On 6/7/17, Suhaib Mbarak <suhaib.om...@gmail.com> wrote: > Dear Lee, > > First of all thank you very much for your high response. > > As I mentioned in my email above , I'm using shadow simulator; not real tor > network; my goal is only to run an experiment and from the output of that > experiment I can confess my students that Tor really : > > 1- Can keep the traffic anonymous.(at least through Tor onion circuit)
At one point, the tor docs said it wasn't proof against a global adversary. I suspect that's still true. Something else to consider https://www.wired.com/2017/03/feds-rather-drop-child-porn-case-give-exploit/ "... Evidence in United States v. Jay Michaud hinged at least in part on information federal investigators had gathered by exploiting a vulnerability in the Tor anonymity network." So it seems to me that the answer to your question is "no" Best regards, Lee > 2- How the circuit was selected. ( or to figure out what was the circuit > selected) > > 3- All handshakes done at each node on the circuit from entry node till > exit. (e.g encryption and decryption keys used on handshake at each node > including the directory authority server as well). > > 4- If there is away to show student that at each circuit nodes only the > successor and predecessor addresses not the original source or final > destination of the request. > > Thanks and Best Regards, > Suhib > > > > On 6 June 2017 at 13:05, Lee <ler...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> > Dear All; >> > >> > I'm a master student in computer science and I have a task from my >> > professor to know more about Tor networks and how it works to >> > anonymise >> the >> > traffic. I've read a lot about Tor and I got a very good idea about it. >> My >> > task goal is to show how Tor works and to proof that it relay anonymise >> user >> > traffic. In other word, I need to make something deliverable (e.g lab >> > experiment) to the student if they follow my steps then I can confess >> them >> > with : >> > >> > 1- That Tor route from client to server can't be traced. >> >> https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#stayinganonymous >> Tor does not provide protection against end-to-end timing attacks: >> If your attacker can watch the traffic coming out of your computer, >> and also the traffic arriving at your chosen destination, he can use >> statistical analysis to discover that they are part of the same >> circuit. >> > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
