On Fri, 27 Jun 2014 10:53:46 +0100
Mark McCarron <[email protected]> wrote:
> Well, I think this is settling down into a proper discussion. Whilst
> the hypothesis is untested, leveraging illegal activity, especially
> reviled illegal activity, as a metric for the quality of anonymity
> and security provided by Tor is a sound strategy.
>
> As mentioned before, the 'canary' is dead and we need to understand
> why.
Easy. Tor, by design, is useless against
governments that can do traffic analysis. For instance, the US
government.
Notice that this fact is mentioned in tor´s ´fine print´ so to
speak. Once in a while some developer would mention that
traffic correlation is trivial if you can watch traffic in and
out of the network. And then, it seems as if everyone forgets
that little fact.
And so we have amusing tor lackeys like ¨coderman¨
parroting propaganda that not even the tor developers
themselves believe.
So, how did the american gestapo get freedom hosting and silk
road? Traffic analysis.
Also, in case that great ´security´ ´experts´ such as
coderman and other tor lackeys on this list havent been reading
the mainstream media :
It is now common knowledge that the nsa gives information to
´ordinary´ cops, and that ´ordinary´ cops then pretend
they got the information doing ´police work´
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction
J.
Given that this is a global phenomenon, then we need to examine
> the factors that effect this group. The primary factor would be the
> software itself. A secondary factor would be the law, but this is
> not a consistent factor across the world.
>
> What other consistent factors are there?
>
> Regards,
>
> Mark McCarron
>
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