aka <[email protected]>: > Why not Tor over Tor? Using a Tor exit to connect to the first hop. > Would require traffic correlating twice.
It wouldn't. Traffic correlation doesn't care of the traffic content itself. It doesn't break the traffic anonymity, it just correlates your traffic with the traffic on the site you're visiting, regardless of nodes or encryption layers in between. I guess that there are methods to calculate a probability based on correlating individual packets. Later it could be used in court, like "we're 99,99999% certain it was him". -- Oskar Wendel, [email protected] Pubkey: https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?search=0x6690CC52318DB84C Fingerprint: C8C4 B75C BB72 36FB 94B4 925C 6690 CC52 318D B84C -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
