How would you obfuscate the packets from the the Time/Size correlation in this 
example activity:

The user in California sends the E-Mail message from the web client provider, 
possibly 1Gmail to the 2Gmail address?

It is said that Tor Browser working with protocol that is made to send this 
message in 512 bytes packets.
The users Internet provider could log and see the approximate size of the 
message and in California for example the Google working with self-owned 
Internet Provider could correlate the approximate size of the send to the 
message sent from 1Gmail to the Entry Node with the size of the message 
received by 2Gmail. Does this threat exists?

Maybe the web application that could be opened in the same Tor Browser next to 
the web mail client and that application would generate some truly random 
traffic from some truly random generating server so the Internet Provider would 
see the all traffic including the random and would not be able to sufficiently 
correlate the Size? It would be wonderful if there could be such option in the 
Tor Browser. It would be awesome if the user could just use non-exit relaying 
for this purpose but not everyone is able to use it because of the NAT or 
Firewall. It looks that Time could not be obfuscated as easily as Size. Is the 
Size obfuscation possible within the current Tor protocol specification for the 
Tor Browser? If this kind of web application is possible and would obfuscate 
the Size from the Internet Provider? If Google is running the Entry Node or it 
is being hosted on Google, the Google would still be able to correlate the Size 
and Time?

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