OK, so this is very interesting: | The court documents refer to a source that provided "reliable | IP addresses" for Tor hidden services between January and July | of 2014, leading them back to both the servers and 78 different | people doing business on the site. | | According to a Tor blog post, someone during that period was | infiltrating the network by offering new relays, then altering | the traffic subtly so as to weaken Tor's anonymity protections. | By attacking the system from within, they were able to trace | traffic across the network, effectively following the server | traffic back to their home IP. In July, Tor noticed the bug and | published an update to fix it — but for six months, certain | hidden services were badly exposed, and the Silk Road 2 appears | to have been one of them. | || OK, almost certain: CERT Tor deanon attack was FBI source: || https://t.co/JKwWD2E3VK SR2 server, 78 vendor IPs, Jan-July 2014 || — Nicholas Weaver (@ncweaver) January 21, 2015 | | So who carried out the attack? Already, researchers are pointing | to a Black Hat presentation this summer that promised to outline | a similar attack, but was controversially cancelled at the last | minute. The researchers, working for CMU's CERT Center described | similar capabilities and performed their research over a nearly | identical span of time: January to July of 2014. If the | researchers were also helping the FBI investigate criminal | activity on Tor, it would explain why law enforcement might | not want their methods getting out to the community at large.
https://www.theverge.com/2015/1/21/7867471/fbi-found-silk-road-2-tor-anonymity-hack -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
