Thank you for clarifying that. The obfs4 bridges you can get at bridges.torproject.org also pose an interesting risk, the ports each Bridge IP Address is using seem to be non-standard, I'm in the US and most networks I am at do not censor although sometimes certain ports at public wifi networks are blocked, could a threat actor threatening you or tor users in general realize an IP Address was a Tor Bridge by identifying a large amount of traffic to a non-standard port on random datacenter IP Addresses?
You can tell Tor Browser your Firewall only allows connections to certain ports which I assume when used with bridges would help further hide the fact you are using Tor. The fact I email here obviously shows I am a Tor user, although I'd like more technical measures built into Tor Browser to obfuscate the times I am using Tor. Cheers, Nathaniel Suchy On 4/29/18 2:36 PM, Matthew Finkel wrote: > On Sun, Apr 29, 2018 at 02:06:49PM -0400, Nathaniel Suchy (Lunorian) wrote: >> I see that Tor Browser, for users who are censored in their country, >> work, or school (or have some other reason to use bridges) has a variety >> of built in bridges. Once of those are the OBFS4 bridges. My first >> thought would be these are hard coded, of course giving everyone the >> same set of bridges is bad right? > > Currently this is how it works, yes. It is not ideal, and there is > on-going development work for rolling out a more scalable method. > >> Then a bad actor could download Tor >> Browser, get the list, and null route the IPs on their network(s). Also >> these bridges could get quite crowded. Are the bridges being used to >> fetch other bridges, or something else? How does Tor Browser handle >> these risks / technical issues? > > Indeed "Bad actors" could block the bridges hard-coded in Tor Browser. > It is also true many of those default bridges are overloaded. >
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