On 10/12/2018 01:47 PM, Nick Levinson wrote: >> This is the use case for Tails. . . . [T]here are no writes to storage, >> unless users configure [otherwise] . . . . > > One need not use Tails to use Tor (I used to sometimes use Tor and never used > Tails), so, while Tails may be a good idea, the question remains for Tor and > its security architecture when not using Tails.
Sure, but this isn't a _Tor_ issue. It's just about Tor browser, which is just (heavily) modified Firefox. And although I'm no software expert, I'm guessing that it's impossible to guarantee what some code will or won't leave behind when it crashes. Even if you tweaked the browser to never write temp files to disk, and keep everything in RAM, you couldn't guarantee that the OS won't write stuff to disk. That is, unless there _is_ no disk, as in Tails. Even with Whonix, traces likely remain in the virtual disk. And sure, you can run Whonix with virtual disks, which don't persist changes. But even then, who's to say what might get left on the host. I'm less familiar with other sandboxing options, but I suspect that there are similar issues. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
