I have been sorting through my mailbox the last few days and stumbled upon an email from 2012, from this mailing list. A worried user got a false negative from check.torproject.org because an exit relay sent exit traffic out on an IP that's different from what was advertised.
However, this made me think that it is perhaps not such a bad idea if more exit relays did that, even slower ones. I have access to a couple of IP numbers that I could easily configure in this way. Basically: Use one IP for Tor traffic, and one IP for exit traffic. The Tor traffic IP:Port is what would be advertised to the Tor network, and only that. The reason would be to minimize the chances of the exit IP ending up in some overzealous blacklist. I'm pretty sure that a lot of the blacklist operators just scrape the public list of relays and then they end up in a lot of places where the customer is not even aware what is being blocked. This is painfully obvious to people running a non-exit relay from home, when trying to use IRC or other services. Is this a good idea to do if you have the resources? Will it cause any non-obvious problems? I guess one problem is that check.torproject.org will show that you're not using Tor, unless it's been modified since 2012 to check this in another way. I'm not sure if I'm making myself clear here, please ask me to clarify if this is the case. // Anders -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
