On 10/06/2013 03:19 AM, [email protected] wrote:
> If there is any wiretap in place to monitor VPN then it would instantly drop > the connection because encryption has been tampered with - that's the whole > design for VPN. Once a VPN server detects a line that has been tampered with, > it will drop the connection and proceed to create a new connection. If the cable/fiber/etc just leaks a little signal to a passive tap, the tap is undetectable (except through changes in adversary behavior). > ---- Original Message ---- > From: "mirimir" > To: [email protected] > Sent: Sun, Oct 6, 2013, 02:41 AM > Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Silk Road taken down by FBI > On 10/05/2013 12:08 PM, Lunar wrote: > > [email protected] > (mailto:[email protected]): > Not necessarily, as long VPN provider doesn't keep logs of your > traffic. Like for instance, Phantom Peer works wonderfully since you > can use bitcoin for their service. > > Sorry, but no. > > It is easy to order a wiretap on the VPN uplinks (without even the > VPN operators knowing it) and to match packets going in and out. > > Nobody is plausibly claiming that VPN services are as anonymous as Tor > is. However, it's just as easy to tap uplinks for Tor routers. But of > course, there are (probably) many more Tor routers than VPN services. > And Tor routers are distributed among several spheres of influence, some > of which don't cooperate readily. > > Still, if one uses nested VPN tunnels from multiple providers in > suitably chosen spheres of influence, it will be nontrivial for > adversaries to install enough taps. Going through China, for example, > would be a serious roadblock for US-aligned TLAs. Even with four nested > VPN tunnels, latency and bandwidth are far better than using Tor. > > Finally, it's not either/or. It's easy to include Tor in nested VPN > configurations. Latency is typically over two seconds, but bandwidth is > adequate, especially for UDP traffic. > -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
