O.K., so if the Guards that are used are based on the view of the network, this means NC knows which Entry-Guards are accessed from users within NC, so the next approach would be to fake these Entry-Guards (IPs) from within the country (Lets setup a Tor-Node inside NC, that uses the same IP as the Tor-Node that would be accessed from outside NC)...
Isn´t Kim Jong-UN a smart guy somehow? ;-) Am 01.11.2015 11:12, schrieb Tom van der Woerdt: > Felix, > > Guards' network speeds are assessed based on the view of the network, not the > client. What this means for your North Korea example is that the government > couldn't affect path selection by slowing down the network, as Tor will still > pick the same guards. > > Tom > > >> On 01 Nov 2015, at 11:10, Felix <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Hello, >> >> I read the linked Page and understand most of the ideas behind the concept >> of using only a few number of Entry-Guadrs. However, as I understand Entry >> Guards are chosen by Parameters like Response-Time or Network-Bandwidth. >> >> If i.e North Corea. would like to control the Tor-Network in NC, NC would >> have to do the following things: >> >> 1. Slow down (or disable) the rest of the Internet from outside NC extremely. >> 2. Setup some fast Tor-Servers (Primary Entry Guards) inside NC. >> 3. Provide fast Tor-Relays (inside NC) that are accessible from these Entry >> Guards (other Tor-Relays are slow from or inaccessible these Entry Guards) >> 4. Provide (fast) Exit-Nodes inside NC. >> >> In this scenario the fast Primary Entry Guards would proably the chosen for >> almost any Network-Traffic using Tor, and I could at least see which >> IP-Source-Adresse would bei using Tor. >> >> If the rest of the Tor-Network would rely on Performance-Data for Routing >> the Traffic, NC could proably also see the Tor-Relays (and maybe even the >> Exit-Nodes) - so Tor would be (somehow) useless. >> >> So in my opinion it would be at least a good (configurable) option to >> provide dynamic switching of the Entry-Guards - as this would at least make >> it more difficult to trace every move of a Tor-User. >> >> Regards, >> >> Felix >> >> >> >> Am 01.11.2015 02:24, schrieb Harmony: >>> Felix: >>>> Hello, >>>> >>>> I am from Germany and I use the Tor-Browser very often. I think Tor is a >>>> great product. >>>> >>>> I have a question regarding the connection from my Tor-Browser to the >>>> Tor-Network. >>>> >>>> I noticed, that Tor tends to always connect to the same Tor-Relays on >>>> the internet. I can observe this when I monitor the connections using >>>> Netstat on my Linux-machine - even after restart of the Tor-Browser or >>>> even after a reboot of the Linux-machine. >>>> >>>> So my initial Idea was to delete the "cached*-files" in the >>>> /Data/Tor-Directory before each start - but this does not help - Tor >>>> always connects basically to the same Tor-Nodes all the time. I think >>>> this is probably due to an internal "ranking" in the Tor-Network. >>>> >>>> So my question is, would´nt it be better (or more secure) for the >>>> End-User, if the Tor-Browser (or the Onion-Router) would change the used >>>> Tor-Relays i.e. every 5 minutes. As the Tor-Browser connects to more >>>> than one Tor-Relay, this could be staged, Drop Tor-Relay 1 after >>>> connection to Tor-Relay 3 has been established i.e. >>>> >>>> Are there any plans to enhance the Tor-Network / the Tor-Browser in this >>>> direction? >>> Hello Felix, >>> >>> https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards >>> >>> This is in fact a safety mechanism that Tor uses, as explained in the >>> above link. If your browser connected to new 'first-hop' relays every >>> time, there would be a greater chance that one day all the relays in >>> your circuit are attacking you. By picking one (or a few) guards only >>> and cycling them rarely, it is that much more tedious for anyone who is >>> waiting until you pick their bad relay in order to attack you. >>> >>> Tor certainly did at one stage change its circuits after ten minutes, as >>> you suggest, but for various reasons this was altered, and in any case >>> Tor Browser itself manages circuits in a different way to the core Tor >>> program. It's a much-discussed question and no one yet has the perfect >>> answer. >>> >>> If for some reason you really do need to change the guards that your >>> browser is using, the file to delete is called 'state', and it is under >>> Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor (on Linux). Generally, however, you should >>> not do that. >>> >>> [I am not an expert on any of the above.] >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>>> Thank you very much. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Felix >> -- >> tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] >> To unsubscribe or change other settings go to >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
