On Sa, Jul 06 2013, Roger Dingledine wrote: > One of the unfortunate properties of the Internet is how it's much less > decentralized than we'd like (and than we used to think). But there are > still quite a few different places that you need to tap in order to have > a good chance of beating a Tor circuit. For background, you might like: > http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004 > http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#DBLP:conf:ccs:EdmanS09
Yes, I like those papers. Yet, I’m confused on at least two levels. First, the current Tor Path Specification [1] selects nodes based on /16 subnets but does not consider AS paths as in those papers. DBLP:conf:ccs:EdmanS09 briefly mentions /16 subnets being “largely effective, though may not be stringent enough.” In fact, the more recent paper on LASTor [2] reports a “false-negative rate of 57% with the default Tor client” to detect snooping ASes. Second, I deliberately considered IXes, not ASes. From the paper by Murdoch and Zieliński [3]: “We suggest that existing models, based on Autonomous System (AS) diversity, do not properly take account of the fact that while, at the AS level abstraction, a path may have good administrative domain diversity, physically it could repeatedly pass through the same Internet eXchange (IX).” Although the paper by Murdoch and Zieliński is cited in DBLP:conf:ccs:EdmanS09, I fail to see that they address IXes at all. Best wishes Jens Footnotes: [1] https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git?a=blob_plain;hb=HEAD;f=path-spec.txt [2] http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#oakland2012-lastor [3] http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#murdoch-pet2007 _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
