-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Question 1) Does the Tor client remember the state of the relay list between boots?
Assuming there isn't too much time between boots a lot of the nodes will likely still be there the next time you log on, making it quicker next time and easier to boot, possibly even to the point of not needing the root servers to boot onto the network. I assume Tor downloads the entire list of *all* available public relays from root directory servers and mirroring clients (like the bridges you connect to), which of course if they get blocked off from all sources the whole system goes down (for you). Admittedly it would be difficult for them to block all the mirroring bridges anyway so this might not be of great concern at the moment, but I could well see them improving the traffic detection and blocking at border firewalls which would stop people from booting. But lets assume at some point in the future they perform the next wave of blocking that pretty well cuts a lot of people from accessing the nework, noone will be able to download updates and they wont be able to boot. Question 2) Has the Tor team considered using the Kademlia algorithm for inter peer communication and decentralized resistance? This way even if the main servers are blocked the network still works. One advantage is this way even if your blocked off from the main network your client will still function by connecting to the peers in your area, actually it occurs to me this might not be that useful to the user since if your data cannot leave your country it probably cant get to the *clear* internet anyway. It also occurs to me that sometime in the future (probably not that far into the future either) there wont be much of a thing as a *clear* internet. Possible disadvantage is your peer might perform a lot of inter peer communication allowing them to find more relay addresses. But I notice that the client has to connect to a number of IPs anyway to boot up and setup tunnels, and these connections obviously cannot be avoided, so Kademlia might be an advantage in this case. I was thinking about the problem that required bridges to get onto the network, but what if every peer could be given a *small world* view of the network, they can see some peers but not all as if they are short sighted,, bridges exiting the country could be hidden behind other peers so you cannot see them, this prevents them from getting all the IPs. It would also remove the need to have central servers almost entirely, as the peer list will be distributed by the peers automatically, just one peer is all that is needed to get onto the network. The DHT could also be used to store and retrieve information like for example storage of the DNS information to locate resources within the network. You can still have a bunch of the relays invisible whos IPs are not propagated. Im not sure about how this would affect there ability to detect the network, but it would surely make the network highly resistant. But then again resistance doesnt matter if jack boots come knocking your door down. This feature could be turned on and off and maybe only used as a last resort if all other routes of connection fail. Not sure if this is a good idea but it would certainly add resistance and scalablity. ~TheMindwareGroup [email protected] PGP: 0xf4b6586f -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJS0wdOAAoJEKcLVST0tlhvbu8IAKiH46ctLmQhRtWZ2i6aHFiE auMEXXZpKzVJLTrzYq51qeVVkJSIdQrg7NxCB/3AA16eaKlCCX1kzDP45v7VBX+l LW5Auwvk6t+0JHIMznHTr2XTQr2CftpcW/CRz7cRiq314ROCqmxfEQHxdQ0Cys3Q GWQdE1CGYYr4ZsiBmHv3o8wXSlDU81Ovsn3bDeA98rY1m8HSW8PjEL8sPSWNTvD1 Bd2ZPX7appqa5+letJ29WPdrn82iImP8WF1WhzF7YAyNUoE7cGetqH/6K+DnBh+m +Adrd9YtFw4jIDZxkeytWoCX6FfUT9Sv6LtWheDVk7+9KJ7EfGE07Kz+CxFRA3o= =UfB0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
