bob1983 writes: > 3. Even if this protocol is integrated in Tor Browser, after clicking "New > Identity", all local data will be erased. Considering this feature is > frequently > used by Tor users, we still need to solve some CAPTCHAs.
If the protocol is sound here in its unlinkability property, the Tor Browser should not need to erase the store of tokens. I realize that this may be a challenge architecturally and conceptually, but in the design of this protocol, persistence of the tokens shouldn't compromise Tor's anonymity goals. (Although it does potentially reduce the anonymity set a bit by partitioning users into those who have the extension and those who don't have the extension, as well those who currently have tokens remaining and those who are currently out of tokens.) -- Seth Schoen <sch...@eff.org> Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107 -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
