I totally agree with you. While the Tor network already provides crypto, an on-top encryption wouldn't be bad.
If one security layer has holes there would be an additional layer/fallback. Am 03.01.2015 00:55 schrieb s7r <[email protected]>: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Now why would we use https on top of a Tor Hidden Service? > > http://foo.onion is not the same as http://foo.com > > The regular internet (clearnet) domains, when used with http, do not > provide any kind of encryption or authentication and are vulnerable to > man in the middle attacks and wiretapping. > > .onion Tor Hidden Services _already provide end to end encryption and > authentication_ when used with the default http. They are not > vulnerable to man in the middle attacks or hijacks. On top of this > primary layer of encryption, there are more crypto layers in the Tor > circuits connecting a client to a hidden service. > > Maybe the crypto currently used in hidden services is not considered > _very_ strong with nowadays available computing power, but adding an > additional layer of encryption using the commercial CA model seams > like the wrong way to do it. Why? Because facebook did it (they were > the first ones as far as I Know), it means now this is somehow a > requirement? > > I encourage the work on new generation hidden services, which will > have better security and better end to end crypto. We do not need > commercial CA's in a Tor hidden services for various reasons, > including but not being limited to the fact that when you purchase a > SSL certificate you leave another money trail and provide details to > make a payment / place an order, hurting the anonymity of a hidden > service. Why would you pay for something which Tor already does, and > even does it better? > > P.S. I personally have _way more trust_ in the RSA1024 and SHA1 > implementation used in current Tor Hidden Services design than in a > publicly available CA. > > Rather than spending time to convince commercial CAs to sign .onion > domains, better spend that time to find sponsors in order to enable > coders and skilled persons to work on next generation hidden services. > > > On 1/3/2015 1:23 AM, Josef 'veloc1ty' Stautner wrote: > > Why does Tor have to setup an official CA and passing some audits? > > Are they even public? > > > > And why should Tor even rely on that broken CA system? In my > > opinion a self signed certificate is the best way at the moment to > > ship. The tor developers should invest some time in the CA topic > > after Tor becomes a well-known and accpeted network. > > > > ~Josef > > > > Am 03.01.2015 um 00:06 schrieb Moritz Bartl: > >> On 01/02/2015 06:03 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote: > >>> Being a CA for .onion seems a reasonable thing to be. Should > >>> someone already part of the Tor community like torservers.net > >>> become that CA? > >> I don't think becoming an official CA (ie. passing the audits > >> required for inclusion in major browsers) is something we should > >> spend our already limited time on. > >> > > > > > > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) > > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJUpy/6AAoJEIN/pSyBJlsRSHUH/0KlnYp/CC8CuGzSWLra3m6G > d4dy9To1AOLWAnOzZ9H7KSXVxxg8SSHr+fXT35Uz483lxN7204vfGHvXc13mzmXW > Dy9JM7RS5BXz5a3l7/dxm9Ch7gBr6MQLsVLUJ+5aMjvFY0icnO9z1Xu/CMAYnhrx > 1aeYNppGY2eiOsZNUUm2pmPYAPGr/cAarOzRlFvTwHsdaj1IfPPtYkO2ZoPLg+6y > HqW+Z+YejwRUZcaksNBdM6qVRjrK80MKX2LfIzU60Mj++chepPpUSYPe1n/5uY6c > udd7spOTccawEgpa/XXwQZNHeCoQYXNZX9evCRSilNzvNudgWA4BK5jXXUoQHt8= > =LbQ9 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -- > tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
