On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 7:06 PM, Random Tor Node Operator <[email protected]> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > On 07/11/2014 11:12 PM, Helder Ribeiro wrote: >> 4. Make the Popcorn Time fork also **be a relay by default* >> whenever possible**. >> >> Nobody would agree to do this on the main tor software for a >> thousand reasons, but it's an *app* and you can decide to do that >> in it independently. If you're going to add a lot of load to the >> network, you have to give back. > > > There are at least 2 problems with many "make users a relay by > default" ideas: > > 1. Some overzealous website administrators blacklist all Tor relay > IPs, even non-exits. [1] > This might cause lots of frustration in users when they realize that > some sites lock them out because they used to be running a Tor relay > for some time on their IP. Right now, that type of problem is limited > to very few cases where relay IPs are used for non-Tor purposes as well.
True. Hopefully, if the app is popular enough and this happens, there will be enough pressure from users to unban relays (after all non-exit relays are harmless to website operators). > > 2. Currently, the time constant of the Tor system to pick up a new > relay[2] is way bigger than the time of a typical Bittorrent session > (This is a handwaving guesstimate of mine). > So the effect of contributing to Tor that way would in most cases be > minimal. > One could think of a way to have Tor use something like "short-lived > relays", which are perhaps propagated through a DHT instead of the > regular consensus system. On the one hand, that would make "giving > something back to the network" a whole lot easier. On the other hand, > I can hardly estimate what the security and anonymity implications of > that would look like. Good point. As an optimization, users could pick relays for their circuits from the torrent DHT itself (not necessarily nodes hosting/downloading the same file). That would at least make them neutral in terms of bandwidth consumption for the network. The interface/"tit for tat" mechanism could also encourage users to keep running the app longer. Other than that, there could be a way to authenticate relays so that they keep certain flags across sessions, and have regular tor clients pick them for short-lived circuits like for HTTP traffic. No idea aobut privacy implications either :/ > > > > > [1] > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2013-August/002531.html > > [2] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTwF/EAAoJEJe61A/xrcOQW5kP/jFB8l+/GrjDjb1gwJfRu3GY > LfBWv0LUpRRV6NjqB7y9IZI6kyPSJtB9Vb8DJ91QYt653SX4Rwa0POCgDGVfQRmn > HN9GWPCz9yr5jI8NU9HaFIYu+DZhYtnvlNjDDG4/ltyUr78k5uh5syrdaxwLJuV+ > fue1Ef+QcybR+atkGCiMHJnn8rJcpmnFL/ntAhozGXTf6jMlAMKrekeGKc/bcNMb > t8yRk0slKqlkL1/okPk7rO7tlEvGRPet8YQP6GrswT5EGk0BryxDHIwth2fJDvSK > dYtI1l1XndMlVtZXOlIS2FXiack6X75aGaaot4oPQF+vUuj4AaUbC9qb6+z5FCQ8 > y6hIjJNoJZ2b4m5SN3TWj/hdWAkLOVT6XUckd1Ddt03krQJH6Zs1B0IEa9wT52jm > zlrxwOcUGRyvTC6R1Jh18Gj7SJE5U0E3S+sODFJIbCAcmGkwc5ZQ3j1muvJ2JvfL > h53q8ZQvgzP5TnqcebUEtxKjJQtWO20+2gFDghz1+Fw+nZDDeHNVyHjEIFpPnxyy > OEUYRzGY+iRWa6Wnvq+6jsts8z+zpn6cgd9PkQf+xQOkbZliG6W1RMzLlIElDYKe > bGfO3VQZJHM6+gutt0JJPd7RTgJ5LGhi+utKNzZw2p7RjT6+jU62BVPJQ22sXGBT > Co5y+99/dnsVR61hqy30 > =l95K > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -- > tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- Apoie a transparência no voto eletrônico: http://www.vocefiscal.org Blog: http://www.discor.de PGP: CED4 BB85 FBC5 661E 56B2 3D5C DCE5 C2D2 FC19 843C https://keybase.io/obvio171 Ricochet IM: ricochet:jqprzgdxxqk2g63b Code is politics. Se você usa a Wikipédia, doe mensalmente para mantê-la no ar: http://bit.ly/wikipedia-assinatura-mensal -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
