Amplifying just one little bit of this:
On 7 October 2016 at 12:21, Mirimir <miri...@riseup.net> wrote:
> Yes, that's the hardest problem. Why do sites care about the
> relatively small share of users that want pseudonymous and/or
> location-obscured access?
I would phrase that as "Why _should_ sites care about the _definitely_
small share of users who want pseudonymity or geolocation-neutral access?"
With the FB Onion the argument was simple: "there are a lot of such people,
they are at the mercy of sketchy exit-nodes, and we can make people happier
and give them a better service for a small expenditure."
For smaller organisations, especially ones with less-good stats and
less-good resources, to attempt to metaphorically beat them into submission
/ into caring about Tor users, does not really sound like a good strategy.
> FB has a Tor onion site, but they still want
> to know who you are, and you still need a mobile account for text
> authentication.
>
Yes, but to be fair, that information is wanted on the clearnet site also.
To FB the Onion is just another form of access: HTTP(defunct)
HTTPS(default) and Onion(new hotness). :-)
> Maybe worse, even setting aside the needs of worthy users, the arms
> race between assholes and their targets is clearly escalating, and Tor
> exit operators are getting caught in the crossfire.
Yes.
> Ironically, in
> recent discussion on the tor-relays list, some have argued that it's
> website owners who are responsible for blocking abuse. And if they
> can't manage that, they should just block access from Tor exits ;)
>
Oy veh. Well, at least it sounds like civil discussion of the actual
issues.
-a
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