The NSA cannot always know who is behind Tor. This is due to the fast that tor uses a circut guard - middle - exit and unless the NSA can get access to the guard's isp, the middle's isp, and the exit's isp which more than one of them may be in a country that hates the US they can't see what your doing and prove it was you. Also even if you had a .pcap of each networks traffic it would be very difficult to put the information back together.
On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 5:04 PM, Ed Fletcher <[email protected]> wrote: > On 19/07/2013 9:23 AM, Tom Ritter wrote: > >> On 19 July 2013 06:35, Ed Fletcher <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On a related note, does having (what I assume is) a serious percentage of >>> the Tor relays in the Amazon cloud make it easier for the NSA to >>> compromise >>> anonymity? >>> >> >> I don't think a 'series percentage' of relays are in EC2. I would >> politely ask you to research that and prove me wrong if you feel >> strongly about it. There might be a serious percentage of bridges, >> but even that is questionable. (Related: Runa is giving a talk at >> Defcon on the Diversity of the Tor Network, so hopefully that will be >> a canonical answer to these sorts of questions once her slides go up >> in a couple weeks.) >> > > My mistake. I had thought that a bridge was a relay with extra > functionality. I'll have to do some more reading. And thanks for the tip > on the slides. I'll look for them after Defcon is done. > > Ed > > ______________________________**_________________ > tor-talk mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/**cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-**talk<https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk> > -- Nathan Suchy If this email was not intended for you delete it and any copies you have of it. The email was intended for "FirstName LastName". _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
