On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 08:38:37PM +0000, adrelanos wrote: > what if everyone, also people in uncensored countries, would use > obfsproxy like traffic obfuscation for all circuits? > > Could that make website traffic fingerprinting [1] more difficult?
Obfsproxy transforms each byte, but it doesn't change timing or size. So I expect it does nothing against website fingerprinting. To protect against somebody recognizing that the obfsproxied flows are really Tor traffic underneath (i.e. by noticing a lot of 586-byte packets), you'll want a chopper as well as obfsproxy. See the Stegotorus paper: http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#ccs2012-stegotorus But ultimately, the good website fingerprinting attacks look at overall flow volume, so you'll want something that pads your sent/received flows so they collide with a lot of other potential websites, without adding too much overhead. For the latest website fingerprinting paper, see Rob Johnson's "Touching from a Distance" paper at CCS 2012. --Roger _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
