-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 W. Greenhouse wrote: > Some degree of centralization of the directory is, for now, the > only way to prevent an attacker from owning everything simply by > dumping a lot of bandwidth onto the network (what Lizard Squad > attempted to do). Networks like i2p and bitcoin are to a greater > extent vulnerable to that than Tor is,
As with everything, it's a question of balance. Tor errs on the side of centralization, which enables it to easily detect bandwidth dumping and block arbitrary routers with quick turnaround, but that is a lot of power in the hands of a (trusted) few. It also does nothing against e.g. carefully-planned slow Sybil attacks. > because i2p and bitcoin didn't even consider resistance to network > sibyls as part of their design. > The original I2P devs *did* consider Sybil resistance while designing the network, and did include scope in the network architecture for e.g. HashCash-like mechanisms, but ultimately decided to take the decentralized route, and designed the network on the assumption that no router is trusted. As for detecting and inhibiting Sybil attacks: it is still possible to detect bandwidth dumping (one example I recall was a research group starting up a bunch of routers), and we do have the ability to block routers, but only via router upgrades. So yes, it is certainly more difficult right now to impede Sybils on I2P. But there is more focus on making the attacks that Sybil enables harder to carry out (because a Sybil on its own is not an attack), as well as general network growth to make obtaining a large enough network fraction more difficult (we estimate there are currently around 25,000 I2P routers). str4d -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVSK4iAAoJEBO17ljAn7Pgz1AP/1FkitJsLNDZzB3q8+xNRb2Q qS669IdXkin1oFPr/LeZ6zlic2N7cqgVtYhTkVKaq03w9f4P52EqCgN7ZzNUCShK xvx2bM/EN/fhNm1xHdTLMQRXvD2X3cpHPoc7MVPyl8fhUNe09Xivdm2NwusMso7y LQmkAJXoBf6uHVVyCZDvLYXuMBiXpSMlpbFWqOJJEyTDbbC1Wo6JScxFShJ0Dd3S Htz01LjdMLy9TcDhsiy4kZrRev+It2sARe6cUyEHYhJRt1elraVveW4VhdthlAS2 VK78XWvlMKRZDEuRVK7Gm0chkLK4gtDgEXnsEwr7EAwXkyb2VBHuyMVo7ISpH7sT 2eRTMmlBINXqV8I5AeIRXc3SPQRg7gqmx7vyw+khAnjgtjWWuEKWiBHrxZ/jLDVR rcr06+CXLuYthae038QL6qUHCP5LUu6uXGXxBeAJ4Fr/Ig8+SiMda+Ctv2a/hBmd kSklCnpeh4/gFo8VUZlyMLF+PEK8d5EtEDBHLIGITQAqQSZb03xpv7KIDeJ4D/uc vIP5f25dCguaMxzNO0gpk3ikeZDo2zkt/PRd6VUh2cYUU1K4SL0jYpDBajX3/OKG b2/CoOz+pSDVgvYDjupyQ0vFDgtvUckOPfxR48v+bhcH5v9HFUo4iezSX5zNZhd0 eItO8jzcv887nVAAGcAG =E7Pe -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
