 2016
07:27:21 -0500
** Changed in: apport (Ubuntu Trusty)
Status: New => Fix Released
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1648806
Title:
Arbitrary code execution through crafted CrashDB or Package/Source
fields in .crash files
Status in Apport:
Fix Released
Status in apport package in Ubuntu:
Fix Committed
Status in apport source package in Precise:
Fix Released
Status in apport source package in Trusty:
Fix Released
Status in apport source package in Xenial:
Fix Released
Status in apport source package in Yakkety:
Fix Released
Status in apport source package in Zesty:
Fix Committed
Bug description:
Forwarding private (encrypted) mail from Donncha O'Cearbhaill
<donn...@donncha.is>:
===================== 8< ==========================
Hi Martin,
I have been auditing the Apport software in my free time and
unfortunately I have found some serious security issues.
Untrusted files can be passed to apport-gtk as it is registered as the
default file handler for "text/x-apport" files. The mime-type includes
.crash files but also any unknown file type which begins with
"ProblemType: ". An attacker could social engineer a victim into opening
a malicious Apport crash file simply by clicking on it.
In apport/ui.py, Apport is reading the CrashDB field and then it then
evaluates the field as Python code if it begins with a "{". This is very
dangerous as it can allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary Python code.
The vulnerable code was introduce on 2012-08-22 in Apport revision
2464
(http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~apport-hackers/apport/trunk/files/2464).
This code was first included in release 2.6.1. All Ubuntu Desktop
versions after 12.05 (Precise) include this vulnerable code by default.
An easy fix would be to parse the value as JSON instead of eval()'ing
it.
There is also a path traversal issue where the Package or SourcePackage
fields are not sanitized before being used to build a path to the
package specific hook files in the /usr/share/apport/package-hooks/
directory.
By setting "Package: ../../../../proc/self/cwd/Downloads/rce-hook.py" a
remote attacker could exploit this bug to execute Python scripts that
have be placed in the user's Downloads directory.
Would you like to apply for a CVE for this issues or should I? I'd like
to see these issue fixed soon so that Ubuntu users can be kept safe. I'm
planning to publish a blog post about these issues but I'll wait until
patched version of Apport are available in the repositories.
Please let me know if you have any questions.
Kind Regards,
Donncha
===================== 8< ==========================
I just talked to Donna on Jabber, and he plans to disclose that in
around a week.
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