> The simplest solution would be to use a VM. Run the VPN client on the > host machine, and the Tor setup in the VM. You could also run the VPN > client in a pfSense VM, and the Tor setup in another VM that uses the > pfSense VM as its LAN router.
This wouldn't work for me, I only have access to an outdated netbook, it can't run a single VM without bringing the computer almost to a halt, definitely not two. > How fast must new obfuscated bridges be created to replace old ones that > have been discovered? What's the mean lifetime of an obfuscated bridge? > > If obfuscated bridges don't last very long, it's very likely that ef2k's > ISP will quickly determine that he's using Tor, even if it can't > consistently block Tor use. > > If ef2k were using a VPN service, on the other hand, his ISP would need > to gain cooperation of his VPN provider, or snoop its exit traffic. And > he could choose VPN providers prudently to make either harder for his > ISP to accomplish. Or he could nest multiple VPNs. > > He could also use both VPNs and obfuscated bridges, if hiding Tor use > really matters. I am worried about this. It's why I don't want to rely on obfuscated bridges to hide my Tor usage, as they're not private and one day I could get flagged as using Tor if the ISP/military/police is monitoring connections to the bridge that I'm using at the time. VPN seems to be the best solution. Services like Airvpn offer additional services - VPN over SSH and VPN over SSL. VPN over SSL would hide that I'm using a VPN, unless they are monitoring connections to Airvpn servers, but even then they could only see that I'm using a VPN - *not* a big deal compared to Tor. _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
