Hey Guys, I'm one of the authors of Astoria. It's a very new system that tries to improve the current Tor relay selection algorithm by using the state-of-the-art in AS path inference and measurement tools to detect the possibility of having the same AS on the paths between the (client, entry) and (exit, destination).
Our evaluation shows that it does quite well to avoid asymmetric correlation attacks, but the performance is a bit off from Tor (metric: page load times for Alexa Top 100 from 10 countries). But to be clear: the only thing changed is the entry and exit node selection in the Tor circuit construction. We don't require any modifications to the Tor eco-system and infrastructure. Unlike previous AS aware clients, we also perform load balancing to not overwhelm the slower relays, consider the case where it is impossible to build any attacker-free circuits, and also consider that ASes from the same organization might collude with each other. This blew up less than 24 hours after updating our paper on Arxiv. We're working on cleaning up the source code and will have it ready soon (about a week). Rishab On Fri, May 22, 2015 at 5:08 PM, Yuri <[email protected]> wrote: > This story > http://www.dailydot.com/politics/tor-astoria-timing-attack-client/ has > been injected into all possible news streams today. > > Is there any merit to it? > > Yuri > -- > tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
