On 2016-06-05 14:31, Flipchan wrote:
Got any beta code on this? Maybe add/c ode it as a daemon ?;)
Not Friendly <notfrien...@riseup.net> skrev: (5 juni 2016 16:40:52
CEST)
After about an hour of brain storming I may of found a way to stop
traffic correlation attacks. The idea is to add an artificial delay of
a few randomized ms (two separate delays, one to the tor exit and
another deal on traffic exiting the network) and add an extra chunk of
randomized data (just a small random amount of KB that never exits the
network). It would make traffic harder to correlate. What are your
thoughts on this?
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Sincerly Flipchan
I do not have any beta code. This was merely a suggestion. The added
randomized delays (two separate sets) and randomized data padding (two
separate sets) would make it more difficult to correlate traffic. I
think it could be done in a way that still allows Tor to keep latency
low.
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