-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi,
After little over 3 days of uptime, the OnionBalance hidden service http://eujuuws2nacz4xw4.onion/ was successfully accessed over 1 Million times. There was no complaint in any of the running Tor instance s. Here are the counts of successful hits per each failback server (as previously stated, I am using 5 separate virtual machines running their own Tor instance): Failback server #1: 199892 Failback server #2: 130329 Failback server #3: 278323 Failback server #4: 184836 Failback server #5: 291119 ========================== *TOTAL: 1084499* Zip archives of the Apache log files of each instance are available here: https://www.sky-ip.org/onionbalance/ This does not mean that there were over 1 million unique clients (or circuits). Some clients connected hundreds or thousands of times through the same rendezvous circuit (Tor will keep a rendezvous circuit to a hidden service alive and use that for as many connections to that particular hidden service, unless the descriptor is manually flushed and circuit killed). I would be interested to know if there is any Tor control port option which would allow me to query via telnet and ask regularly with a cronjob how many rendezvous circuits it has (will run it on each failback instance). This way, I can combine this info with the webserver logs in order to have an idea about the number of circuits handled per instance and average number of requests per circuit. If anyone has an idea how to do this, please let me know. I want to thank everyone who contributed in stress testing this hidden service, and please continue to do it, even harder if possible. I still see no complaint or sign that anything is overloaded. I know there are people who built scripts to make automated requests to this hidden service (thanks!): please share them on the mail list, with as much details as you can. The more we know about how the requests were made, the better we can make out of these numbers. Have fun stress testing even more! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJVmGTJAAoJEIN/pSyBJlsR2fYIAK8HQaykT2nG1hQxOBpDoBXK lzoC5dd6Rb42EKeQ7xnRCa3CEgV9QQmc/V+T50hEUF1udsv1msuMKCzrboEjky7I MjXAejHxSKHnkp6z/iOoDj+NNKHMgJ0tx8ustG9MghKHTQ59PCWEJL86ByuSv/fJ 2q4kJdz/wNStdF1SJJBrrgF5d7rVkiLHMYgu5GlCdubsMIODi/GGCjhs1ULVGzb+ VsysSlq7qVfXV8pomvnZTIgCS7EnVpHqjQWKD2eiCqTB4i+8CohJp4A713heTeMx HjXGVL6LCN508Ve/ggq2NOIysa54M7OOAMzL7zYdxt8VtdyBBYR2g5OsmXoBvgM= =MU5c -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
