So far I have been unable to gain a working torrc and iptables setup for either 
tor, or, particularly, Tor Browser Bundle. And believe me, I've read, searched 
and tried - alot. Funnily, many of the security advantages of using Tor are 
defeated by the need for heavy research and the amount of bad/disnformation out 
there: Tor is undone by its complications and the lack of clear solutions for 
heavily secured use.

I would like to be able to run TBB secured with a custom torrc file and 
iptables policy, but this has proven challenging. Torrc settings and iptables 
settings for tor itself will not easily translate into TBB, which presents its 
own specific problems.

For examples, TBB does not run as a service as tor does, so it cannot be 
isolated in iptables in this way. Userspace and namespace methods, where TBB 
could be run as a dedicated user or in a dedicated namespace, have so far been 
tried and failed - and I have found no specific workthroughs for this subject. 
Userspace or namespace isolation would still be ultimately desirable, and this 
is one thing I would like to see described for this specific purpose.
As a result I am left trying to isolate TBB by port, which also requires that I 
define tor ports in torrc. Defining default ports, those that are known, causes 
TBB to stop working, solved by redefining different ports. Examining netstat 
shows that TBB continues to open the default Control Port on 9151 in addition 
to any newly defined ports. It is currently unclear where TBB is set to do this.

Iptables policies of any complexity, providing 'torification' of a system to 
avoid potential leaks, so far fail with TBB. Policies adapted from those on 
trac.troproject cause TBB to fail on certain counts, and I am unclear as why 
certain settings are specified.
VirtualAddrNetwork specified in torrc for TBB will produce an unknown host/port 
response from iptables.
The various addresses I have seen specified for LAN or IANA are a mystery to me.

TBB seems to be neglected almost entirely in serious discussions of Tor. And 
yet it is more up-to-date than debian-tor, which currently only offers Obfs3 
transports, now somewhat old, in Debian packages, and Meek with some trouble: 
TBB contains all transports in .py files; it is portable, making it instantly 
operable in any Debian distro with a few simple (scripted) adjusts, and 
affording the protection of a 'disposable app', and faster to run than 
installing Tor and obfs3 on a lacking system, with the Tor Browser only 
installable via the Tor Launcher package and downloading into debian from the 
Tor project directly (leaving me unaware of how the browser might be saved for 
offline installation): TBB can double as a Tor Browser for debian-tor without 
trouble, but I would still like to be able to run or even adapt to debian-tor) 
its malleable and rapidly reconfigurable implementation and transports (I 
assume it might be possible to adapt TBB's .py transports provision to 
debian-tor, I just don't know how).

My chosen solution is to install debian-tor from stored files, adapt transports 
from the TBB, and use the TBB as a proxy browser for Tor, with additional 
hardening (lock prefs) if possible. And to run TBB in itself. All require good 
iptables policies, which has proven a particular challange for TBB.

Ideally, what is required is:

1. A clear explanation of how Linux solicits and maintains network connections, 
particularly with regard to public wifi negotiation.
2. A separation of this basic networking functionality required to maintain 
router access and of the Tor or TBB processes.
3. A clear explanation of all required allowances in iptables, of Tor, 
including by port if possible, and including of addresses like those for LAN et 
al. NAT table routing has proven particularly challenging.
4. A method for running TBB with custom torrc, observing the failure of default 
port specification (which is part of port securing in custom hashed passwords, 
etc.) and VirtualAddrNetwork (which I assume is due to TBB's lack of 
service/daemon functionality.
5. Advice for adapting the transports from TBB to tor.
6. A walkthrough for advanced isolation methods like dedicated user accounts, 
which have so far proven impossible to run with TBB from a separate account, 
and network namespaces, which appear to be a potentially powerful isolation 
solution but which I have not seen adapted to this purpose yet, despite being 
considerably lighter than complete OS virtualisation/containers.

A walkthrough for applying TBB transports to debian-tor would be a bonus.

As I say, all my attempts so far to produce a working custom torrc and iptables 
solution for TBB have not worked (though TBB itself will run with an 'open' 
clearnet iptables setup), all my attempts to adapt published iptables setups 
have not worked, and all attempts to isolate TBB particularly behind userspaces 
have also failed. Namespaces are not something I have yet seen tried for this 
purpose. A working TBB setup is of course likely more readily adaptable to 
debian-tor than vice-versa, with a few minor adjustments.
As it is I will have to go back to using TAILS for any degree of Tor security 
until the problems are solved, despite the failings of TAILS in my view 
(rigidity, lack of programmability in scripting, GUI style, etc.) :/

Any helpful advice would be appreciated.
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