Yeah.. the concern here is that it's so feasible now that an attacker can correlate packet timing with a smaller portion of nodes and with the advent of high speed internet I think it would be beneficial for people who would like to adjust settings on their routing as such to be able to.
On Mon, Dec 10, 2018, 10:50 AM Gunnar Wolf <sis...@gwolf.org> wrote: > Kevin Burress dijo [Mon, Dec 10, 2018 at 10:21:22AM -0500]: > > I just have to check, is tor secure yet? > > > > I was thinking it might be more secure with these AI based timing attacks > > now if the number of hops is more adjustable. Although I would like to > see > > a means of negotiating a layer between a hidden service or exit node > using > > multiple connections in rendezvous as well, splitting data up in both > > directions between multiple tunnels that could be specified and juggled > in > > and out of queue at random.. > > Do you think perfect security, perfect anonymity, perfect privacy will > ever be achieved? > > It is *more* secure, and particularly *more* anonymous and *more* > private than not using it. > > What you suggest is closer to the original David Chaum idea of > anonymous mail exchangers by using mixing networks (1981, > https://www.chaum.com/publications/chaum-mix.pdf) or more recent > implementations, such as Katzenpost > (https://katzenpost.mixnetworks.org/). > > This, however, fares very poorly for today's internet users' use cases > — Mix networks are great for protocols such as mail delivery (SMTP), > because they are not time sensitive. You will likely not care if your > mail gets through immediately or it is delayed by five > minutes. Greylisting already imposes such minimum delays in many > cases. > > Network browsing, remotely logging in to administer a system, having a > videoconference... Those activities are *very* latency- and > jitter-sensitive and, as such... Cannot really escape from traffic > analysis by an adversary *who controls enough of the network*. And > that's closer to Tor's model. > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
